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Abstract
This thesis is a case study of the formation of new norms in international law.
The norms are those that concern animal protection. The thesis argues that international
trade law is playing a part in the development of international legal norms for animal
protection. The theoretical model applied is interactional international law, the theory of
the constructivist international legal scholars Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope.
Interactional theory posits that legitimate, binding international law arises from norms
based on shared understandings, exhibits specifically legal characteristics that correspond
to Lon Fuller’s criteria of legality, and is created, maintained and supported through
interaction of a practice of legality. The thesis argues that the international trade regime
gives rise to practices of legality that enable the development of animal protection norms
as contemplated by interactional theory. Two main practices of legality within
international trade governance are reviewed. One is adjudication in the WTO dispute
settlement system. The most important case here is the WTO’s 2014 decision on the EU
ban on trade in seal products, which was justified as a response to public moral concerns
about animal welfare and cruelty in the seal hunt. The second practice of legality
considered is law formation and implementation under new preferential trade agreements
outside the WTO system. The thesis analyzes affirmative obligations under
environmental side agreements, especially the Environment Chapter of the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The thesis
argues that, despite the long-standing hostility of animal advocates to economic
globalization, the legal structures of global economic governance provide important
opportunities to drive the development of robust and effective animal protection norms.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

This thesis is a case study of the formation of new norms in international law.
The norms are those that concern animal protection. I argue that international trade law
is playing a part in the development of those norms, and contributing to the process by
which they are potentially taking shape in the international legal system as global animal
law.
The most important contribution of international trade law so far is the WTO EC
– Seal Products case.1 In its ruling on this dispute over the European Union’s ban on
importing and selling seal products – legislation that the EU adopted to target animal
cruelty in seal hunting – the WTO recognized animal welfare as a serious policy
objective and confirmed that it can be a justification for relying on exceptions to
otherwise applicable international trade law obligations. The WTO arbitration panel that
decided the case in the first instance went further, expressing the importance of animal
welfare as an international concern. The panel stated that animal welfare is “an ethical
responsibility for human beings in general” and “a globally recognized issue.”2
International law has only recently begun to pay attention to the welfare of
individual animals, an ethical concern that arises from the intrinsic value of animals as

1

European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products (Complaints by Canada and Norway) (2013), WTO Docs WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R,
WT/DS400/R/Add1, WT/DS401/R/Add1 [EC – Seal Products Panel Report]. The panel’s decision was
reversed in part by the WTO Appellate Body: European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (Complaints by Canada and Norway) (2014)
WT/DS401/AB/R. The part of the panel decision that these quotations come from was not disturbed, and
the Appellate Body’s decision is consistent with the panel’s serious, thoughtful approach to animal welfare.
I refer to this case, consisting of both the panel and Appellate Body reports, as EC – Seal Products.
Chapter Seven is a detailed discussion of the case.
2
EC – Seal Products Panel Report, ibid at paras 7.409, 7.420.

1

sentient beings who experience pleasure and pain and pursue their own ends.3 By
contrast, the protection of wild animal species under international environmental law,
generally for use by humans as resources or to ensure that future generations can enjoy
their presence, is more established. Conservation and welfare have long been bifurcated
in international law.4 I use the term “animal protection” here to bring the two concepts
together. Although the split between them is ingrained into the way international lawyers
and legal scholars generally approach questions concerning animals, it is neither
inevitable nor immutable. After all, animals are both individuals and members of
species, and from their point of view, presumably, their survival and their freedom from
unnecessary suffering are not categorically distinct problems. WTO jurisprudence has
made some contribution to reintegrating animal conservation and welfare as components
of a more general norm of animal protection.5
An international network of scholars who identify with the project of global
animal law are advocating for recognition of holistic, ethically grounded and non-

3

The authors of the second edition of Lyster’s International Wildlife Law identify the “intrinsic
value” of an entity as “that which an entity possesses of itself, for itself, regardless of the interests and
utility of others,” and equate it to “moral value, indicating that all entities which exhibit such value can be
said to have a good of their own, and therefore to fall within the scope of moral considerability” (Michael
Bowman, Peter Davies & Catherine Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law, 2d ed (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 63). The intrinsic value of entities in the natural world, in particular
of “autopoietic entities” or individual beings that function towards the realization of their own ends, is
included in the values recognized in international environmental law (along with the instrumental and
inherent value of the natural world and its components) (ibid at 69).
4
Laura Nielsen, The WTO, Animals and PPMs (Boston: Brill, 2007) at 44 (noting that the
“general assumption is that protection of animals as natural resources in environmental law is species
protection, i.e. not protection of the individual specimen” (emphasis in the original)) and 83-106
(delineating animal welfare as a separate concern based on the moral concept that it is wrong to subject
animals to suffering and stress); Katie Sykes, “Globalization and the Animal Turn: How International
Trade Law Contributes to Global Norms of Animal Protection” (2016) 5:1 Transnational Envt’l L 55 at 5862; Werner Scholtz, “Injecting Compassion into International Wildlife Law: From Conservation to
Protection?” (2017) 6:2 Transnational Envt’l L 463 (arguing that international wildlife law focuses on
conservation and has a blind spot concerning the pain and suffering of individual animals).
5
Sykes, ibid.

2

anthropocentric norms of animal protection in international law.6 The material of global
animal law is a collection of treaty provisions, interstate practices and guidelines,
scholarship, and advocacy initiatives that together aim to ensure that the interests of
animals are represented in international law.7
Global animal law is at the early stages of establishing itself in international law,
and it has a long way to go. This thesis analyzes how far global animal law has
progressed in the process of evolving as part of international law, what is missing, and
how international trade law both has contributed to supplying some of the deficiencies,
and may continue to contribute in the future.
For this analysis I apply a methodology called interactional international law,
which was developed and articulated by the constructivist international legal scholars
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope – most importantly in their 2010 book Legitimacy and
Legality in International Law.8 Brunnée and Toope’s interactional theory describes how
international legal law is created and maintained based on three propositions. First, legal
norms arise from social norms based on consensus or “shared understandings.” Second,
legal norms are not the same as social norms, because they possess distinctive
characteristics, associated with the idea of the rule of law, which are essential to the
ability of legal norms to command adherence and compliance. Third, legal norms are

6

See, e.g., the work of scholars including Anne Peters, Charlotte Blattner, Sabine Brels and
Werner Scholtz, and the Global Animal Law Project web site at https://www.globalanimallaw.org/. A
more detailed discussion (with references to specific works) is set out in Section 4.2.
7
For an extended discussion of global animal law, see Chapter Four.
8
Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An
Interactional Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See Chapter Three, which sets out
the methodological approach in detail.

3

created, maintained and can become obsolete through a specific type of interaction that
exhibits the characteristics of legality, which they call “the practice of legality.”9
I apply the interactional framework to assess the emergence of animal-protective
norms in international law. I propose that international trade law is the site of “practices
of legality” that are helping to form, specify and maintain these norms. WTO
jurisprudence under the dispute settlement body created in 1995 (referred to here as the
DSB) is the practice of legality that has had the most impact, and it is the focus of most of
the analysis in this thesis.10 More modern WTO trade agreements outside the WTO
system (preferential trade agreements or PTAs), contribute something more: they
commonly link membership in trade blocs to positive obligations on matters including the
environment, and animal protection norms can be embedded in these provisions.
Interaction in the context of PTAs is another practice of legality that is leading to some
important work in the development of international legal norms for animal protection.11
The idea that international trade law is contributing to the formation of global
animal law may seem surprising. The central purpose of trade law is trade liberalization
and increased (human) economic welfare.12 Animal protection has little place in WTO
law except in the interstices, as an exception that WTO members13 can invoke to tradelaw obligations that would otherwise apply. The WTO is not an animal protection

9

Ibid at 15.
The analysis of WTO law is set out mainly in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.
11
For a detailed discussion, see Chapter Eight.
12
Nielsen, supra note 4 at 11 (noting that the goal of liberalizing trade “is the most important
goal” for the WTO).
13
I follow the terminology of the WTO treaties, and generally of WTO-related scholarship and
policy documents, by referring to nation states that are part of the WTO system as “members.”
10

4

agency.14 Its core objective is to increase the free of flow global trade, including,
increasingly, trade in animals and animal products. Trade in animal-derived foods,
animal fur and skins, live animals, and other products made from or made using animals
has increased exponentially since the 1970s as demand has grown, production methods
have become more intensive, and transport and refrigeration technology has advanced.15
Therefore, other things being equal, as the international trade regime advances its project
of facilitating and increasing world trade, it can be expected that animal suffering and
animal deaths will proportionally increase.
Yet the WTO’s dispute settlement body is the only international adjudication
body so far to have paid serious attention to animal welfare as an ethical concern and a
global value. To date, there has been no other statement affirming the importance of
animals in the international legal arena that emanates from such an authoritative source.
This WTO case is one of the most significant developments in the evolution of global
animal law, which is why the EC – Seal Products case is the principal focus of this thesis.
In the discussion that follows, I argue that the analytical tools of interactional
theory can assist in diagnosing what is holding global animal law back from generating
fully articulated legal norms that command fidelity. The same tools also help to pinpoint

14

Compare the statement on the WTO website (intentionally echoed here) concerning WTO
competency and the environment: “The WTO is not an environmental agency. Its members do not want it
to intervene in national or international environmental policies or to set environmental standards. Other
agencies that specialize in environmental issues are better qualified to undertake those tasks.” WTO, “The
Environment: A Specific Concern,” online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey2_e.htm>.
15
Clive JC Phillips, The Animal Trade: Evolution, Ethics and Implications (Wallingford and
Boston: CABI, 2015) at x-xiii.

5

how the institutions of international trade law – both the WTO and PTAs – can make up
for some of those deficiencies.
Interactional legal theory posits that international legal norms can only inspire
adherence if they are consensual. One of the most difficult problems for achieving
consensus on animal protection is conflicts over cultural values. Legal initiatives to
protect animals, especially in the international context, often run up against traditional
animal-use practices that are deeply rooted in distinct cultures. These conflicts are
especially difficult when they involve the traditional practices of Indigenous peoples,
whose rights have their own protections under international law. The EC – Seal Products
case thrust this conflict into the international trade dispute settlement arena, because the
EU’s ban on trade in seal products had an exemption for products that came from
traditional Indigenous hunts.16
The attempt to bypass the difficulty through this type of exemption is an example
of what animal rights scholars Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson call a “strategy of
avoidance” of the conflict between animal rights and Indigenous rights.17 Part of my
argument in this thesis is that the strategy of avoidance does not work. As embodied in
the EU’s seal products ban, it did not stand up to scrutiny in the WTO DSB. Although
the WTO confirmed that the EU could legally ban seal products, it found the exception
for traditional Indigenous hunts to be incoherent and unfair in its application.

16

See Chapter Seven.
Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, “Animal Rights and Aboriginal Rights” in Peter Sankoff,
Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes, eds, Canadian Perspectives on Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin, 2015)
159. See also discussion in Chapter Seven.
17

6

EC – Seal Products therefore reminds global animal law scholars of the
imperative to engage in a deeper discussion over these matters than the strategy of
avoidance allows, so as to work out consensual principles on animal protection. This is
another way (in addition to recognizing animal welfare as a serious ethical responsibility
for humanity) in which the WTO EC – Seal Products case has contributed to the
possibility of generating international animal protection norms grounded in an
overlapping ethical consensus. Cultural differences in the weight accorded to animal
interests, and the specific ways that those interests are balanced with other values, are
real. Interactional theory teaches that genuinely legal international norms need a
foundation in the place where different cultural perspectives overlap. The imposition of
one perspective on another (regardless of their relative moral worth) cannot ground
robust international law. Nor can solutions that try to bypass conflicts by simply
exempting or carving out cultural practices and avoiding engagement on how tradition
and animal protection can coexist.
This thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter Two, I set out an overview of
discussion in scholarship and advocacy discourse on the relationship between animal
protection and international trade. I argue that there has been a significant shift in this
discussion, with EC – Seal Products marking a turning point.18 Critics of international
trade law used to consider it one of the greatest threats to progress on the protection of
animals, in both domestic and international law. Some still do, but the predominant
opinion has shifted towards seeing the WTO as less of a threat to animals than was once

18

As I argue below, that shift can be seen in some of the scholarship summarized in Sections 2.3

and 2.4.

7

feared. Some scholars have even drawn attention to the potential for environmental
provisions in PTAs to work as a basis for international cooperation for animal protection.
Chapter Three sets out the methodological approach, international interactional
law, in detail.
Chapter Four examines the phenomenon of global animal law. This chapter
explains why many animal law scholars and advocates see a need for a transnational
approach to animal protection, and where animal protection norms are beginning to
emerge in international law. I discuss some of the key legal materials, scholarly work
and advocacy on protection of the environment, animal welfare and animal rights. I
apply the interactional framework to assess how global animal law is faring as animal
advocates work for its establishment as part of international law. The chapter also
identifies specific problems that interactional theory points to and that practices of
legality under international trade law could help to resolve.
Chapter Five is an overview of international trade law, focusing on the WTO and
its antecedents. The chapter explains the origins and development of the international
trade regime, from the classical liberal economic theories that provided an ideational
justification for free trade, through the creation of a multilateral trade law framework
after the Second World War, to the creation and evolution of the WTO. This chapter also
sets out a summary of the key legal principles under WTO law that are relevant to the
trade-animal protection relationship.
Chapter Six examines some prominent controversies over animal protection and
trade law that arose before the Seal Products case. This chapter looks at trade fights over
8

animal mortality due to fishing bycatch; fur; farmed animal welfare; and cosmetic testing
on animals.
Chapter Seven is an extended analysis of the WTO EC – Seal Products decision.
This chapter describes the background to the EU seal ban and the two WTO decisions (at
the panel and the Appellate Body) in detail. I also explore how the problems with the
exemption for traditional Indigenous hunting in the EU legislation exemplify both the
attractiveness and, ultimately, the unsustainability of the “strategy of avoidance.”
Chapter Eight shifts focus from the WTO to preferential trade agreements, with a
particular focus on the new Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership19
and its Environment Chapter. This chapter explains the emergence and significance of
modern PTAs, especially the relatively new category of large super-regional agreements
with ambitious governance provisions that have been labeled “mega-regional trade
agreements” or MRTAs, of which the CPTPP is an example. The chapter describes
international collaboration efforts for animal protection under PTAs and the potential for
more significant and extensive work on this front under the CPTPP. I also look at the
EU’s efforts to include specific animal welfare obligations in its PTAs. Finally, I analyze
these initiatives using the tools of interactional theory, identifying how practice under
PTAs can potentially help to address some of the deficiencies that global animal law
faces – especially with respect to compliance mechanisms and enforcement.

19
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, 8 March 2018, [2018]
ATS 23 (entered into force on 30 December 2018 for Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and
Singapore, and entered into force 14 January 2019 for Vietnam), referred to here as both the CPTPP and
the TPP. For more, see Chapter Eight.
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Chapter Nine is the conclusion.
The emergence of animal protection as a global concern (a “globally recognized
issue,” in the words of the EC – Seal Products panel) is linked to and shaped by debates
and legal reform initiatives at the domestic level in many countries. As one recent article
considering the definition of animals as (mere) property in US law, put it, “[s]ociety is in
a period of accelerated evolution regarding how we view the status of animals.”20 This
statement is also true of international society. As the world grows increasingly
interconnected and interdependent, such developments and their implications are unlikely
to be limited to a particular country or part of the world.
Eyal Benvenisti has described the changing nature of sovereignty using an
insightful metaphor: whereas sovereignty used to be understood as “akin to owning a
large estate separated from other properties by rivers or deserts,” today it is “more
analogous to owning a small apartment in one densely packed high-rise that is home to
two hundred separate families.”21 In this global high-rise, the policy choices and
regulatory actions of each small apartment are unlikely to work effectively unless there is
cooperation and coordination with the other residents. This is as true of measures to
enhance the protection of animals as it is in other areas. As Anne Peters has argued, “[i]n
times of globalization, regulation at the domestic level is insufficient to address animal
welfare and, to be effective, needs to be complemented by international rules.”22

20 Richard L Cupp, Jr, “Animals as More than ‘Mere Things,’ But Still Property: A Call for
Continuing Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm” (2016) 84 U Cinn L Rev 1023 at 1033.
21 Eyal Benvenisti, “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to
Foreign Stakeholders” (2013) 107:2 AJIL 295 at 295.
22 Anne Peters, “Global Animal Law: What It Is and Why We Need It” (2016) 5:1 Transnat’l
Envt’l L 9 at 11-13.
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Animals need legal norms for their protection at the global level. Whether such
legal norms will truly crystallize, and be effective, is not yet clear. But some seeds have
been planted. The view that the human-animal relationship has global or universal
implications and transcends national boundaries is gaining traction, and there is
increasing evidence of animal protection establishing a foothold in international law.
Trade law has already played a part in articulating and applying international legal norms
that protect animals. It has the potential to continue to do so, and to do more in building
positive collaboration and capacity-building in international animal protection.
Perhaps the most important message of this thesis is a practical one. Animal
advocates have good reasons to be skeptical about globalization and international trade
law, but at the same time they should not overlook the potential of international trade law
as a tool that, at least potentially, can be put to work in furthering their objectives at the
international level.
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Chapter 2
2.1

The Sea Change of Seal Products

Introduction

This chapter situates the analysis presented in this thesis in the context of recent
scholarship and intellectual debate about the relationship between trade and animal
protection, beginning around the creation of the WTO in 1995. I divide the scholarship
into three stages. The stages are roughly, but not strictly, temporal and sequential. Ideas
that can be identified with each of the stages coexist in the research throughout the period
being discussed, but there has been a discernible shift over time towards a somewhat
more positive assessment of how international trade law affects animal protection, with
EC – Seal Products marking a significant pivot point. The “stages” are used here not
exactly to present a picture of a teleological progression, but more as a convenient
taxonomy for organizing the scholarship and identifying trends and emerging currents in
it.
Stage one, beginning with the leadup to creation of the WTO and the debates over
conflict between trade and progressive policies that have played such a prominent part in
the WTO’s history, is characterized by deep skepticism, even hostility, on the part of
animal advocates towards international trade and trade law. Stage two is where we are
now: a period of transition from the skepticism of stage one, or perhaps a partial
tempering of that skepticism, with thoughts that WTO law, at least, may not be as much
of an impediment to animal-protective policies as we used to fear. Stage three is about
what may be emerging: the potential for trade law not just to stand in the way of the
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development of animal protection norms, but also to make a positive contribution to that
development.

2.2

Stage One: “A Malign Influence”

In 1994, just before the creation of the WTO, Daniel Esty published an influential
analysis of the relationship between trade and the environment, Greening the GATT.1
Esty’s starting point was the conflict between the world views of “environmentalists” and
“free traders.” Environmentalists generally regarded the trade regime with trepidation:
“[t]rade liberalization viewed through the environmentalists’ lens seems to invite
increased pollution, lost regulatory sovereignty, an anti-environmental counterforce
driven by the desire for jobs and profits, and policymaking by obscure, unaccountable,
business-oriented international bureaucrats.”2
The tension between animal protection and trade is analogous to the tension
between trade and the environment. These two areas also overlap, because
environmental protection encompasses aspects of biodiversity and the conservation of
animal species. From the point of view of animal advocates, trade liberalization appears
to bring with it the risk that domestic rules intended to protect animals will be found
inconsistent with international trade obligations, a threat that domestic and regional
lawmakers will be discouraged from moving forward on animal protection out of fear that

1

Daniel C Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future (Washington: Institute
for International Economics, 1994).
2
Ibid at 2.
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such initiatives could violate trade rules, and an anti-animal counterforce that elevates
profit and economic development over ethical concern for animals.
An analysis of the WTO rules that is representative of this point of view is Peter
Stevenson’s article on the WTO published in Animal Law Review in 2002, quite early in
the WTO’s history.3 Stevenson is an English lawyer and the Chief Policy Advisor of
Compassion in World Farming.4 Stevenson’s article expresses the apprehension, widely
shared by animal advocates when the WTO replaced the GATT, that the new and
strengthened multilateral trade regime would have severe negative consequences for
animal protection. There were good reasons for such pessimism. Before the WTO was
created, the dispute settlement system under the GATT had taken an interpretive
approach that constrained the ability of GATT parties to protect animals if by doing so
they affected trade, especially in its rulings against the US concerning its ban on imported
non-dolphin-safe tuna.5 The GATT tuna/dolphin decisions were problematic for animal
protection, but the GATT dispute settlement system was relatively weak, and the US had
the option of rejecting the rulings – which it did.
By contrast, when the WTO was created in 1995, it had a new, strong, mandatory
dispute settlement system whose rulings WTO members were legally obligated to adhere
to: the DSB.6 The stronger WTO enforcement mechanism, combined with treaty rules
extending trade disciplines into new areas, raised concern that WTO members’ right to

3

Peter Stevenson, “The World Trade Organisation Rules: A Legal Analysis of Their Adverse
Impact on Animal Welfare” (2002) 8 Animal Law 107.
4 Compassion in World Farming, “Peter Stevenson - Chief Policy Advisor,” online:
<https://www.ciwf.org.uk/about-us/our-staff/peter-stevenson/>.
5 These GATT rulings, and the rest of the history of the dolphin / tuna dispute, are discussed in
Chapter Six.
6
See Section 5.4.2.
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regulate for the protection of animals would be seriously constrained by the new
multilateral trade regime. A trade regime with teeth, coupled with the interpretive
approach established under GATT that paid little deference to nontrade policy objectives,
looked like a deadly combination for animals.
Stevenson’s assessment of the effect of trade rules on animal protection was
disconcerting. He argued that GATT rules had “already had an immensely damaging
impact on animal protection rules,” both in application (as in the tuna/dolphin rulings)
and also simply by putting lawmakers off taking action to protect animals, because of
their worry that such initiatives might be found to violate trade disciplines.7 Two pieces
of proposed legislation in the EU, a ban on marketing cosmetics tested on animals and a
ban on imports of fur from countries that permit the use of leghold traps, had been
“severely diluted” because of fear that they might violate GATT.8 EU rules phasing out
battery cages for egg-laying hens provided for a review in 2005, prior to the rules coming
into force, for compliance with WTO rules (among other factors).9 Thus it appeared that
unless WTO rules were reformed “to enable the E.U. to prevent its farmers from being
undermined by cheap battery egg imports, it may decide not to go ahead with its own ban
on the cage.”10
Stevenson argued that unless the trade rules were reformed (or their interpretation
changed) “they are likely to continue to exercise a malign influence on future attempts to
secure improved standards of animal welfare.”11 He did, however, see reason for
7
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9
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“cautious optimism” in some recent developments, including signs of a more flexible
approach to interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body.12
Other legal scholars interested in animal protection shared Stevenson’s skepticism
about the effect of WTO rules on progress for animals. In 1998, not long after the WTO
and its strengthened compliance process came into existence, Stuart Harrop (a professor
of wildlife management law) and David Bowles (an international specialist with the UK
RSPCA) wrote that “environmental and animal welfare constituencies are likely to regard
the long-term consequences of the new WTO regime as threatening existing or future
legislation.”13 Harrop and Bowles find “sufficient evidence to show that the WTO
regime presents a barrier to the development of international animal welfare legislation,
and may hinder the development of internal legislation.”14 They point out that the
decisions of the WTO’s DSB are now binding, and can no longer be “set aside” as the US
did in the past with the GATT tuna-dolphin rulings.15
Harrop and Bowles note the contrast between animal welfare and the environment
in the WTO system. The WTO responded to growing pressure to work on clarifying the
relationship between trade and environment by creating the Committee on Trade and
Environment.16 Animal welfare, however, at that point simply was not being addressed at
the WTO; it “has not been mentioned at any of the CTE discussions and is not on the
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agenda of the WTO in any of its official [fora].”17 Harrop and Bowles’s prognosis for the
future of animal welfare in the international trade regime is not optimistic:
What is clear, in the midst of the uncertainty over the relationship
between the multilateral trade regime and animal welfare (and other
moral issues of international concern), is that the gulf between the two
will only continue to grow as measures continue to be inhibited either
by the decisions of dispute panels or through regulators downgrading
legislation enacted in response to overwhelming public support.18
Laura Nielsen’s The WTO, Animals and PPMs,19 published in 2007, is the most
extensive analysis so far of the relationship between WTO law and animal protection.
Nielsen’s take is similar to Stevenson’s, in that she sees WTO law as fundamentally
inimical to animal protection and especially to progress on animal welfare. Nielsen notes
that “the WTO has interfered with the ability for the members to enact trade measures to
protect the environment or animal welfare, because these measures are most likely
inconsistent with the substantive obligation under the GATT,” and can only be justified
under the policy exceptions in WTO law.20
Like Harrop and Bowles, Nielsen sees the different footings of animal welfare and
the environment in the WTO system as significant. For her, this distinction is
appropriate, because these two matters have with different textual foundations in the
WTO treaties and different philosophical bases. Protection of the environment, Nielsen
argues, is based in the anthropocentric principle that preserving biological diversity
benefits humans, whereas protection of animal welfare is based on moral
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considerations.21 Nielsen observes that protection of the environment has a much more
solid footing in international law generally as well as in WTO law.22 Nielsen also sees a
threat to non-trade priorities (including animal welfare) in the strength of the WTO’s
governance structure, which she describes as amounting to a “global governance
monopoly,” with “apparently little concern for the environment and even lesser for social
issues.”23
Edward Thomas’s 2007 article on the potential WTO implications of the EU’s
regulation requiring higher welfare standards for broiler chickens is subtly more
optimistic about the compatibility of international trade law and animal welfare.24
Thomas acknowledges that animal welfare advocates generally see free trade agreements
as holding back progress.25 But he argues that import restrictions on broiler chickens
produced at lower welfare standards, if carefully drafted to meet the requirements of
WTO law, could survive scrutiny and could “open the door to more national import
restrictions aimed at improving animal welfare.”26 Thomas notes that decisions emerging
from dispute settlement at the WTO are fairly flexible, allowing more room for the
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application of policy exceptions than was the case under GATT, and indicating that an
animal welfare measure might be justified as a matter of morality.27
Thomas also summarizes some criticisms raised by animal welfare advocates of
the WTO’s interpretive approach to the relevant provisions of the treaties. He argues that
the DSB should take those arguments into consideration and “re-evaluate its
interpretation of several key components of GATT” to address problems and
inconsistencies that the critics have brought to light.28 In the end the proposed import
restrictions Thomas discusses did not make it into the broiler chicken legislation that the
EU adopted, so a test of his argument that trade-related animal welfares could survive
WTO scrutiny would have to wait for a later day.
By this time, the conflict that would eventually result in the EC – Seal Products
decision was already starting to emerge. The EU adopted a measure banning imports and
sales of seal products in 2009, following earlier similar actions by some member states.29
Since the legislation mainly affected imported seal products (and, arguably, was
motivated by a goal of targeting and pressuring Canada’s sealing industry), it became
apparent that a trade conflict might ensue. On the positive side, although commentators
like Stevenson had pointed out the way the chilling effect of a risk of trade litigation
could deter legislators from acting to protect animals, the EU had proceeded with its seal
ban anyway and seemed prepared to defend it at the WTO. But trade scholars continued
to see reason to doubt that the WTO would permit an import ban driven by moral
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concerns about animal cruelty outside the enacting jurisdiction to stand. Peter
Fitzgerald’s 2011 analysis of the WTO-legality of the ban (written after the EU adopted
the legislation, but before the WTO case) finds it “very unlikely” that the seal products
measure would be justified under the public morals exception in trade law.30 Fitzgerald’s
analysis predicts that the WTO would construe the public morals exception narrowly,31
and would find the seal products ban as drafted not to be narrowly tailored to its
objectives, and also to be arbitrary in some aspects of its application. Like Thomas,
however, Fitzgerald sees possibility for a trade measure motivated by animal welfare
concerns to be carefully drafted in such a way that it could hold up in a WTO dispute.
Bruce Wagman and Matthew Liebman’s 2011 book on comparative and
international animal law, A Worldview of Animal Law, summarizes the relationship
between animal welfare and the WTO in a way that is consistent with Stevenson’s view,
almost a decade earlier, that trade rules were a “malign influence.” They see the effect of
the WTO on animals as an impediment to progress on animal protection at best, and as
potentially increasing inhumane treatment of animals:
Because a nation cannot discriminate against another nation for using a
certain method of producing an animal product, commerce and WTO
compliance may promote the inhumane treatment of animals in other
countries, or at least delay a change in practices … the global
community is thus hindered in its ability to move towards more humane
practices by the strict limitations of the international trade rules …
Perhaps the biggest barrier to such a change is the fact that the WTO
has never had even a secondary focus on animal issues. It is primarily a
market economy organization, and its rules are focused almost
exclusively on maximizing the function of the global market. Neither
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general nor specific animal welfare issues have ever been a topic of
consideration for the WTO.32
To sum up, all of these scholars see a real risk of WTO law impeding progress on
animal protection. At best, they see a narrow possibility that animal welfare measures
could be crafted so as to be found WTO-legal. The picture here is of a fundamentally
antagonistic relationship between trade law and animal protection.
2.2.1 Beyond the WTO: Mega-Regional Trade Agreements as a
Threat to Animals
There are many trade agreements outside the WTO system, including bilateral
treaties, regional trading blocs, and, more recently, very large agreements among multiple
parties that span large sections of the globe. Non-WTO trade agreements generally are
referred to here as preferential trade agreements (PTAs), and the relatively new category
of big multiparty trade partnerships are referred to as mega-regional trade agreements
(MRTAs). Both types of trade agreement are analyzed in detail in Chapter Eight.
For the purposes of this chapter, what is important to note is that the scholarly and
advocacy discussions around the relationship between animal protection and trade also
extend to PTAs, which are becoming more important as ambitious new agreements re-set
the rules of international trade. PTAs and especially MRTAs aim to increase trade
liberalization and extend into areas that WTO law does not address. For some observers,
this development is an amplification of the “malign influence” of trade law, evidence of
an ascendant economic globalization agenda that will be even more inimical to animal
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protection reform efforts both domestically and internationally. Animal advocates fear
that the more aggressive integration agenda under new PTAs will result in dilution of
regulations for the protection of animals, bringing them down to the level of the trading
partners with weaker animal protection laws.
This concern was especially visible in the negotiations between the EU and the
US to create a new Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that aims to
liberalize trade between the world’s two largest economies.33 The EU has some of the
world’s most progressive laws on animal protection, and animal welfare rules are
generally much less strict in the US. Eurogroup for Animals, a civil society lobbying
organization that focuses on improving animal welfare in the EU,34 sounded the alarm
about the potential for regulatory integration under the TTIP to undermine Europe’s
relatively high standards for animal welfare, and kept pressure on EU officials to ensure
that animal protection remained a salient issue in the negotiations.
Eurogroup for Animals launched a Trade and Animal Welfare project in 2015,
largely “as a response to the realisation amongst the membership that something must be
done about TTIP.”35 Eurogroup for Animals worried that regulatory cooperation under
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TTIP would put animal welfare at risk, and welcomed the suspension of TTIP
negotiations in 2016 because “the deal was shaping up to be a bad one for animals.”36
In a similar vein, a coalition of civil society groups (including the Institute for
Agriculture and Trade Policy, Compassion in World Farming and Friends of the Earth
Europe) released a briefing note in 2015 describing TTIP as “a Trojan Horse that will
threaten our food safety and environment,”37 decrying language on animal welfare in the
EU negotiating proposals as nonbinding and “so weak that it may put animal welfare
standards at risk,” and warning that regulatory harmonization would undermine EU
animal welfare rules by allowing lower-welfare US products to be imported with no
requirement of compliance with the higher EU standards.38

2.3

Stage Two: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?

Even as scholars were articulating their concerns about the “malign influence” of
trade rules on animal protection, some of the analyses discussed above recognized that
things might not be irredeemably bad, and that there is at least potentially space within
trade law for animal protection objectives to be pursued. As the WTO dispute settlement
system has matured and generated a substantial body of jurisprudence, it has become
clear that the DSB and particularly the WTO’s Appellate Body is sensitive to the need to
balance trade with legitimate regulatory purposes. The DSB has carefully crafted its
decisions to achieve that balance, by contrast with the more restrictive approach under
36
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GATT.39 A separate, relevant development is the growing profile of animal protection as
a matter that is taken increasingly seriously both locally and at the international level. As
Chapter Four explains, internationally there is now an emerging body of rules, principles,
proposals and law reform efforts that some scholars are referring to as “global animal
law.” Animal protection is an international governance problem that was not prominent
when the WTO treaties were negotiated in the 1990s. Since then, it has gained
recognition as something that deserves to be given weight in the balance between trade
liberalization and non-trade social values.
EC – Seal Products was the first case to assess the compatibility of a trade
measure based on animal welfare objectives with WTO law. Thus, the case is an
important test of just how much of a “malign influence” and an obstacle to progress on
animal protection WTO law actually is in the context of a fully litigated dispute. And the
answer is: it is not as bad was previously feared.
As the EC – Seal Products case was proceeding through the WTO system, Robert
Howse and Joanna Langille published an article arguing that WTO law should be
interpreted to have enough flexibility and deference to local policy choices to permit
moral legislation based on expressive, rather than purely instrumental, rationales to
stand.40 That is, measures designed in part to express moral outrage towards a practice
that harms animals – and not just to function as a practical way of limiting animal
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suffering – should be recognized as defensible under the public morals exception in WTO
law. As Howse and Langille argue, “[l]egitimate, well-founded, moral justifications such
as respect for animal welfare and repugnance at complicity with cruelty to animals should
not be dismissed as grounds for regulation, nor treated in a narrow and skeptical
fashion.”41
Howse and Langille propose that the interpretive approach they recommend is
essential to reflect the very wide diversity of cultural traditions, moral positions, and
ethical views in the WTO membership.42 To impose conformity in too heavy-handed a
way would jeopardize the legitimacy of the WTO.43 Howse and Langille find ample
grounds in prior WTO case law to support this approach. Anticipating the WTO ruling in
EC – Seal Products, they predict that the outcome will allow space in WTO law for
morally motivated animal protection legislation.
In a follow-up article in 2015, after the WTO had ruled in the EC – Seal Products
case, Howse, Langille and I assess the case as “a highly significant if partial victory for a
pluralist approach,” praising the DSB’s “open-textured approach to the public morals
exception” while noting that there are still some problems with the decision from a
pluralist perspective.44 (For a detailed discussion of the EC-Products decision, see
Chapter Eight.)
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Overall, EC – Seal Products confirms that WTO law allows fairly generous scope
for the expression of moral positions in legislation, and it leaves no further room for
doubt that animal welfare is a recognized and important justificatory basis for legislation
affecting trade. We also note in that article that the WTO “took into account the growing
global tendency towards taking animal welfare seriously in concluding that it could be a
component of the public morals exception,” and we anticipate that the decision “open[s]
the door to future animal welfare defenses and provide[s] an important endorsement for
the protection of animal welfare.”45
Both the reasoning and the outcome of EC – Seal Products suggest that
international trade law is not as damaging to animal protection as scholars feared in the
1990s and early 2000s, at least with respect to progress on animal welfare at the domestic
level. But what of progress in international law? As discussed above, Harrop and
Bowles found evidence that the WTO legal regime was a barrier to the development of
international animal law. By contrast, Charlotte Blattner argues in a 2016 article (after
the EC – Seal Products decision) that the recognition of animal sentience and animal
welfare in WTO case law have actually enhanced the international discourse on these
matters and support the protection of animal interests at the global level.46
Blattner notes that existing international legal frameworks for animal protection
are preoccupied with conservation, largely anthropocentric in their concern with
preserving animals for the future benefit of humanity, and demonstrate little recognition
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of the interests or ethical significance of animals in their own right.47 In her view, WTO
law, especially the EC – Seal Products decision, has “introduced the possibility of
legitimizing the global protection of animal interests.”48 At the same time, Blattner
recites the many inadequacies of WTO law as a legal mechanism for animal protection at
the global level, including the fact that “under WTO law, members are not required to
provide a certain level of welfare for animals” but are only (at best) permitted space in
which they may choose to do so.49 Blattner concludes that although “[f]or many decades
up until the present day, the WTO has been identified as a major obstacle for national and
international efforts to further animals' interests,” international trade law may be “less of
a wolf in this game. Rather, it might turn out to be the sheep in wolf’s clothing.”50
David Favre, a leading animal law scholar who has advocated for many years for
an international instrument to protect animals, sums up the state of play in a recent book
chapter. Favre observes that the lack of express reference to animal welfare in the WTO
treaties leaves animals vulnerable because the WTO regime “may be the most important
legal framework regarding animals as it controls international trade of live animals and
animal products, such as meat and skin.”51 To this extent, Favre echoes the negative (or
Stage One) view of the WTO as an impediment to progress on animal protection. But,
noting the EC – Seal Products panel’s acceptance of moral concern about seal welfare as
an acceptable justification for the EU seal products ban, Favre observes that “[t]his seems
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to open a new door of animal welfare considerations,” although it is “too soon to suggest
the potential scope of this new path.”52
In short, the Stage Two view of the trade-animal protection relationship is mixed,
but cautiously optimistic by comparison with the grim predictions of Stage One.

2.4

Stage Three: Towards “Syncretic Norms”?

Looking ahead, there are reasons to believe that more significant developments on
trade and animal protection may occur not at the WTO but in the context of new PTAs,
especially MRTAs, which typically bind members to a set of affirmative obligations on
social issues.53 In the case of MRTAs in particular, these new norms have systemic
influence that potentially extends beyond the parties to the agreement. Although there
are no PTAs with fully elaborated commitments on animal welfare standards, there are
references to animal welfare in some agreements negotiated by the EU, and modern trade
agreements typically include detailed, legally binding commitments on the environment
that encompass obligations concerning the protection of animal species.54
Although these projects to liberalize international trade do still risk increasing
aggregate animal suffering by intensifying the international trade in animals and their
products (as the critics discussed under Stage One have highlighted), the emerging legal
frameworks under PTAs may also present fruitful opportunities for the articulation and
application of robust, positive international obligations on animal protection.
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Andrew Jensen Kerr has explored this possibility in a recent article looking at the
scope afforded to protection of animal interests in the Environment Chapter of the new
Trans-Pacific Partnership (the TPP, which I also refer to here as the Comprehensive and
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership55 or CPTPP).56 Kerr “question[s] the negative
juxtaposition of the TPP with animal welfare”57 by those who argue that “trade
liberalization is an inherent threat to animal well-being,”58 seeing promise in this new
legal regime for the articulation of animals’ interests. He observes that animal law and
environmental law have “conflicting goals,” because animal rights theory prioritizes
individual animals, while environmental law is about protecting ecosystems, but, at the
same time, they are “twin doctrines” with shared goals. 59
The fact that the TPP Environment Chapter includes obligations concerning
habitat management and trade in endangered animals helps to make the commonalities
and connections between the twin doctrines clearer, potentially supporting the
development of a “syncretic norm” of animal welfare (as the title of Kerr’s article puts it)
in the context of environmental governance. Kerr suggests that the presence of an
“animal welfare sensibility” implicit in the TPP Environment Chapter “might even help
to overcome the theoretic tensions in U.S. animal and environmental law.”60

55

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, 8 March 2018, [2018]
ATS 23 (entered into force on 30 December 2018 for Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and
Singapore, and entered into force 14 January 2019 for Vietnam).
56
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Kerr’s analysis suggests several intriguing possibilities in the relationship
between animal welfare and trade going forward. First, the integration of some level of
attention to animal interests into the TPP Environment Chapter is a further step in
bridging the long-standing dichotomy between environment and animal welfare, a divide
that is no longer as deep as it once seemed even in the WTO context (as Blattner’s take
on the WTO case law brings out). Along the same lines, I have argued elsewhere that
international trade law is helping to point the way to a more integrated concept of animal
protection that recognizes the connections between conservation and welfare.61 Second,
the TPP and other non-WTO trade agreements often include affirmative provisions
relevant to animal protection – the missing piece in WTO law, which recognizes animal
protection only in the context of exceptions to the general rules of the regime. Third, this
perspective of the relationship between animal protection and international trade law
opens up the possibility of seeing it not simply as one of opposition (where trade law
blocks progress on animal protection) but as an interaction where each has a role in
shaping and influencing the other.

2.5

Conclusion

The overview presented here of scholarship and commentary on the relationship
between animal protection and international trade law indicates that there has been a shift
in the way observers think about that relationship, with EC – Seal Products marking an
important watershed. Before EC – Seal Products, predictions about the potential fate of
animal protection in an ascendant international trade were gloomy. The prevailing view
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was that WTO law, and international trade more generally, is a force directly opposed to
strong animal protection measures. Perhaps, understandably, scholars saw a body of law
that primarily conceives of animals as articles of commerce as inevitably inimical to
animal interests, and to law reform efforts that seek recognition of animals as sentient
beings with inherent moral significance.
These concerns certainly are not unfounded, but, in retrospect, the analyses of this
period may unduly discount doctrinal arguments that animal protection measures can be
consistent with WTO law. EC – Seal Products not only confirmed that this was the case
– that WTO law does have room for animal welfare – but also acknowledged the
importance of animal welfare as a legislative objective and as an international value.
More recent scholarship sees in both WTO law and emerging trade regimes outside the
WTO the potential for a mutually constitutive interaction between international trade law
and global animal law.
If we look at the relationship of animal law and trade law as one of interaction and
a potentially productive encounter between legal regimes, rather than one of opposition
and blockage, then it starts to appear especially suitable for analysis through the lens of
constructivist legal theory.62 In the next chapter, I set out the methodological framework
used in this thesis: a constructivist methodology that is specifically concerned with how
international law forms through a process of interaction. This is the theory of
interactional international law developed by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope.63
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Interactional international law provides a theoretical vocabulary and theoretical tools that
enhance understanding of the mutually constitutive interactive process that work like
Blattner’s and Kerr’s has identified.
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Chapter 3
3.1

Methodological Framework: Interactional
International Law
Introduction

Chapter One, the Introduction, summarized my argument that international trade
law is contributing positively to the formation of global animal law. It also introduced
the theory of interactional international law, the theoretical model applied in this thesis to
analyze and understand both how international norms concerning animals are developing,
and the relationship of international trade law to that process of development. In this
chapter, I present a more detailed account of Brunnée and Toope’s theory of interactional
international law.1 This sets the stage for the application of the theory in the following
chapters, as a framework for understanding international trade law as the site of
“practices of legality” (in Brunnée and Toope’s terminology) that contribute to the

1

Most importantly, in Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [Brunnée & Toope, Legitimacy and Legality]. See
also Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an
Interactional Theory of International Law” (2000) 39:1 Columbia J Transnat’l L 19 [Brunnée & Toope,
“Elements of an Interactional Theory”]; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, “Interactional International
Law: An Introduction” (2011) 3:2 Int’l Theory 307 [Brunnée & Toope, “Introduction”]; Jutta Brunnée &
Stephen Toope, “Constructivism and International Law” in Jeffrey L Dunoff & Mark A Pollack, eds,
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 119 [Brunnée & Toope, “Constructivism and International
Law”]; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, “The Sovereignty of International Law?” (2017) 67 UTLJ 496
[Brunnée & Toope, “Sovereignty”]; Jutta Brunnée, “The Sources of International Environmental Law:
Interactional Law” in Jean d’Aspremont & Samantha Besson, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 960 [Brunnée, “Sources”]; Jutta Brunnée &
Stephen J Toope, “Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors: Are Powerful States Willing but Unable to
Change International Law?” (2018) 67:2 Int’l & Comparative L Q’ly 263 [Brunnée & Toope, “SelfDefence Against Non-State Actors”]; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, “Interactional Legal Theory, The
International Rule of Law, and Global Constitutionalism” in Anthony F Lang & Antje Wiener, eds,
Handbook on Global Constitutionalism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018) 170 [Brunnée & Toope,
“Global Constitutionalism”]; Jutta Brunnée, Book Review of International Law in a Transcivilizational
World by Onuma Yasuaki (2018) 59:2 Harvard Int’l L J 431.
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creation, development and maintenance of international legal norms concerning the
protection of animals.2
Brunnée and Toope’s theory of interactional international law is based on three
main propositions. The first is that “legal norms can only arise in the context of social
norms based on shared understandings.”3 The second is that “internal features of law,”
which they refer to as “criteria of legality,” underpin the obligatory nature of law and its
ability to command adherence.4 The third is that “legal norms are built, maintained, and
sometimes destroyed through a continuing practice of legality.”5
This Chapter is organized around those three components and the ways they
manifest in the development of international legal norms concerning animal protection:
the emergence of norms based on shared understandings; the distinctive nature of legal
norms; and the idea of practices of legality.

3.2

Why a Constructivist Methodology?

The theory of interactional international law starts with a foundation in
constructivist social theory, and its account of how norms come into being. A basic

2
This chapter revisits some of the same material and arguments that I have previously written
about in an article (Katie Sykes “‘Nations Like Unto Yourselves’: An Inquiry into the Status of a General
Principle of International Law on Animal Welfare” (2011) 69 CYIL 1 [Sykes, “Nations”]) and also in my
LLM thesis (Katie Sykes, The Beasts in the Jungle: Animal Welfare in International Law (LLM thesis,
Schulich School of Law, 2011) [unpublished] [Sykes, “Beasts in the Jungle”]). In this thesis, as in those
previous works, I examine the emergence of global animal law using the framework of interactional IL
theory. There are two significant, and related, differences between this project and the previous ones.
First, the development of global animal law has moved further along since those earlier analyses, an
evolution that is both manifested in and contributed to by the EC – Seal Products decision. Second, my
primary focus here is on the dialogue between the international trade law regime (specifically) and global
animal law (rather than the status of animal welfare in international law in general).
3
Brunnée & Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, supra note 1 at 15.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
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insight of constructivism is that social structures and the actors within them are mutually
constituted through interaction with one another.6 On this view, agents do not simply
create a structure in a one-way operation; the structure itself and participation in its
creation shape the actors and their ideas of what the structure should be and what its
purpose is, as well as vice versa. As Brunnée and Toope put it, “interests are not simply
‘given’ and then rationally pursued, but … social construction of actors’ identities is a
major factor in interest formation.”7 In other words, constructivists ask why actors have
their identities and interests: what makes them what they are, and what makes them want
what they want?
Applying this framework to international law, constructivist scholars see the
international legal system not simply as an artifact created by states in furtherance of their
interests, but also as shaping the identity of states and their interests, through its “ability
to reshape the discourse of the international community and state conceptions of what is
possible and even desirable in international relations.”8
This understanding of the relationship between agent and structure, and between
identity and social context, is fundamental to the constructivist approach to international
relations and international law. It is also an important point of contrast with realist or
rationalist accounts that take agents (which in the international legal system generally
means states) and their interests as given, and portrays international policies and laws as

6

Brunnée & Toope, “Elements of an Interactional Theory,” supra note 1 at 27. See also
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
at 21; John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social
Constructivist Challenge” (1998) 52:4 Int’l Organization 855 at 856.
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Brunnée & Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, supra note 1 at 13.
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outputs created by states in the pursuit of their interests and shaped primarily by the
power relations among them.9
The latter model (sometimes called realist, neo-realist, rationalist, neo-utilitarian,
neo-liberal, or materialist10) of how international relations and law work has been labeled
“objectivism” by Andrew Lang, following the use of the term in the social theory of
Pierre Bourdieu.11 By “objectivist” Lang means a theory that sees actors and their
interests as objective, material phenomena that exist independent of our ideas about them,
and with respect to international trade law, it yields a model in which “states bargain with
one another in pursuit of their own self-interest, typically seeking the greatest possible
market access for their exports while at the same time avoiding, as far as possible,
making market access commitments of their own.”12
What Lang calls “objectivism” also has much common ground with rationalist
theories of international law, which see international law as the outcome of states’
rational pursuit of their own interests.13 I follow Lang in mainly using the term
“objectivist” here, but it is roughly interchangeable with “rationalist,” a term I also use.

9

Brunnée & Toope, “Elements of an Interactional Theory,” supra note 1 at 31-32.
This list is admittedly a somewhat reductive grouping together of approaches that are not
identical, but they do have in common the premise that states create international policies and laws in the
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Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 164.
12
Ibid at 161.
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Objectivist or rationalist models of international law have undeniable intuitive
appeal and explanatory power. I share the view of Andrew Guzman, whose How
International Law Works is one of the leading rational-choice explanations of
international law, that in adopting one methodology there is no need to attack others or
prove them wrong, as there is “room within the study of international law for a
multiplicity of methodologies” and serious inquiries using a variety of different
methodological approaches can enhance understanding.14
Objectivism is in some ways very well suited to analyzing international trade law.
Undeniably, states’ rational pursuit of their perceived economic interests plays at least
some part in the creation of trade law. But objectivism falls short when it comes to
explaining the interpretive and ideological questions that permeate international trade
law, as Lang has shown15 (and as further discussed below).
Especially as a methodology for making sense of global animal law, the
objectivist approach has important limitations. In fact, an observer applying the
objectivist optic would probably conclude that there is no such thing as global animal
law. An account of international law as the product of competition among states pursuing
self-seeking interests could only see global animal law as epiphenomenal. Animals have
neither states, nor power; they may have interests, but they certainly have no means of
pursuing them in the context of international negotiation and lawmaking. It may perhaps
reflect the influence of objectivist ways of thinking about international law that when
14
Ibid at 21. As Brunnée and Toope note, constructivism seems to be quite well suited to
explaining phenomena in a way that is open to diverse perspectives, and many international relations
scholars reportedly use both constructivist and rationalist approaches. Brunnée & Toope, “Constructivism
and International Law,” supra note 1 at 125 and 125 n 1.
15
Lang, supra note 11 at 159-189.
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animal questions arise in international law they are sometimes marginalized as merely a
sentimental distraction from more serious problems,16 a manifestation of cultural
imperialism, 17 or a hypocritical mask for self-interest.18
The “animal turn”19 in international law looks quite different when observed
through the lens of constructivism and interactional theory. Constructivism defines
interests “in both material and non-material terms,” and examines “the role that culture,
institutions and norms play in shaping identity and influencing behavior.”20 That
approach allows more space for meaningful engagement with the cultural, ethical, and
ideational aspects of the human-animal relationship.
The basic principle of constructivism – that agents and structures are mutually
constitutive, and international politics and law are integrally bound up with ideas, values,
and ideological presuppositions – shapes both interactional IL theory and the analysis set

16

The moral and animal-protection arguments in support of the EU ban on seal products that was
at issue in EC – Seal Products have been categorized by some observers as sentimental and emotional,
rather than rational. See, e.g., Tamara Perišin, “Is the EU Seal Products Regulation a Sealed Deal?” (2013)
62 ICLQ 373 at 375 (asserting that an emotional reaction to the cuteness of seals may make some people
“intuitively biased” in favour of the EU ban). See further discussion in Section 7.4.1 below. Compare Will
Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson’s observation that the struggle for animal rights has been late to gain a
foothold in leftist political movements in part because of concern that “including animals in the Left’s
pantheon of just causes will diminish the very currency of justice and thereby erode the moral seriousness
with which human injustices are treated.” Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, “Animal Rights,
Multiculturalism and the Left” (2014) 45:1 J Social Philosophy 116 at 119.
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out in this thesis. In the simplest terms, the argument could be summed up as follows:
interests are not all that matters and not the sole explanation for international law; ideas
matter too; and interests do not exist independently of ideas. Constructivists
“[acknowledge] the importance of power and material interests” but at the same time
“focus attention upon the role that culture, ideas, institutions, discourse, and social norms
play in identifying and influencing behavior.”21
Objectivism is probably the dominant explanatory approach in international trade
discussions today,22 not only in academic but also in public discourse on trade. But there
is also a rich and deep tradition of constructivist scholarship of international economic
law, going back to the work of the constructivist political scientist John Gerard Ruggie.
Ruggie argued that the post-war system of international economic governance,
before the neoliberal turn of the 1970s and 1980s, was based on a shared sense of the role
and purpose of trade in international society and on a shared set of ideas about the
relationship between markets and social governance, generally accepting the legitimacy
of a fairly high level of state intervention in the economy to protect social welfare.
Borrowing terminology from Karl Polyani, Ruggie described the normative framework of
the postwar international economic legal regime as “embedded liberalism.”23 In this
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paradigm, international trade governance, like the other great post-war global institutions,
was for something: a shared project of international peace and prosperity.24
Post-war embedded liberalism in economic governance grew out of a particular
historical moment. It is no longer an accurate description of what Lang calls the trade
regime’s “normative orientation.”25 But Ruggie’s insights about economic governance
having a normative orientation and needing to be embedded in social purpose remain
powerful and illuminating.
Those insights provide an important corrective to the objectivist understanding of
the international trade regime as having no inherent purpose and being explicable simply
as the outcome of a competitive struggle between the participating states to further their
own interests or purposes. Lang recounts the objectivist view of how trade law is
generated as follows:
[S]tates bargain with one another in pursuit of their own self-interest,
typically seeking the greatest possible market access for their exports
while at the same time avoiding, as far as possible, making market
access commitments of their own, at least where such commitments
have domestic political costs. The outcomes of these negotiations, as
reflected in the texts of the WTO agreements, fundamentally reflect the
distribution of power between these state actors, so that the most
powerful states are typically able to demand more market access for
their exports than less powerful states.26
The objectivist understanding of the international trade regime as a content-empty
negotiating forum is also reflected in the WTO’s own presentation of itself on its web site
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Lang, supra note 11 at 41 (here focusing on the historical relationship between international
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as “[e]ssentially … a place where member governments go, to try to sort out the trade
problems they face with each other.”27 A sidebar on the same page on the WTO web site
picks out a quotation from a radio discussion of the WTO’s role, in which various
propositions were made about things that the WTO ought to do: “One of [the
participants] finally interjected ‘Wait a minute. The WTO is a table. People sit round the
table and negotiate. What do you expect the table to do?’”28
Constructivist analysis pays attention to what the objectivist model elides: the
ideological struggle and dialogue that are played out in, and constitutive of, the trade
regime. From this standpoint, we miss a lot if we think of the international trade regime
as merely an inert and value-neutral “table” that does not do anything. As Lang puts it,
the trade regime is a dynamic “mental world” that is intersubjective in nature, “a social
product, collectively produced.”29 It is both constituted by and constitutive of social
actors engaged in a struggle of ideas, values and interpretation.
This understanding of what trade lawmaking does and how it generates meaning
allows for deeper insight into the relationship between animal protection and trade law
than the objectivist approach can provide. An objectivist account of the subject is
certainly possible, but would not tell us much of interest. One could easily tell a story
about the increasing prominence of animal-protective norms in the context of the
international trade regime that focused exclusively states’ pursuit of their own selfinterest as they bargain around a table, with the negotiations resulting in treaty

27

WTO, “What is the World Trade Organization?” online:
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agreements reflecting the distribution of power among those states. Along those lines,
invocation of animal welfare as a basis for trade-law exceptions is sometimes associated
with fears that domestic industries in richer WTO members with relatively high animalprotection standards – the EU, for example – will be outcompeted by cheap imports from
(often poorer) countries with lower standards. An analysis that looked no further than
these material factors might well see expressions of concern for animal protection as
nothing more than a pretext for a member like the EU to limit access to its markets in the
pursuit of pure self-interest.
There is no serious question that the differentials in global power and economic
leverage that objectivist accounts highlight are part of the picture in international trade
negotiations and relationships. That said, objectivist, interest-based analysis does not
satisfactorily explain why, for example, the EU, would make efforts to enhance animal
protection in the trade context. If the EU is (and all the other players are also) driven
solely by a material interest in protecting its own industries, why not simply resile from
all its own animal-protection commitments? From the point of view of pure self-interest,
what is in it for any human nation to make animal protection part of its international
agenda? In this sense animal protection is a particularly instructive object lesson in the
limitations of what Lang calls “materialist and interest-based analyses.”30 Its place in
international law and in the international trade regime cannot be completely accounted
for with reference only to raw material interest, because in the end the decision to
prioritize the interests of other species must have an element of disregarding one’s own

30

Lang, supra note 23 at 84.

42

material interest and has to be driven by some sense of ethical obligation, however mixed
such motives may be with self-serving and material calculations.
Although I view the international trade governance system not as a mere “table”
but as a social institution with a social purpose (or purposes), both shaped by and shaping
the actors who participate in it, I do not mean to imply that the WTO or any other trade
agreement has an institutional role of creating or propagating a community of shared
values or norms in the thick sense, what Brunnée and Toope call a “shared global identity
or deep value coalescence.”31 Our world is too diverse for claims that international law
can or should achieve this type of strong substantive consensus to be either empirically
accurate or normatively appealing.
International trade law, with its relatively narrow focus on fair rules for economic
interaction, is an especially poor candidate for bringing about some kind of backdoor
global constitutionalism32 – and in particular is not a vehicle for imposing neoliberal
values, in the sense of promoting a “neoliberal normative vision for world order.”33 One
does not have to go so far as seeing the trade regime as an inert bargaining table detached
from any social purpose to keep a comfortable distance from the idea of trade law as a
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form of global constitutionalism instantiating a particular normative vision for world
order, neoliberal or otherwise.
But a more thorough and precise understanding both of the formation of legal
norms in the trade context and of the genealogy of international norms of animal
protection reveals that this story, although not exactly wrong, is incomplete. For one
thing, it is not the case that animal-protective norms are a creation of the West imposed
on the rest of the world. On the contrary, their instantiation in law, including domestic
law, is in part the product of international interaction and the cross-pollination of ideas
rooted in different cultures.34 The evolution of legal norms in the international trade
regime is better understood as the outcome of a collective process of interaction,
ideological struggle, and persuasion, rather than a simple imposition of the will of the
more powerful on the less powerful.
It is not that power relationships do not matter or are not reflected in the legal
texts that emerge from this process. They do, and they are. But a simple mapping from
power differentials to outcomes fails to account for the development of norms with a
specifically legal nature, characterized by persuasiveness, legitimacy, and the qualities
that generate a sense of obligation and a pull to compliance. 35
Brunnée and Toope’s interactional theory of international law is especially well
suited to analyzing the development of international legal principles concerning animal
protection, because it steers a middle course between objectivist or positivist theory
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(which would probably have little to say about animal protection in international law,
given its very limited reflection in treaty law or in power relations between states) and
natural law theory (which might consider animal protection to have a place in
international law as a universal moral principle, but can have less explanatory force when
it comes to analyzing the effects of supposed legal principles in influencing the behaviour
of international actors).36

3.3

Norms and Shared Understandings

3.3.1 The Constructivist Understanding of Norms
The first component of Brunnée and Toope’s interactional theory of international
law is the proposition that legal norms evolve out of social norms based on shared
understandings. This argument is based on constructivist accounts of how norms in
general (not just legal norms) come to be. As Brunnée and Toope observe,
constructivism’s account of “norm creation, evolution and destruction … has proven to
be the strongest bridging point between some international legal theorists and the
constructivists.”37
Brunnée and Toope define norms, at a high level of generality (that is, not limited
to legal norms), as “standards of behavior created through mutual expectation in a social
setting.”38 This high-level definition includes, but is not limited to, legal norms.39 The
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concept of shared understandings has common ground with accounts of how norms
generally come into being in international society, and Brunnée and Toope draw on the
work of other constructivist theorists who have analyzed the genesis and diffusion of
international norms.
Congruent with the constructivist concept of mutuality of agent and structure,
Brunnée and Toope see shared understandings as created through interaction in a social
context. Shared understandings are shared “precisely because they are maintained and
generated through social interaction.” 40 Once shared understandings exist, they, in turn,
influence the actors who generated them: “shared understandings become ‘structures’ that
shape how actors perceive themselves and the world, how they form interests and set
priorities, and how they make arguments or evaluate others’ arguments.”41
Brunnée and Toope posit that actors generate and maintain shared understandings
through social learning in “communities of practice,” a term borrowed from Emmanuel
Adler and others.42 This means that norms are not simply formed in people’s minds and
communicated to others, but created and maintained through an ongoing process of
negotiation and engagement in social practice. The practice shapes the identities and
relationships of those participating in it, just as much as the participants create the
practice.43 It should be noted that the word “communities” in “communities of practice”
does not necessarily imply egalitarian relationships or harmony, and is not intended to
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mask the unequal power relationships that sometimes characterize international
interaction.44
Brunnée and Toope also make use of concepts used by other constructivist
theorists of international relations to explain the process by which norms and shared
understandings are formed. One such conceptual tool is the idea that norms emerge in
stages of a life cycle or “norm cycle,” posited by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink.45 Another is Peter Haas’s account of norm construction through the activities of
“epistemic communities.”46 These accounts focus on the generation of norms by actors –
the agent rather than the structure side of the equation – and thus for purposes of
interactional IL theory they need to be supplemented by a focus on interaction in
communities of practice.
3.3.2 International Norms and Animal Protection
The idea of norms based on shared understandings, the norm cycle and epistemic
communities are all concepts that have resonance for observers of the evolution of animal
protection as a “globally recognized issue” and an ethical concern for humanity (in the
words of the EC – Seal Products panel47). These ideas about how norms evolve in

44

Ibid at 63.
Ibid at 57-59; Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change” (1998) 52 Int’l Organization 887.
46
Brunnée & Toope, ibid at 59-60; Peter Haas, “Epistemic Communities” in Daniel Bodansky,
Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007) 791 [Haas, “Epistemic Communities”]; Peter M Haas, “Introduction:
Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination” (1992) 46:1 International Organization 1
[Haas, “Policy Coordination”].
47
European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products (Complaints by Canada and Norway) (2013), WTO Docs WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R,
WT/DS400/R/Add1, WT/DS401/R/Add1 at paras 7.409, 7.420. See discussion in Chapter One.
45

47

international society are illuminating when applied to the evolution of global animal law
so far, and to offer some insight into its significance and potential next developments.
Finnemore and Sikkink define norms as rules of social behaviour that are
distinguished by their “prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of ‘oughtness.’”48 Norms
“involve standards of ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper’ behavior” that are inherently social: “We
only know what is appropriate by reference to the judgments of a community or a society.
We recognize norm-breaking behavior because it generates disapproval or stigma and
norm conforming behavior because it produces praise or, in the case of a highly
internalized norm, because it is so taken for granted that it provokes no reaction
whatsoever.”49
Two points can be made about this model of norms as knowable through social
judgment. First, it fits with Brunnée and Toope’s emphasis on the centrality of social
interaction to norm creation and maintenance. Second, it has explanatory power when
applied to the “accelerated evolution regarding how we view the status of animals”
observed by Cupp.50 Social judgments and expressions of approval or condemnation
about animals are changing, and the evolution of animal-protective norms becomes more
visible where that change is happening. Practices that only a short time ago – decades or
just years – were widely, unquestioningly accepted as appropriate and socially acceptable
(in a taken-for-granted manner) now generate disapproval and stigma, at least in some
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societies, and to some extent internationally. The normative landscape is shifting,51 so
significantly and quickly that people who have engaged in behavior once seen as
appropriate and unremarkable seem quite taken aback to find themselves suddenly
excoriated for it.
One example of this shift in the normative landscape is trophy hunting. In 2015, a
dentist from Minnesota called Walter Palmer on a hunting safari in Zimbabwe shot and
killed a lion known as Cecil, who was distinguished by his magnificent black mane, and
had been collared and tracked by researchers at Oxford University.52 The killing sparked
intense outrage around the world, reflecting not just the imperiled status of lion
populations but also the cruelty of the way Cecil was killed and the particular charisma he
had as an individual.53 The hunter faced prosecution for illegally hunting Cecil,
protestors picketed his dental practice, and he went into hiding.54 It must have been a
bewildering experience given that hunting is widely seen as a proper and acceptable, even
venerated, activity,55 and that objecting to trophy hunting would probably have seemed
like a fringe position not very long before the Cecil incident.
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Another example is the rapid fall from grace of entertainment facilities that keep
captive whales and dolphins, like SeaWorld in the US and Marineland and the Vancouver
Aquarium in Canada.56 For decades they have been beloved institutions; one scholar
descried SeaWorld as “one of the most popular and available versions of the wild that
contemporary American and international tourists can encounter.”57 Now, the normative
consensus on the acceptability of keeping large marine mammals in captivity to perform
and entertain has shifted. There are protestors outside the theme parks, investigative
journalists and documentarians exposing the conditions endured by the animals in those
facilities,58 and stricter regulation.59
A related point can be made about the status of animal protection in international
law. Norms operate in international law scholarship as much as in other social
institutions, and sometimes their invisible, taken-for-granted quality can determine what
is seen as fitting within a discipline like international law and what is not. Animal
welfare, as distinct from the protection of species and biodiversity, has not featured much
in international law or legal scholarship until recently.60 Global animal law scholars seek
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to bring animal protection into the fold of international law, by “erect[ing] a conceptual
basis and contribut[ing] to the practical development of the field by furnishing
appropriate legal arguments and concepts,” and “stimulat[ing] law reform by identifying
legal gaps.”61
The emergent status of animal law as a serious and identifiable phenomenon in
international law – that is, global animal law – is reminiscent of Finnemore and Sikkink’s
observations about the status of gender-focused and feminist scholarship in the field of
international relations. In Finnemore and Sikkink’s 1998 article, they observed that the
leading international relations journal International Organization had published only one
article related to gender or women in its first fifty years.62 They posit that this omission
may reveal the presence of a real but unarticulated norm: “there may have been a wellinternalized norm (with a taken-for-granted quality) that research on gender and women
did not constitute an appropriate topic for international relations scholarship.”63
Arguably, there has been a similar understanding, so obvious it has not needed to be
stated, that animal issues (insofar as they are distinct from environmental protection) do
not belong in international legal discourse or scholarship.64 Scholars of global animal
law are turning a critical light on that taken-for-granted assumption, exposing it,
questioning it, and changing it.
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3.3.3 The Norm Cycle
Finnemore and Sikkink identify three stages in the emergence of “life cycle” of a
norm in international society.65 The first stage is the emergence of a norm. At this stage,
proponents of the norm – “norm entrepreneurs,” in their phrase – persuade others to
recognize and adopt the norm and to elevate it to international status.66 Norm
entrepreneurs, whose role in getting a norm established at this stage is all-important, are
“agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their
communities.”67 They are “critical for norm emergence because they call attention to
issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets and dramatizes
them.”68
The second stage is widespread acceptance of the norm. At some point there is a
threshold level of acceptance by a critical mass of states, following which the norm
“cascades.”69 This stage is “characterized … by a dynamic of imitation as the norm
leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers.”70 The third stage is
internalization: the norm becomes internalized, and compliance with it is taken for
granted as a standard for good state behaviour.71
Finnemore and Sikkink do not make strong claims about which characteristics,
qualities or circumstances increase the chances that a norm will take hold transnationally
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and “cascade,” leaving the question open for further empirical investigation, but they do
summarize several plausible hypotheses from the literature.72
Certain formal characteristics, such as clarity and specificity, increase the chance
that a norm will be effective.73 This proposition resonates with the argument of
interactional theory (discussed below) that norms must possess characteristic qualities of
legality to become legal norms, and thus to be binding or to command fidelity.
In addition, analogy or similarity to existing norms may increase the chance of
acceptance.74 This quality of “adjacency” to already-established norms is especially
important, Finnemore and Sikkink argue, in international law, “since the power or
persuasiveness of a normative claim in law is explicitly tied to the ‘fit’ of that claim with
existing normative frameworks.”75
This observation helps to explain the rhetorical strategies of animal advocates
who borrow from and analogize to human rights frameworks, structuring claims on
behalf of nonhuman animals as analogous to established human rights norms both in
substance – for example, by pushing for recognition of animals’ basic rights to life,
liberty and freedom from torture) and in form (presenting these claims as “Universal
Declarations”).76 Peters describes these analogies as “transferable legal concepts,” noting
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that they borrow from “established legal institutions and concepts for the benefit of
human beings.”77 For example, the “five freedoms” for farmed animal welfare in
“structure and terminology are based quite clearly on the ‘four freedoms’ applicable to
human beings” formulated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt78 (and reflected in
international human rights instruments).
The insight that the emergence and acceptance of norms is linked to “adjacency,”
and that adjacency to already established norms can make the evolution of shared
understandings more likely, is a useful way of understanding how animal advocacy
efforts that consciously borrow from international human rights frameworks contribute to
building norms based on shared understandings.
3.3.4 Epistemic Communities
Haas’s account of the role of epistemic communities in international relations also
contributes to the picture of how shared understandings evolve and ground norms.
Epistemic communities, by Haas’s definition, are “networks of knowledge-based
experts”79 made up of “professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
domain or issue-area.”80 What distinguishes an epistemic community from members of
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a profession in general is their commitment to a “common policy enterprise” based on a
shared worldview,81 shared normative beliefs and shared ideas of causation and validity.82
Epistemic communities may be national (working within a single country), but
transnational epistemic communities can emerge “as a result of the diffusion of
community ideas through conferences, journals, research collaboration, and a variety of
informal communications and contacts.”83 They play an important role in “helping states
identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific
policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation,”84 especially when issues are
complex and decision-making involves a high degree of uncertainty.
Epistemic communities have the authority and influence to play this role because
of their “reputation for impartial expertise.”85 They are not the same as interest groups or
activists, whose prescriptions are seen as being driven by conviction or ideology rather
than disinterested knowledge. Haas asserts, for instance, that international environmental
lawyers are not an epistemic community, in part because they “lack the public respect for
impartial views about the world to which their advice is deployed.”86 Epistemic
communities, therefore, can overlap with Finnemore and Sikkink’s “norm entrepreneurs,”
the actors who advocate for recognition of an emerging norm especially at the first stage
of its life, but are certainly not coterminous with them.
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3.3.5 Regime Encounters
In addition to the mechanisms of norm formation that Brunnée and Toope refer to,
there is another to add, adopted from Andrew Lang’s constructivist analysis of the
relationship between the international trade and human rights regimes: the idea of a
“regime encounter.” Lang describes a regime encounter between human rights and trade
which has at times been characterized by deep conflict, notably with the mobilization of
global justice movements against the WTO in the 1980s and 1990s.87 This was fertile
ground for an especially active period of international norm creation around a vision of
globalization that was an alternative to economic globalization, emphasizing social
justice, development and the empowerment of the poor and oppressed.
The progressive alternative version of globalization to a large extent defined itself
in opposition to the neoliberal politics perceived as driving the expansion of the trade
regime.88 In other words, the global human rights movement crystallized, and started off
its own norm cycles, in part through the encounter with another international regime, the
international trade regime.
Lang’s concept of a regime encounter has similarities with Brunnée and Toope’s
account of how norms are shaped by the work of norm entrepreneurs, including domestic
and global social justice movements, NGOs and civil society groups. But an additional
piece of the picture that Lang’s analysis brings into focus is the way the particular vision
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of human rights espoused by the global movement for social justice and human rights
was (and still is) constituted in opposition to the international trade regime.
The idea of a regime encounter suggests that resistance and opposition can be key
ingredients in norm formation. Through protest, criticism and debate, ideas that were
once latent or inchoate can become crystallized and articulated as full-fledged norms that
may then go on to win more adherents and eventually “cascade.”89 If the struggle plays
out in a formal or semi-formal legal forum, it may also be part of a “practice of legality”
by means of which legal norms are, in Brunnée and Toope’s account, built and
maintained (as discussed below).
On the face of it, the proposition that dispute and contestation play a part in
creating international legal norms may seem at odds with Brunnée and Toope’s
interactional theory, with its emphasis on consensus and normative convergence. But in
my view this point is actually consistent with and implied by interactional IL theory,
whose central tenet is that law is formed through interaction. Interaction inherently
involves contestation, political struggle and encounters between different worldviews.
Sometimes this process can reveal lesser or greater areas of overlapping consensus or
shared fundamental assumptions. It also prevents false consensus, papering over or
ignoring divisions that have not been resolved.
As Lang shows with respect to the human rights / trade encounter, the struggles of
the 1980s and 1990s led to a fruitful, sophisticated examination of the relationship
between trade and human rights from within both regimes, “in order to work out how the
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two regimes might more productively relate to one another.”90 The regime encounter is a
locus of struggle and opposition, but also one where understandings can ultimately be
shared between proponents of different ideational frameworks, even if the common
ground may be limited and unstable.

International legal regimes do not form or exist in

isolation from one another, “as strangers to one another,”91 but in a context of ideas about
overlapping objectives and theoretical foundations, and ongoing struggles over the nature
and purpose of each regime as well as the relationship between them.
The encounter between international trade law and animal protection is also a site
of contestation where shared understandings, potentially leading to the development of
international legal norms, can be formed. The previous chapter discussed Blattner’s
argument that engagement with animal protection by the WTO has helped to legitimize
the idea of global legal protections for animals,92 and Kerr’s work on the potential for
animal protection elements in the TPP Environment Chapter to reshape US legal culture’s
assumptions about the division between animal welfare and environmental law.93 These
examples fit into Lang’s account of how regime encounters work.
The trade-animal protection regime encounter has an important difference from
the trade-human rights encounter that Lang focuses on: animal protection is much less
established in international law than human rights. At this point, animal protection has
no more than an embryonic presence in international law. This regime encounter is
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between a new international legal regime in its early stages of formation (animal
protection), in interaction with an established, powerful and mature one (trade).
3.3.6 From Norms to Law
To sum up, Brunnée and Toope’s theory of interactional international law
explains the emergence and evolution of norms in global society through a process of
social interaction, often including the work of norm entrepreneurs and epistemic
communities, that gives rise to “shared understandings.” Lang’s concept of “regime
encounters” adds the idea that this process may also include struggle and contestation
with existing international legal regimes.
Shared understandings are a prerequisite for international legal norms, but do not
in themselves constitute legal norms. They are a kind of normative consensus, but they
need not amount to convergence on shared norms in a thick sense, or “deep value
coalescence.”94 Shared understandings may be deep, or they may be more limited or
minimal. Where they lie on this spectrum affects what kind of law can emerge from
them: “the deeper the shared understandings, the greater the possibility of ambitious
law.”95
Shared understandings constitute a “foundation” for law, but law does not emerge
unless they “come to be intertwined with distinctive internal qualities of law and practices
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of legality.”96 The next Section covers Brunnée and Toope’s account of what the
distinctive internal qualities of law are.

3.4

The Distinctive Qualities of Law

Legal norms are a special subset of norms. A legal norm is one that is binding,
that those subject to it are obligated to follow; international legal norms are “possessed of
a special ability to influence and behavior of international actors.”97 Brunnée and Toope
argue that this character of bindingness is generated not by the fact that law is imposed by
an outside or supervening authority (in international law, a horizontal system, there is no
such authority) but by internal characteristics that particularly belong to law, drawn from
the legal theory of Lon Fuller.98
3.4.1 Traditional Sources
Interactional theory’s approach to determining what constitutes law (or is on the
way to becoming a legal norm) is not the same as the usual starting point in much of
international legal scholarship, which identifies law by looking to recognized sources of
international law.99
The starting point in this inquiry is usually Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
Court of International Justice, which sets out a list of sources.100 It provides that, when
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“decid[ing] in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it,” the
Court shall apply the following:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.101
This list of sources can be summed up (in more current terminology) as: treaties,
customary international law, general principles of international law, and secondary
sources including judicial decisions.
Article 38 (or, more precisely, its predecessor, Article 38 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice) has been called “the most important attempt to
specify the sources of international law”102 and is “often put forward as a complete
statement of the sources of international law.”103
Yet this taxonomy of formal sources of international law, although it is a useful
starting point, is not the end of the inquiry. It leads into “deeper questions about the
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nature and function of sources of international law.”104 In part the deeper questions arise
from the lack of “constitutional machinery of law-making” at the international level,
analogous to that which exists within states.105 The traditionally recognized sources are
authoritative not because they emanate from such an authority (since none exists), but are
best understood as “evidence of a normative consensus among states and other relevant
actors concerning particular rules or practices.”106
The “deeper questions” Brunnée alludes to are linked to one fundamental
question: what is it that makes international law law? Answering this question involves
looking at the legitimacy and authority of law, or what persuades those who are subject to
it treat it as binding. What makes states comply with international law, given that there is
no enforcement authority to punish them for not doing so, and in what circumstances do
they recognize it as law to be complied with, given that it does not originate from a
constitutional authority? What gives international law authority and legitimacy? These
questions are especially important in the study of evolving or emerging international law,
or norms that are at some point in the process of potentially becoming law, a category
that global animal law fits into.
3.4.2 Evolving Law-Making Processes
Global animal law, to the extent that it has a presence in the international legal
system at all at this point, consists in large part of emergent or aspirational principles
without a strong presence in the Article 38 sources.107 Although species protection is an
104
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established objective of international environmental law, animal welfare norms “remain
incidental in international legal regimes” and are mainly notable for their absence from
treaty law or binding international law in the usual sense. 108 Furthermore, the proposition
that animal-protective principles have global and cross-cultural legitimacy is a highly
contested one.109
One possible conclusion that could be reached from this evidence is, of course,
that there is no global animal law, outside of species protection, which would then be
seen as simply an aspect of biodiversity not distinguished in any significant way from the
protection of endangered species of plants.110 And yet that conclusion would fail to
account for the widespread and increasing activities of norm creation and diffusion
concerning animal welfare and animal protection in international society, aimed in part at
ensuring the expression of these norms in law.
The traditional Article 38 taxonomy of sources leaves out new processes of norm
creation that have an important place in today’s international legal system, such as
decisions of conferences to the parties to treaties, standard-setting by treaty plenary
bodies, guidelines created by international agencies, and so-called “soft” or nonbinding
law generally.111 For Brunnée, the prominence of such processes and the intertwining of
“hard” and “soft” rules in international environmental law makes that area “fertile terrain
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for an exploration of the evolving range of law-making processes.”112 One of the
examples she cites to illustrate the permeable boundaries and overlap of “hard” or
binding law and “soft” principles is the concept of sustainable development. Sustainable
development is articulated in “soft” instruments such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development.113 It is also referred to in the preamble of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization114 as an objective animating the
global trading system. In WTO dispute settlement proceedings, Brunnée notes, this
reference to sustainable development in the trade regime’s constitutive treaty has been
“an entry point for a more environmentally minded interpretation of trade law by dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body.”115
These observations carry over to global animal law, where most provisions
relating to animal welfare “are contained in secondary law emanating from international
organizations, bodies, and conferences of the parties.”116 To understand the significance
of these norms and the process of their creation the Article 38 list of sources is of limited
help. It is often more illuminating to look for what Brunnée calls “family resemblance”
between established sources and other (newer, softer, more aspirational) varieties of
lawmaking.117
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3.4.3 Fuller’s Criteria of Legality
For Brunnée and Toope, the family resemblance between established legal norms
and evolving or potential legal norms is seen in certain characteristics that connect law to
a form of natural justice, or the concept of the rule of law. They adopt as markers of this
quality of law the “criteria of legality”118 enumerated by Lon Fuller. Fuller’s criteria (or
something like them) “are central to every effort to define the rule of law and they
capture distinctive traits of legal practice.”119
Fuller’s criteria of legality120 are:
•

Generality. This requirement means that there must be rules of general
application, as opposed to ad hoc determinations on a case-by-case basis.

•

Promulgation. Law must be made publicly available so that people who
are subject to it know what it is that they are subject to.

•

Non-retroactivity. Generally speaking, law should apply only
prospectively and not retroactively.

•

Clarity. Law must have at least a baseline level of clarity and
intelligibility.

•

Avoidance of contradiction. Law cannot impose requirements that
contradict one another.

118
Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); see
also discussion in Brunnée & Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, supra note 1 at 20-33; Brunnée & Toope,
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•

Possible to obey. Law cannot demand compliance that is impossible to
perform.

•

Relative constancy. There should not be constant changes in law so that
people cannot organize their affairs and behaviour to comply with the
rules.

•

Congruence of official action with declared rules. Officials should not
behave in a way, or interpret or apply law in a manner, that is completely
unsupported by the apparent meaning of the law.

Fuller argued that these features expressed what he called the “internal morality of
law.”121 Fuller defended the proposition that law has its own inner morality in his
arguments against legal positivism, most famously in his debate with the great positivist
philosopher HLA Hart. Hart insisted on the separateness of law and morality and that the
distinction must be observed between is and ought, between “law as it is and law as it
should be.”122 For the positivist Hart, what gives law its force as law is its provenance
from duly constituted lawmaking authorities.123
Fuller, by contrast, saw the rule of law as something more than the rule of the
powerful. Purported laws could, he argued, be laid down by those in authority, but if
they lacked the characteristics of law – if they were kept secret, for example, or
demanded contradictory things or were impossible to follow – they would not actually be
law but just the arbitrary exercise of power, which is not the same thing. For Brunnée
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and Toope, it is the criteria of legality that explain law’s “obligatory quality”; when they
are met, “law will tend to attract its own adherence.”124
Fuller’s theory is a form of natural justice theory, but it is a minimalist, procedural
version of natural justice. It requires no “fundamental shared commitments to a single
political morality.”125 Fuller’s theory is in the middle ground between the positivist
rejection of any moral standard for judging the legality or legitimacy of law, and strong
versions of natural justice that evaluate law against external morality.
The idea of law’s internal morality, and the emphasis on communication,
intelligibility and interpretation in Fuller’s theory, locate the binding force of law
elsewhere than in its provenance from a ruler with the authority to promulgate law. The
theory explains law as something distinct from an exercise of raw power. Fuller’s
account of law’s authority emphasizes mutual collaboration in a social enterprise, where
those to whom law applies “are not merely subjects, but are interacting agents creating
law through specific processes of communication.”126
Fuller’s own focus was domestic, not international law. Brunnée and Toope note
that he rarely turned his attention to international law, and when he did so he suggested
that the rule of law in international society might be unfeasible.127 For Brunnée and
Toope, though, a conception of law as a non-hierarchical enterprise based on reciprocity
is especially helpful for making sense of the international legal system, a horizontal
structure with no central authority which nevertheless functions recognizably as law.
124
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They also see Fuller’s theory as able to address “the greatest challenge facing
international law: to construct normative institutions while admitting and upholding the
diversity of peoples in international society,” because of its agnosticism about substantive
ends.128
Reciprocity, communication and mutual participation are essential features of
ordering human affairs through law, and it is the idea of participation in law as an
enterprise or form of social ordering that leads to the last of interactional theory’s three
pillars: the “practice of legality.” For Brunnée and Toope, participation in a practice of
legality is what builds law and keeps it going, while the absence of a practice of legality
is an indication of a purported legal norm that has fallen into disuse or never really
became law.129

3.5

The Practice of Legality

The idea of a practice of legality brings together the other two themes of the
interactional framework (shared understandings and the criteria of legality) by defining
lawmaking as a particular kind of social interaction. Brunnée describes the practice of
legality as a process of norm application that satisfies the requirements of legality.130
When norm creation meets the criteria of legality and “is matched with norm application,
interpretation and implementation that also satisfies them … actors are able to organize
their interactions through law.”131
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The practice of legality has obvious commonalities with the processes of
generating social norms and shared understandings that interactional IL theory highlights.
In particular, there is a parallel to the idea of “communities of practice,” in Adler’s
terminology, as the source of social norms.132 Similarly, the norm-building work of
“norm entrepreneurs” and “epistemic communities” could occur within a practice of
legality. But it is a particular kind of practice that meets the distinctively legal criteria
identified by Fuller. The practice of legality (as distinct from other kinds of social
practice) involves norm application – “legal argumentation, interpretation,
implementation or enforcement measures” – that manifests the criteria of legality.133
This is a model of creation, application, maintenance and modification of law –
and even of its destruction – through a dynamic, ever-evolving process, “continuing
struggles of social practice”134 involving interaction among all the actors in the system.
Interactional IL theory says that international law commands fidelity, and is seen as
legitimate, because it is created and upheld through this particular kind of process. Law
is not imposed on subjects, but is the product of active give-and-take among all
participants that exhibits the “internal morality of law” as Fuller perceived it. A practice
of legality “produces law that is legitimate in the eyes of the persons to whom it is
addressed.”135
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3.6

The Idea of a Continuum of Legality

The dynamic nature of the practice of legality also implies that law itself is not
fixed or static, and since law can be in a state of becoming (or unbecoming) law it also
follows that law “not an all-or-nothing proposition”136 or an on/off switch. There can be
law by degrees, or a “continuum of legality,” and it is “possible to talk about law that is
being constructed.”137 The idea of a “continuum of legality” is a helpful analytical device
for deepening understanding of global animal law, an area that is still largely aspirational
and embryonic.
Interactional theory’s idea of a “continuum of legality” is a particularly useful
theoretical lens through which to examine an emerging area of international law in its
early stages, as global animal law is. Traditional, positivist models of what counts as
international law, heavily influenced by the Article 38 list of sources, do not tell us very
much about the extensive and burgeoning developments in this area.
On the traditional view, there is little to say about these developments except that
they do not amount to law. That may be the conclusion of an interactional analysis, too.
In Chapter Four, I will apply the interactional framework to inquire whether “global
animal law” has reached the stage in its evolution where it can properly be called law,
and it is probably not a spoiler to say that for the most part it has not. But interactional
theory does not stop at a simple yes or no answer to the question of whether law has
emerged. It enables observers to organize and make sense of steps being taken towards
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the formation of law, and recognize and understand signs of further work that would
develop, apply and maintain global animal law (a practice of legality). It implies no
assumptions about whether new and emerging norms will move further along the
continuum and attain a more clearly legal status, but it provides the analytical tools
needed to identify and evaluate stages in the process.

3.7

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the interactional theory of international law
developed by Brunnée and Toope, and outlined its elements: norms based on shared
understandings, the distinctive qualities of legal norms, and the idea of a practice of
legality. The analytical tools of interactional theory are useful for understanding the
formation of global animal law, and the effect on the formation of global animal law of
interaction with the international trade law regime. This theoretical model assists in
organizing and making sense of what might otherwise seem to be disparate and
incoherent phenomena,138 and reveals the potential for the practice of legality unfolding
in the WTO dispute settlement system to move animal-protective principles further along
the “continuum of legality.”
Global animal law is a rich area for investigation using a constructivist approach
and interactional theory. In this respect, it can be compared to international
environmental law, Brunnée’s main area of expertise, which she describes, as “fertile
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terrain for an exploration of the evolving range of law-making practices” because there is
so much and such a variety of new lawmaking work happening in this field.139 Brunnée
and Toope observe that “most of the work seeking to draw together the insights of
constructivism and international legal theory” has focused on areas – including
international environmental, human rights and criminal law – where there has been
“extraordinary normative evolution” since the second half of the twentieth century.140
Brunnée and Toope do not include animal protection in that list (except to the
extent that it forms part of international environmental law), perhaps because it is such a
new area in international law that it did not come to their attention, or because there was
not much to say about it when their book on interactional theory came out in 2010 (not
very long ago, but a long time ago in the evolution of global animal law). Global animal
law is another area experiencing extraordinary normative evolution, and it, too, is fertile
terrain for applying constructivist analysis and the interactional international law
framework.
With respect to international trade law’s contribution to global animal law, the
most powerful concept offered by interactional IL theory is that of a “practice of legality”
as a place of normative contestation as well as adherence to norms. The trade regime,
especially the WTO dispute settlement system, is engaged in the business of interpreting,
upholding and enforcing the legal norms that are internal to itself, the rules of
international trade. But it also plays a part in articulating and refining norms that are
external to itself and are rooted in other areas of international law. This is a process that
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tends to make emergent norms gradually become more law-like. The international trade
regime’s own particular brand of a practice of legality is contributing to the growth of
animal protection norms in global law.
Interactional theory provides a framework for explaining why the WTO decision
in EC – Seal Products is such an important development in global animal law, and the
further possibilities that could follow. Interactional theory proposes that social
interaction in a practice of legality is indispensable in turning social norms into law.
Logic suggests that this indispensable element is all the more important when a norm
faces significant hurdles on the journey to becoming law, which is the case for animal
protection. This theoretical proposition helps to explain the significance of engagement
with animal protection in the context of practices of legality in the trade regime, notably
the WTO DSB and compliance and capacity-building processes under PTAs. Later
chapters (Five through Eight) examine in more detail how this is happening. First, in
Chapter Four, I explain the emerging phenomenon of global animal law and apply the
interactional framework to assess its viability as law.
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Chapter 4
4.1

Global Animal Law

Introduction

This thesis argues that international trade law, especially since EC – Seal
Products,1 contributes to the development of animal protection norms in international
law. This chapter examines the international animal law side of that equation. It begins
with an explanation of what scholars mean by the term “global animal law,” why they see
a need for this body of law to arise now, and how the philosophical foundation of global
animal law was laid in the wider intellectual movement known as the “animal turn.” The
chapter then surveys the landscape of global animal law, looking at international legal
instruments and initiatives on the environment, animal welfare, and animal rights.
I then apply the tools of interactional international law (discussed in Chapter
Three) to assess to what extent global animal law has now emerged as law, as understood
by interactional theory – that is, a set of legal norms exhibiting the characteristics of law
and being articulated and applied through a practice of legality. Finally, I look at how the
encounter between global animal law and international trade law might turn out to solve
some of the deficiencies that global animal law now has as putative body of law.

1
European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products (Complaints by Canada and Norway) (2013), WTO Docs WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R,
WT/DS400/R/Add1, WT/DS401/R/Add1 as modified by European Communities — Measures Prohibiting
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (Complaints by Canada and Norway) (2014)
WT/DS401/AB/R [EC – Seal Products].
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4.2

What is Global Animal Law?

The term “global animal law,” or “GAL,” has emerged in the last decade or so as
a label for various efforts to enhance international governance mechanisms to protect
animals, to give voice to their interests, and to regulate the way they are treated by
humans. Global animal law is a disparate and fragmented phenomenon that consists in
large part of advocacy, proposals and theoretical arguments, as well as some elements of
positive law.
The recognition of global animal law as a phenomenon is largely due to the work
of legal scholars who are working to identify, categorize, theorize and further develop
transboundary and supranational law for animal protection.2 Appropriately, global
animal law scholars are working in a number of places around the world.
In Europe, one of the leading scholars and theorists in this area is Anne Peters,
Director of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law.3
A cluster of European scholars who studied under Peters and are now doing further work
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in this direction include Saskia Stucki4 and Charlotte Blattner.5 Another European-based
project, more focused on cataloguing animal protection laws around the world at all
levels of government, including international, is the Global Animal Law Project, founded
by Antoine Goetschel.6 Sabine Brels, a leader of the Global Animal Law Project, has
also researched and written on the evolution of animal law globally7 and the need for an
international approach to animal protection.8 Paola Cavalieri, an Italian moral
philosopher, has focused much of her work on universal human rights – one of the
signature projects of international law; her argument that the internal logic of human
rights requires that they include at least some nonhuman animals have important
implications for the idea of rights in international law.9
In the US, David Favre has been working for decades to build a workable model
for an international animal welfare treaty,10 and the Animal Legal & Historical Center11
housed at Michigan State University (where Favre is based) maintains a database of
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Animal Welfare Labels, the Ambivalence of Humanizing the Inhumane, and What International
Humanitarian Law Has to Do with It” (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 277; Saskia Stucki, “Towards Hominid
and Other Humanoid Rights: Are We Witnessing a Legal Revolution?” (2016) online:
<https://intr2dok.vifa-recht.de/receive/mir_mods_00000726>.
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global and international animal-related laws. Thomas Kelch has written extensively on
globalization, animal law, and the need to identify globally shared values and principles
of governance for animal protection.12 The work of Steven White in Australia13 and
Werner Scholtz in South Africa also highlights gaps in international law with respect to
the protection of animals.14
Peters writes that academics working in the global animal law field “are
developing proposals to fill gaps in international law, are reformulating traditional legal
concepts such as rights, jurisdiction, or civilians, and are reconfiguring the domestic lawinternational law divide.”15 Global animal law borrows from the methodological
approach of scholars of “transnational” or “global” law more generally, in that it is not
limited to international law in the classic sense of binding legal obligations between
states, but also looks at comparisons between different legal regimes and at mechanisms
beyond “hard” law, such as international standard-setting.16 This broader lens is
necessary to capture the phenomenon of global animal law because “the relevant body of
hard international law is very fragmented and thin.”17
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Two background factors have driven the emergence of global animal law as a
legal phenomenon and a subject of scholarship – one practical, and the other more
ideational. The first, practical factor is the growing need for transnational cooperation on
the protection of animals in an interconnected world where human activities that affect
animals increasingly have international dimensions. The second, ideational factor is the
philosophical foundation for global animal law that is found in the growing scholarly
discourse around human-animal relationships and the moral status of animals, sometimes
referred to as the “animal turn.” The animal turn in philosophy and other scholarly
disciplines has paved the way for the animal turn in international law.
4.2.1 The Need for a Transnational Approach
Anne Peters’s foreword to the recent symposium on global animal law in the
journal Transnational Environmental Law is entitled “Global Animal Law: What It Is and
Why We Need It.”18 This title highlights an important question about the emergence of
global animal law: why should it exist? Animal protection, especially animal welfare,
has traditionally been a domestic matter, so what need is there for an international body
of law on this matter?
An obvious answer to this question is that human activities affecting animals are
no longer confined within national borders. This means that effective regulation of those
activities now needs a transnational reach as well. Thus, Blattner describes global animal
law as “dealing with the trans-boundary reality of human-animal interaction,” taking into
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account “the economic forces involved in the globalized animal industry, as well as the
multilevel regulation of it.”19
Bruce Wagman and Matthew Liebman observe that animal protection matters
may be internationally regulated either because of the nature of the problem being
addressed – if it involves “multiple countries and border crossings” and so requires an
international solution – or because the animals themselves are “transnational or
migratory, and thus require international treatment.”20 The need for international
cooperation to protect animals who are “transnational or migratory” is not new, and
underlies international governance regimes such as the Convention on Migratory
Species.21 By contrast, Wagman and Liebman’s first category, human activity affecting
animals that involves multiple jurisdictions and crosses borders, is creating new practical
challenges for international governance because it is growing so fast, especially in the
area of food production.22
The speed of recent growth in production and consumption of animal products,
especially for food, is staggering. Since the 1960s, “milk consumption has almost
doubled, meat consumption has more than tripled, and egg consumption has increased by
a factor of five.”23 Developing countries are building new meat export industries to
provide the growing global demand, and consumption of meat and eggs has gone up
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sharply in rapidly developing Asian countries, especially China.24 Growth is driven both
by an increasing global population and by increasing per capita consumption of animal
foods.25
The rise in the sheer amount of animal products being produced and consumed
has happened at the same time that trade barriers have progressively reduced and the
global economy has become more integrated. This change, too, adds to the practical
challenge of effectively regulating the way the animals are treated. Park and Singer
observe that intensive methods of animal agriculture that have the most troubling welfare
impacts are being taken up in developing countries, especially in Asia and Latin America,
just as they are coming under fire in richer countries:
The result has been an unmitigated disaster for animals: more animals
in more places are confined in restrictive conditions utterly unlike their
natural environments and are pushed beyond their physiological limits
to produce ever-greater numbers of eggs, gallons of milk, and pounds of
flesh. It is a tragic turn of events that just as these methods are being
modified or even phased out in the countries where they were first
invented, they are being introduced in their old, unmodified forms in
other countries around the world. The exportation of industrialized
animal-production models has inflicted misery on animals on an
unprecedented scale.26
Kelch describes this phenomenon as a form of “outsourcing.”27 Activities that are
strictly regulated or expensive in one jurisdiction can be moved to another to realize cost
and regulatory advantages, and relatively frictionless international trade makes this more
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feasible. The relocation of intensive animal production is, effectively, a way of
outsourcing cruelty.
Globalization and the growing trade in animal products create a governance gap
that requires international cooperation to solve. The same phenomena have also
increased the visibility of animal suffering and public support for action to address it in a
global or transnational manner. Park and Singer note that the increasing number of
animals in animal trade as well as the new availability of video footage revealing what
happens to the animals has driven interest among “policy-makers, businesspeople,
nongonvernmental organizations, and ordinary citizens” in the treatment of animals
“wherever they may be.”28 As a result, [i]t is no longer sufficient for governments to be
concerned for the welfare of animals within their own borders: animal welfare is quickly
becoming an issue of international concern.”29
The need for global animal law is closely linked to the evolution of international
trade law. Globalization has driven an explosion in economic exploitation of animals, a
gap in regulation that has to be met with a transnational approach, and recognition that
animal protection is no longer just a domestic matter. Alongside this practical need, the
second underlying condition that has supported the emergence of global animal law is a
framework of ideas, which comes from the wider intellectual movement known as the
animal turn.
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4.2.2

The ‘Animal Turn’ and Global Animal Law

Peters identifies global animal law as “a manifestation and a driver of the broader
ongoing ‘animal turn’ in the social sciences and humanities.”30 The term “the animal
turn” denotes a move to thinking seriously about animals as ethically significant, and
rethinking the meanings of human-animal relationships, across a number of academic
disciplines and also in society more generally. The reference to a “turn” towards thinking
seriously about animals suggests a new direction, but it is also one with a long history.
And, while what makes the “animal turn” a “turn” is in part a shift towards taking
questions about animals more seriously in mainstream discourse, these questions and
theories about the ethical significance of animals remain mainly marginal. Both the
gradual mainstreaming of animal rights discourse and its continuing marginality are
important to understanding the emergence of global animal law – and to what extent it
has really established itself as law, as evaluated using the measures of interactional
international law.
The “animal turn” was named, most famously, in a 2007 article by Harriet Ritvo.
Ritvo pointed out a “more frequent focus of scholarship” on animals in humanities and
science disciplines, manifested in more published books and articles, conference
presentations, and new journals focusing on animals.31 She saw this burgeoning interest
as opening up new areas of inquiry and ways of thinking about animals: “As it has
expanded the range of possible topics in a number of disciplines, the animal turn has also

30
31

Peters, “Global Animal Law,” supra note 4 at 23 (internal citations omitted).
Harriet Ritvo, “on the animal turn” (2007) 136 Daedalus 118 at 119.

82

suggested new relationships between scholars and their subjects, and new understandings
of the role of animals in the past and at present.”32
But at the same time, as Ritvo notes, serious study of animals still remains at the
margins, in an “awkward location or set of locations.”33 Kari Weill writes that the fight
against speciesism so far has “not had the same force in the academy” as struggles against
sexism and racism.34 For Ritvo, this marginality is part of what makes animal questions
interesting and powerful: it “allows the study of animals to challenge settled assumptions
and relationships – to re-raise the largest issues – both within the community of scholars
and in the larger society to which they and their subjects belong.”35
The foundation of the animal turn is in philosophy. As Angus Taylor has
observed, the case of extending legal rights or stronger legal protection to animals
ultimately turns on philosophical questions:
Legal protections for human beings are grounded in our conviction that
they have significant moral status: that every individual has a
fundamental worth, or dignity, that must be respected. … Whether at
least some animals have the sort of non-instrumental value that ought to
afford them protection from exploitation has been the subject of
vigorous debate among philosophers for the past four decades.36
The philosophical debate that Taylor describes extends back further than what
eventually came to be labeled the “animal turn.” Taylor identifies it as beginning four
decades ago – in about the 1960s to 1970s.
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A transformational moment in this movement was the publication of Peter
Singer’s Animal Liberation in 1975.37 Singer linked the fight for recognition of animal
interests to human rights-based and equality movements. A key element in Singer’s
argument that animal liberation and human liberation struggles are comparable is his
identification of the systematic discounting of animals as “speciesism,” by analogy with
other forms of unjustifiable identity discrimination such as sexism and racism. The term
“speciesism” was coined by Richard Ryder, a writer, psychologist and animal activist,
who first used it in a privately produced leaflet protesting against animal
experimentation.38 Ryder has said in an interview that he came up with the word in an
“Archimedes moment in the bath.”39
The term “speciesism” draws analogy between the oppression of animals and the
oppression of certain classes human beings because of their morally irrelevant
characteristics. The analogy is based on the premise that the boundary between different
species is no more morally relevant than that between different races or sexes, at least not
as a justification for excluding nonhuman animals from moral consideration or for
abusing them. Singer writes in Animal Liberation that “speciesists allow the interests of
their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species,” just as
racists “violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of
members of their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests
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of another race,” and sexists “violate the principle of equality by favoring the interests of
their own sex.”40
Singer’s utilitarian philosophical framework for recognizing and counting animal
interests has its roots in the work of the father of modern utilitarianism, Jeremy
Bentham.41 Bentham, famously, argued that the key characteristic of animals that made
them matter in the moral calculus is their capacity for suffering, or what we now call
sentience. In a well-known footnote in his Principles of Morals and Legislation,
Bentham predicted that “[t]he day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may
acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand
of tyranny.” 42 Bentham argued that just as the colour of a person’s skin “is no reason
why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor,”
so too such irrelevant characteristics as having four legs or a tail did not put animals over
a line that made it acceptable to “[abandon] a sensitive being to the same fate.”43 For
Bentham, what demarcated that line was not rationality or the power of speech, but
sentience: “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they
suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being?”44
An important part of the “animal turn” in law is recognition of animal sentience as
a morally significant fact, and debate about what it means (and should mean) for the
extension of legal concepts like rights and interests beyond the exclusive domain of
humans. In this way, global animal law is connected to analogous struggles of
40
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marginalized human groups for recognition and legal protection. Paola Cavelieri, whose
work draws links between animal law and universal human rights, has described the
“animal question” as a questioning of assumptions underlying a cultural paradigm of
hierarchy between humans and animals.45 Cavalieri situates the animal turn within a
broader process of moral progression, the “substitution of hierarchical visions with
presumptions in favour of equality.”46 Yet global animal law remains marginal, fighting
to establish its legitimacy, in a way that other justice movements such as human rights are
not.
A major challenge for the legitimacy of global animal law is the international and
inter-cultural diversity in the ways that societies think about animals, and the extent to
which they see it as appropriate to give them legal protection. Peters recognizes that
attitudes towards animals within a society are shaped by “habits, religion, the wealth of
[the] society, its state of industrialization, and other cultural factors.”47 The development
of global animal law requires special sensitivity to “problems of Eurocentrism, of legal
imperialism, and of a North–South divide.”48 Global animal law “should not naively
export European values but should seek an overlapping consensus,” based in arguments
that can carry across cultures and “have the potential to become universal.”49 For Peters,
one such argument is “findings of natural science on the sentience of animals.”50
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Kelch, similarly, sees that for global animal law to gain traction, “cultural divides
that may seem impenetrable must be traversed.”51 He argues that culturally transcendent
universal principles can be derived from an ethic of caring, based in feminist care theory.
This perspective is also rooted in animal sentience and the capacity of animals to suffer;
caring, sympathy and empathy, he posits, are evoked by the suffering of animals used in
experimentation and factory farming.52
Engaging meaningfully with cultural differences in attitudes concerning animals,
while avoiding the pitfalls of cultural imperialism, has been one of the most difficult
challenges on the road to working out a coherent theoretical basis for global animal law.
The starkest difficulties arise when putative universal principles being worked out by
global animal law advocates have to accommodate the animal use practices of traditional
and Indigenous cultures. A concrete illustration of this difficulty is seen in the EC – Seal
Products case and the EU’s special treatment of seal products from traditional Indigenous
hunts. Applying the concept of animal welfare in a fair and even-handed way, without
unfairly imposing the values of one society concerning animals on another and while also
giving due weight to the cultural rights of Indigenous peoples, has proved a significant
challenge both for the WTO and for global animal law scholars and advocates.53
Global animal law has its challenges, but it also opens up fresh and fertile new
possibilities in international law. Ritvo’s observation that the marginality of the animal
turn can inspire questioning and re-thinking ideas at the centre of a discipline, “re-
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rais[ing] the largest issues,” is pertinent here. Paying attention to the interests of animals
challenges the fundamental anthropocentrism of international law. It is not surprising
that international law, as a human institution, should be anthropocentric – but, at the same
time, evaluating its claims of justice and moral authority with an awareness of the
exploitation of animals reveals gaps in the coherence of international law’s justificatory
discourse.
The first area of international law where animal interests have gained a foothold,
and the only area of treaty law that scholars have identified as part of global animal law,54
is international environmental law. Although it would be hard to deny that international
environmental law is largely anthropocentric, it is not entirely so; it is also concerned
with the protection and preservation of the nonhuman natural world. Animals are
included in that protection, and in this area there is at least some space for their interests
to be recognized and articulated.

4.3

International Environmental Law

Major international environmental treaties include legal protections for wild
animals in specific contexts: they regulate trade in endangered species, 55 the protection of
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migratory species,56 the protection of biological diversity,57 habitat protection,58 fisheries
management,59 and the conservation and hunting of whales,60 among other matters.61
Additionally, international institutions promote nature conservation, including the
protection of wild animals; perhaps the most prominent is the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature, which is a non-governmental organization but whose members
include “governments and government agencies alongside scientific, professional and
conservation bodies.”62
There are also a number of “soft” international environmental instruments that
allude to human responsibilities to protect wildlife and nature, including animals. The
1972 Stockholm Declaration63 refers to humanity’s “special responsibility to safeguard
and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat.”64 The World Charter for
Nature,65 adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1982,66 states that “the population
levels of all life forms, wild and domesticated, must be at least sufficient for their
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survival, and to this end necessary habitats shall be safeguarded” 67 and that special
protection should be given “to the habitat of rare or endangered species.”68 The
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Conservation Strategy,
in its 1991 revised version, states that humans have responsibility “towards other forms
of life with which we share this planet,” and affirms that “all the species and systems of
nature deserve respect regardless of their usefulness to humanity.”69
From the perspective of global animal law scholars, the problem with
international environmental law is its anthropocentrism. Protection of animals is
incidental to their value to humans, whether as material resources to be exploited now, or
for the economic, esthetic or recreational benefit of future generations of humans.
Scholtz criticizes the lack of concern with animal welfare in international environmental
law, arguing that this gap shows international environmental law’s failure to “reflect the
recognition of the moral worth of animals.” 70 In Scholtz’s view, this failure is a
manifestation of the “near divorce of environmental law from ethics.”71
International environmental law addresses the protection of wild animals as part
of the management and conservation of nature and natural resources. But animals are
different from other natural phenomena, because (as global animal law points out) they
are sentient. As Donaldson and Kymlicka note, “amongst the many different types of
entities within the ecosystem, some beings have a subjective existence that calls for
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distinctive moral responses.”72 Only animals are such beings; plants, wetlands, rivers and
ecosystems are not.
Foregrounding animal sentience and its ethical implications tends to lead to
thinking about categories like “conservation” and “animal welfare” in a different way.
The traditional view is that the conservation of wild animals belongs in the same legal
category as environmental conservation generally. This category is separate from animal
welfare, which is distinguished because animal welfare focuses on the wellbeing of
individual animals, whereas environmental protection is only concerned with the survival
of the species.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell set out a taxonomy of philosophical
underpinnings of environmental law based on the sources of the value that we accord to
nature.73 They identify three types of value: (i) instrumental, which is the value of
something that can put to use by others; (ii) inherent – value that nature possesses in
itself, for example because we value its beauty; and (iii) intrinsic, or value “which an
entity possesses of itself, for itself, regardless of the interests or utility of others.”74
Value can also be categorized according to where it is found – in individual specimens, in
species or communities, or in entire ecosystems.75 Intrinsic value, importantly, can be
situated at two levels, individual and species. The good of the individual is what
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell call “good-of-its-own”: the conditions needed for the
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individual to flourish, experience wellbeing, and avoid pain and suffering. The good of
the species is “good-of-its-kind”: the conditions needed for the species to thrive.76
Where international environmental law deals with animals, it is mainly concerned
with the good of species (“good-of-its-kind”), and it reflects the instrumental value of
wild animals more than their inherent or intrinsic value. There has, however, been some
evidence of change in these emphases over time. It would not be accurate to say that
international environmental law completely fails to reflect the inherent and intrinsic value
of wild animals or to address their good as individuals.
One example of this change in underlying values is the international regime for
the regulation of whaling. Cymie Payne has described the beginning stages of the
international whaling regime in the early twentieth century as a property management
regime created to cope with a classic tragedy of the commons.77 Whaling nations
cooperated to prevent the exhaustion of a valuable resource, classifying whales outside
national borders as no longer res nullius (no-one’s property, a free resource) but now res
communis (property commonly owned by the parties).78
The modern international whaling regime reflects different values from just
management of a commonly owned resource. The International Whaling Commission
has adopted a moratorium on commercial whale hunting regardless of whether the
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species in question is endangered. Anthony D’Amato and Sudhir Chopra argue that this
particular regime has moved through a series of stages that reflect evolving global
consciousness, culminating in what they argue is the beginnings of a recognition of
whales’ right to life.79 They suggest that this progression mirrors a change in
environmental law itself: “We may be at the brink of replacing the view that ‘nature’
exists only to serve people, with a larger ecological awareness that people share and
ought to share the planet with many other sentient creatures.”80
There are many other places in international environmental law where there is
recognition of the inherent and intrinsic value of wildlife, not just its utilitarian or
instrumental value. For instance, the preamble of CITES alludes to the importance of
wild fauna and flora “in their many beautiful and varied forms” as an “irreplaceable part
of the natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this and the generations to
come.” 81 It also refers to the value of wild fauna and flora from “aesthetic, scientific,
cultural [and] recreational,” as well as economic, points of view. The preamble of the
Convention on Biological Diversity mentions the “intrinsic” value of biological
diversity.82 The World Charter for Nature asserts that every form of life warrants respect
“regardless of its worth to man,” and that according such respect requires us to be
“guided by a moral code of action.”83
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There are also various provisions and instruments in international environmental
law that aim to protect the welfare of wild animals (these are described in more detail
under “Animal Welfare” in Section 4.4). Animal welfare is concerned with the wellbeing
of the individual animal (“good-of-its-own”) and is grounded in the intrinsic value of
animals, their value for their own sake, since there is no instrumental utility to humans in
reducing the suffering of animals or improving the level of wellbeing that the animals
experience. But, to the extent that animal welfare norms are included in international
environmental law, they are “isolated,” “incidental in international legal regimes, which
have as their primary objective the regulation of the harvesting and trading of animals,
conservation, and biodiversity.”84

4.4

Animal Welfare and International Law

Juxtaposing biodiversity protection and animal welfare in international law is a
study in contrasts. The protection of wildlife and biodiversity is established and well
developed in international law. The welfare of individual animals, on the other hand, is
“almost completely unaddressed.”85 The paucity of international law on animal welfare
is partly explained by the fact that it is generally seen as a subject for domestic
regulation,86 one on which local preferences and policy choices can diverge significantly.
But “almost completely unaddressed” is not completely unaddressed. Animal
welfare does have some presence in international law. It is a matter on which there is
some degree of emerging global consensus, and recognition of the need for global
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cooperation. While there are certainly variations among countries’ approaches to the
details of animal welfare protection and their choices about how different categories of
animals should be treated, there is little controversy about the abstract principle that
animals should be treated humanely. Animal welfare is “the key principle underpinning
the governance of animals in most developed countries, and it is becoming increasingly
important in the developing world.”87 Most domestic legal systems have some kind of
protection for animal welfare.88 States have also manifested their commitment to
protecting animal welfare in the context of international interactions. Bowman, Davies
and Redgwell speak of “the pervasiveness of international concern for animal welfare,
and the wealth of recent formal expressions of commitment to that objective” such that,
as they argue, it may be possible to identify a general principle of international law
concerning animal welfare at this point.89 Otter, O’Sullivan and Ross argue that animal
welfare “appears to be evolving into an international norm underpinning a global animal
protection regime.”90
To understand the status of animal welfare in international law, it is helpful to
apply Brunnée and Toope’s concept of the “continuum of legality.”91 Animal welfare has
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a presence on the continuum of international legality. There is extensive and growing
attention to animal welfare in international society, and growing indications of
international consensus that this is a matter to be taken seriously. But it is positioned at
the less “legal” end of the continuum. It remains mostly unaddressed at the other end of
the spectrum, where law, in the strict sense of binding and enforceable rules, is found.
The overview of animal welfare in international law that follows is divided into
three categories. The first is aspirational statements or proposed international
instruments. The second is what Peters identifies as “secondary” law: provisions
“emanating from international organizations, bodies, and conferences of the parties”92 in
the context of treaty regimes. The third is the provisions in international environmental
(wildlife protection) treaties that address animal welfare.
4.4.1 Aspirations
The most important example in this first category is the Universal Declaration of
Animal Welfare (UDAW),93 a statement of principles promoted by an international
animal welfare NGO called World Animal Protection (WAP).94 This text was created
with the intention of presenting it as a resolution for adoption by the UN General
Assembly. The UDAW is being promoted by building up “community support and
citizen participation,” primarily by gathering signatures to a petition favouring its
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adoption.95 The text itself has gone through at least two draft versions, reflecting
discussions among stakeholders and members of the international community.
The draft UDAW begins by affirming that “animals are sentient beings and that
their welfare is an issue worthy of consideration and respect by Member States.”96 It
states that the states potentially adopting it are (or would be) “conscious that humans
share this planet with other species and other forms of life and that all forms of life coexist within an interdependent ecosystem.”97 It incorporates the famous “five freedoms”
that were identified – with a conscious echo of the four freedoms underlying universal
human rights – in the 1965 Brambell Report on animal welfare in factory farming.98 The
UDAW states that “the ‘five freedoms (freedom from hunger, thirst and malnutrition;
freedom from fear and distress; freedom from physical and thermal discomfort; freedom
from pain, injury and disease; and freedom to express normal patterns of behaviour)’
provide valuable general guidance for animal welfare.”99 The operative Articles of the
UDAW define animal welfare to include health and “both the physical and the
psychological state of the animal,”100 and sentience as “the capacity to have feelings,
including pain and pleasure, [implying] a level of conscious awareness.”101 The UDAW
refers to ongoing scientific research and new knowledge concerning animal sentience.102
It would express a commitment on the part of states to take all appropriate steps to

95

Otter, O’Sullivan & Ross, supra note 87 at 66.
UDAW, supra note 93, Preamble.
97
Ibid.
98
Report of the Technical Committee to Enquire into the Welfare of Animals kept under Intensive
Livestock Husbandry Systems (London: HMSO, 1965) (Chairman: Professor F W Rogers Brambell, FRS)
99
UDAW, supra note 93, Preamble.
100
Ibid, Draft Article II.
101
Ibid, Draft Article III.
102
Ibid, Draft Article III.
96

97

“prevent cruelty to animals and to reduce their suffering”103 and for the principles in the
UDAW to be the common basis for policies, legislation and standards around the world
on animal welfare.104
The UDAW is not hard law; as a draft document proposed but not yet formally
put forward, let alone adopted, as a UN resolution it is not even soft law. But the iterative
process of articulating, discussing, and redrafting a set of principles on animal welfare
that could realistically be put forward for endorsement by all the UN member states is an
example of the process of building international shared understandings, even if a firm
consensus on the principles expressed in the UDAW has not yet been achieved.
4.4.2 Secondary Law
The second category is what Peters refers to as “secondary law”: principles
articulated by international organizations and conferences of treaty parties which may
function as guidelines and/or agreed standards for implementing primary treaty
provisions. There is a great variety in this category, but in general such provisions can be
seen as somewhat analogous to regulations or secondary legislation in domestic systems.
One interesting point to be made about secondary law from an interactional IL
perspective is that, although in the traditional formal taxonomy of international legal
sources it is subordinate or not real law, in interactional terms it can, depending on the
specific nature of the rules, be almost as law-like and binding as treaty law, and
sometimes even more so. As Brunnée observes (with respect to international
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environmental law), these secondary processes may result in “detailed, mandatory
regulatory or procedural standards” which may be formally nonbinding but nevertheless
are “routinely implemented” by the parties.105 The very activity of discussion,
cooperation, interpretation and decision-making that goes into creating such provisions is
a robust practice of legality, without which treaty obligations may lose their grounding in
shared understandings and become weakened.106
Peters cites a handful of animal welfare provisions in the category of secondary
law,107 the most significant of which is the framework for animal welfare protection
created by the World Organisation for Animal Health (abbreviated to the OIE, the
initialism for the original French name of the body – the Office International des
Epizooties). The OIE has promulgated codes on both terrestrial and aquatic animals, and
both now include general principles and specific recommendations on animal welfare.108
The OIE’s Terrestrial Animal Health Code has been described as “[t]he one
intergovernmental animal regulatory instrument that encompasses a wide variety of
animals, and not just endangered animals.”109
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The practical effectiveness of OIE standards should not be exaggerated; as Favre
observes of the OIE’s standards on live animal transportation, for example, they “read
like a checklist of issues that should be considered if you are going to engage in live
animal transport” rather than “an actual standard that limits or prohibits practices that are
harmful to animal welfare.”110
What is perhaps most important about the work of the OIE in this area is that it
functions as a kind of global consciousness-raising about the ethical importance of animal
welfare. The OIE reminds the international community that animal welfare matters. It
has adopted as part of its mission the goal of “convinc[ing] all the decision-makers in its
member countries of the need to take into account the human-animal relationship in
favour of a greater respect for animals.”111
4.4.3 Welfare in Environmental Treaty Law
There is a surprisingly high number of provisions tucked away in international
environmental treaties that address wild animal welfare in some way. Bowman, Davies
and Redgwell have done important work compiling these “incidental” or interstitial
provisions from a wide range of different international environmental instruments and
pointing out their conceptual connections to one another, devoting an entire chapter of the
second edition of Lyster’s International Wildlife Law to the “surprisingly wide range of
treaty commitments” concerning welfare issues that affect wildlife.112 Earlier work by

110

Favre, supra note 10 at 252.
Bernard Vallat, “Foreword,” in Proceedings of the Global Conference on Animal Welfare: An
OIE Initiative (Paris, 23-25 February 2004), available at:
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Conferences_Events/docs/pdf/proceedings.pdf.
112
Supra note 61 at 682.
111

100

Bowman highlighted the pervasiveness of welfare-protective rules in international
wildlife law, when hardly any other legal scholars were paying serious attention to animal
protection and international law.113
The first, and so far the only, international treaties centrally concerned with
protecting wild animal welfare are the two international agreements on humane standards
in trapping,114 which are discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. Although the adoption
of international agreements on welfare for wildlife is an important development, these
agreements only involve four parties and their influence is relatively limited.
The most important wildlife treaty that contains animal welfare provisions is
CITES. Once specimens of CITES-protected animal species are taken from the wild, the
treaty requires that they be transported and cared for in a way that minimizes risks of
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.115 Bowman describes the treaty as being
“replete with provisions relating to the welfare of individual living specimens.”116 Brels
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suggests that “CITES was also probably the most advanced in considering wildlife wellbeing at the time it was adopted in the early 1970s.”117
These welfare concerns are additional to the conservation and trade policies of
CITES. Animal species will not be more likely to disappear if individuals taken for
international trade experience poor welfare conditions, nor are they more likely to survive
if those individuals experience good welfare conditions (assuming, of course, that the
individuals do not die in either case, since that might lead to taking more of the species in
question from the wild). Animal welfare is a distinct ethical priority and obligation that
arises because animals are sentient creatures – there are, of course, no parallel provisions
concerning CITES-protected plant species.
The welfare provisions of CITES are limited in scope. They apply only to
members of endangered species that are listed in the CITES appendices and make “no
claim to regulate the much larger transnational trade in domestic animals or animals who
are farmed.”118 And they only apply once those animals are in the flow of international
trade. In the 1980s the CITES conference of the parties attempted to create rules
concerning cruelty in the manner of taking animal specimens from the wild, but these
efforts did not succeed as they were seen as going beyond the scope of the treaty and into
domestic jurisdiction.119 But the welfare provisions of CITES remain an important
example of international treaty rules dealing with the wellbeing of individual animals,
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rules that the great majority of the international community has signed on to (CITES has
182 parties) and that have been established for several decades.

4.5

Animal Rights and International Law

The first thing to say about animal rights in international law is that there are
none. Peters notes that the nonexistence of animal rights in international law mirrors
domestic legal systems: “In the law of presumably all legal systems, and international law
as it stands, humans are accorded rights; animals are not.”120 Favre argues that among
international negotiators using the term “animal rights” would “only cause confusion and
suspicion.”121 All efforts to include animal rights in international law are aspirational.
But while the first thing to say about international animal rights is that they do not
exist, it is not the only thing to be said. Animal rights discourse influences the way we
think about animals, and it plays a part in shaping the law that does exist for animal
protection. The work of advocates and scholars in this area is norm entrepreneurship:
persuading others to accept the idea of animal rights, with the aim of gradually increasing
the extent to which it is accepted.122
4.5.1 Adjacency: Animal Rights and Human Rights
Proponents of animal rights consciously draw analogies to international human
rights, and their roots in notions of dignity and moral significance that we think of as
universally recognized. Cavalieri argues that the internal logic of human rights – the
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essential equality of members of the moral community – requires that they be extended
beyond our species:
For it is clear, on the basis of the very doctrine that establishes them,
human rights are not human … not only is there nothing in the doctrine
of human rights to motivate the reference to our species present in the
phrase but it is the same justificatory argument underlying it that drives
us towards the attribution of human rights to members of species other
than our own.123
By emphasizing the parallels between international human rights and animal
rights, GAL scholars and advocates employ a strategy that interactional theory would
recognize: adjacency to norms that are already established in international law.124 Peters
describes this strategy as one of borrowing “transferable legal concepts” that originally
applied only to human beings, but “have more recently been picked up by scholars or
activists in order to employ them for the benefit of animals.”125 The strategy has both
substantive and formal aspects.
Substantively, animal rights advocates point out the “fit” between animal rights
theories and human rights normative frameworks. Cavalieri’s argument, outlined above,
is that there is no principled distinction between humans who are included in the existing
human rights paradigm, and animals who share the qualities (intelligence,
communication, social bonds, or simply sentience) invoked as the basis of rights. This
logic mirrors Singer’s analysis of speciesism: excluding nonhuman animals categorically
from human rights is just a form of species chauvinism.126
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Formally, animal rights advocates draw on the legitimacy of human rights
discourse by adopting the structures and vocabulary familiar from international human
rights instruments. Formally, animal rights advocates deliberately and strategically
borrow from the legal language and structure of international human rights instruments
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Below I discuss three examples of this type of advocacy for including animal
rights in international law. The first is a proposed international instrument recognizing
basic rights for all animals. The other two concern the extension of the concept of rights
to specific categories of animals: nonhuman great apes, and cetaceans.
4.5.2 The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights
In the 1970s, animal advocates drafted a proposed document recognizing the
rights of animals: the Universal Declaration of Animal Rights (UDAR), which was
originally adopted by the International League for Animal Rights in 1977.127 The UDAR
connects principles of respect for nature, prevention of animal suffering, and the dignity
(even in death) of morally significant beings.128 It proclaims that “all life is one,” “all
living beings possess natural rights,” and “any animal with a nervous system has specific
rights.”129
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The UDAR states that wild animals “have the right to live free in their natural
environment,130” and the destruction of large numbers of wild animals is defined as
genocide.131 Perhaps surprisingly in a declaration of animal rights, breeding animals for
food is not ruled out, but any animal kept for this purpose “must be fed, managed,
transported and killed without it being in fear or pain.”132 Animal rights “must be
defended by laws as are human rights.”133
The UDAR was submitted to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1990, but after that it faded into obscurity.134 The
propositions it sets out are so far from the existing situation as to make mainstream
acceptance unlikely. They are somewhat vague, and even self-contradictory; for
example, the assertion that “[e]very animal that usually lives in a domestic environment
must live and grow to a rhythm natural to his species” and “[a]ny change to this rhythm
and conditions dictated by man for mercantile purpose, is a contradiction of this law”135
does not seem compatible with acceptance of breeding and killing animals for food
(whatever one’s views on the morality of eating animal-based food, it unavoidably
involves death coming sooner than end of the animal’s lifespan in accordance with its
“natural rhythm”).
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Michael Bowman has written that the main value of the UDAR is in “drawing
attention to the general problem of abuse of animals and for itemizing many of the
principal areas of concern.”136 In other words, it is an instrument of norm
entrepreneurship: it calls attention to what its proponents see as a gap in the law by using
the vocabulary and structure of international human rights law to describe it, to argue that
it needs to be changed, and to point out how the gap can be filled using the concepts and
vocabulary of a branch of international law that is well established and accepted.137
4.5.3 Great Apes
More recent declarations of animal rights focus on particular groups of animals,
where the analogy to human rights is strengthened by growing scientific understanding of
these particular animals’ capabilities. One example is The Great Ape Project, founded by
Cavalieri and Singer in 1992. The Great Ape Project brings together scientists and
scholars who have drafted a Declaration of the Rights of Great Apes Nations, which
would acknowledge the rights of nonhuman great apes to life, liberty and freedom from
torture, and have advocated for the international adoption of the Declaration by the
United Nations.138 There is no such international instrument to date. But the work of the
Great Ape Project has influenced domestic adoption in some countries of special legal
protections for chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orangutans (referred to as nonhuman
hominids or nonhuman great apes).
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Notably, New Zealand’s Animal Welfare Act prohibits research, testing or
teaching involving the use of a nonhuman hominid without a permit; permits cannot be
granted unless the activity is in the best interests of the individual or of its species (and, in
the latter case, if the benefits are not outweighed by the harm to the individual).139 A
direct line can be traced to this legislative reform from the work of the Great Ape Project.
According to Rowan Taylor, a proponent of legal reform to protect great apes in New
Zealand, the campaign in support of the legislation took on real momentum after “an
international movement had been spawned” by the publication of the Great Ape Project’s
book.140
At the time that New Zealand’s Animal Welfare Act was being drafted and
discussed, there were calls for the legislation to include rights for nonhuman hominids.
These would have been the rights to life, freedom from torture, and freedom from being
subjected to medical or scientific experimentation. In the event, the legislation that was
adopted is framed around protection of welfare rather than enshrinement of rights.141 A
recent (2015) amendment adds as one of the purposes of the Act “to recognize all animals
as sentient.”142
Spain has also made tentative, although ultimately incomplete, moves towards
robust protections for nonhuman great apes, and these developments too show the
influence of the scientific arguments set out by the Great Ape Project. In 2008, a Spanish
parliamentary committee adopted a resolution to endorse the goals of the Great Ape
139
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Project, potentially going further than the New Zealand legislation does in the direction
of recognizing some form of basic rights. But this effort went no further.
4.5.4 Cetaceans
Cetology, the study of whales and dolphins, has also produced insights into the
capability and intelligence of these animals that have prompted some scientists and
philosophers to reconceptualize their status in relation to humans. Researchers in the
field have built up a complex, compelling picture of cetaceans’ social organization and
their highly sophisticated systems of communication. Hal Whitehead and Luke Rendell
have argued, based on their own collective decades of study of sperm whale vocalizations
as well as studies by others, that there is sufficient evidence at this point to conclude that
cetaceans have their own culture – an attribute traditionally thought to be definingly and
exclusively human.143
As in the case of nonhuman great apes, deeper understanding of cetacean
behaviour and cognition has prompted efforts to frame their moral and legal status in
terms of rights. In 2010 a conference at the University of Helsinki put forward the
“Declaration of Rights for Cetaceans: Whales and Dolphins,” asserting that individual

143
Hal Whitehead & Luke Rendell, The Cultural Lives of Whales and Dolphins (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 2015). Whitehead and Rendell adopt a broad definition of culture as
“behavior patterns shared by members of a community that rely on socially learned and transmitted
information” (ibid at 11). They see the song of the humpback whale as the best example of culture so
defined in cetaceans, because there is strong evidence that it is a communal behaviour and learned socially
(ibid at 192-194). Of course – as Whitehead and Rendell recognize – it can be objected that it is a false
equivalence to talk about “culture” so broadly defined alongside the more complex and elevated examples
of human culture, such as the fine arts and advanced technology (ibid at 203-212). The same objection may
validly be raised about evidence of culture (tool-making and communication) in nonhuman great apes. At a
minimum, however, our current understanding of these nonhuman animal behaviours disrupts the once
accepted boundary between supposedly exclusively human characteristics and those of nonhuman animals.
Like cognition and intelligence, the picture that emerges is of a connected continuum rather than a
categorical distinction.

109

cetaceans have the right to life, should not be held in captivity, treated cruelly or taken
from their natural environment, have the right to “freedom of movement and residence in
their natural environment,” are not property, have the right to protection of their natural
environment, and have the right to protection of their culture.144 The preamble of the
Declaration invokes the “principle of equal treatment of all persons” and proclaims that
cetaceans are persons.145 These claims about the status of whales are explicitly linked to
scientific findings; the preamble notes that “scientific research gives us deeper insights
into the complexities of cetacean minds, societies and cultures.”146
Twenty years before this proposal of a declaration of rights, two prominent
international law scholars, D’Amato and Chopra, had argued in an academic article that
whales already had one right – the right to life – under customary international law.147
D’Amato and Chopra argued that binding customary law recognizing whales’ right to life
existed or was in the process of emerging, based on the presence of these two necessary
elements, state practice and opinio juris.148 Like the authors of the Helsinki Declaration
(one of whom, in fact, was Sudhir Chopra), they ground this argument in part in the
moral implications of our current, growing knowledge of the extraordinary complexity
and sophistication of whales’ brains, communicative abilities and social organization.149
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D’Amato and Chopra’s argument is credible and supported by solid scholarship
and argument, but it cannot be said that the idea of whales having rights has been
accepted in mainstream international law. In 2014, the International Court of Justice
ruled that Japan’s JARPA II150 research whaling program, ostensibly conducted under an
exception to the international moratorium on commercial whaling, was illegal because it
did not qualify for the scientific research exemption.151 Although ethical and
philosophical questions about the rights and wrongs of killing whales were potentially
implicated in the dispute, the Court expressly distanced itself from that aspect of the
controversy, stating that “[t]he Court is aware that members of the international
community hold divergent views about whales and whaling, but it is not for the Court to
settle these differences.”152 The issue was confined to a quite technical question of
interpreting the language of the research whaling exemption.

4.6

Is Global Animal Law Law?

The preceding discussion has covered a number of different areas in international
law and in the work of legal scholars where the problem of legal protection for animals is
addressed or alluded to. This collection of legal obligations, intergovernmental
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standards, statements of principle, and proposed initiatives is what the term “global
animal law” describes. But is it actually law?
Global animal law scholars are frank about the deficiencies of these legal
principles as an effective legal regime. Peters observes that the “piecemeal” phenomena
that have been identified as part of global animal law are not “a coherent and ‘thick’ body
of law,” because they are “fragmented, often qualified, often inconsistent, unenforceable,
and moreover unknown to most lawyers, law enforcers and legal scholars alike.”153
It is clear enough, then, that global animal law is not fully developed as something
that even its supporters would identify as law in the full sense. But interactional theory
can add important insights to this conclusion, by illuminating more specifically how
global animal law is deficient as law, and what further evolution might strengthen its
status.
4.6.1 Traditional Sources: Treaties and General Principles
The analysis presented in this thesis looks at global animal law from an
interactional, rather than a positivist perspective. This means that the inquiry is not
limited to checking for the presence of animal protection principles in the traditional
sources of international law listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.154 Interactional theory argues that just because a norm is reflected in a
recognized source of law such as a treaty, it does not automatically follow that it is fully
legal – and just because a norm emanates from a different source such as
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intergovernmental standard-making it does not necessarily follow that it is not legal. As
Brunnée puts it, “it is important to bear in mind that, while provenance from certain
‘sources’ may be ‘shorthand’ for a norm’s legal quality, the shorthand must not be
mistaken for a complete explanation.”155 At the same time, the traditional account of
sources is a useful shorthand and a good starting point for assessing the status of global
animal law.
Many norms that further the protection of animals are found in international
environmental treaties. But these provisions reflect the sensibility of global animal law
only in a very limited way. They are peripheral to legal regimes that are centrally
concerned with conservation, trade and resource management. There is also evidence
that animal protection norms in treaties are weak when evaluated using interactional
theory, especially when it comes to the criterion of congruence of official action with
stated norms – or, in other words, whether states actually comply with these norms in a
concrete way and through a practice of legality. This problem is elaborated on in Section
4.6.3 below.
The other traditional source of international law that has been put forward as a
basis for international animal protection norms is the category of general principles of
international law, which is referred to in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. General
principles are international norms that can be derived from principles pervasively
recognized in domestic legal systems, if they are so universal that they can be said to be
recognized as internationally binding norms. It has also been suggested by some jurists
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and scholars that general principles of international law may be based on natural law or
values shared universally by members of the international community.156
As discussed in Section 4.4 above, Bowman, Redgwell and Davies argue that
commitment to the principle of animal welfare is so pervasive that there may now be a
general principle of international law on this matter, which they argue would be
procedural in nature, requiring that government actions that affect animal welfare be
subject to some form of review or impact assessment.157 I have also argued that there
may be a substantive general principle of international law based on a consensus that
animals should not be subjected to undue suffering, where there is no good reason for
harming them or the suffering is completely out of proportion to the human purposes
served.158 These norms are so widely reflected in domestic legal systems, as well as
some international instruments, that there is arguably enough here to ground a general
principle of international law.
However, if a general principle concerning animal welfare exists, it is at a high
level of abstraction and it is widely disregarded in practice.159 Again, this would suggest
that even if it fits into one of the recognized sources of international law, it may not work
as binding law as interactional theory evaluates it.
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4.6.2 Shared Understandings
There can be little doubt that global shared understandings exist on some
elementary, general propositions about the significance of animals’ interests. For
example, the preceding discussion indicates that there is normative consensus to the
effect that animal sentience and animal suffering are morally significant facts that law
should recognize, and that the actions of states should at least take animal welfare into
account. There is also a solid consensus apparent in international law that the loss of a
species is a tragedy, that killing of endangered animals and actions that threaten their
habitats should be limited, and that trafficking in endangered animals and products from
them is a scourge that nations have a responsibility to prevent and discipline.
But these uncontroversial principles are general and loose, and they do not go far
in generating the kinds of actionable rules that would look more like an operational body
of law with a strong basis in social practice. They represent a widely shared but shallow
consensus, which would not be sufficient to ground what Brunnée and Toope call
“ambitious law.”160
The norms of global animal law are in the process of establishing themselves. In
constructivist terminology, they are in an early stage of the “norm cycle.”161 Finnemore
and Sikkink argue that at this early stage in their development, new international norms
can be influenced by norms that are widely established domestically: “[m]any
international norms began as domestic norms and become international through the
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efforts of entrepreneurs of various kinds.”162 This influence of domestic norms is
“strongest at the early stages of a norm’s life cycle, and domestic influences lessen
significantly once a norm has become institutionalized in the international system.”163
These observations fit quite well with the current development of global animal
law. Animal protection and especially animal welfare have long been regarded as
primarily domestic matters. The norm entrepreneurs of global animal law are translating
them into universal and global norms, in part in response to the perceived need for a
global response to transboundary animal protection problems.
Although there is evidence of a basis in shared understandings for emerging
norms of animal protection at a high level of generality, there is not much consensus –
and sometimes significant disagreement – on more specific questions about how these
principles should be reflected in action. What are the minimum required standards of
animal welfare, and do they apply across international boundaries? To what extent must
the regulation of hunting methods that conflict with principles of animal protection defer
to the cultural importance of traditional hunting? How is the protection of animals to be
balanced with economic development? What level of law enforcement resources are
states responsible for devoting to combatting illegal trade in wildlife?
It is much more difficult to resolve questions like these than it is to reach
consensus on high-level principles like the proposition that animals have some intrinsic
moral significance and deserve some legal protection. Interactional theory suggests that
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the more concrete, and more controversial, questions can only be worked out (if they can
at all) in a way that would generate consensus-based legal norms through a process of
interaction in the context of a practice of legality.164 Compare, for example, Brunnée and
Toope’s account of how specific international norms concerning climate change,
generated on the basis of vague treaty language, are being developed and reinforced
through ongoing interaction in committee meetings, compliance proceedings, and similar
settings.165 Such opportunities for interaction and for the creation and maintenance of
epistemic communities exist in global animal law to some extent through institutions like
the OIE, but it is a limited extent. Without a robust institutional structure for interactional
lawmaking, global animal law has limited ability to generate and uphold fully articulated
norms with a solid basis in shared understandings.
It is worth noting here that every one of the difficult, specific normative questions
concerning animal welfare listed above has featured, to some degree, in a controversy
implicating international trade. The international trade law regime, unlike the embryonic
collection of norms that make up global animal law, has sophisticated lawmaking
structures that might serve as a forum for some of the interactional practice of legality
around animal protection that so far does not have an institutional home of its own.
4.6.3 Noncompliance and the Congruence Requirement
One of the clearest shortcomings of global animal law when it is evaluated using
the interactional framework is the lack of consistent official action that complies with
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animal-protective principles and demonstrates recognition that these principles are legally
binding.
Congruence between official action and declared rules is one of Fuller’s criteria of
legality.166 It is also connected to the concept of constructing law through interaction in a
practice of legality.167 At the most basic level, if there is some rule that is announced as
law but official actors nevertheless actually conduct themselves as if it were not, then the
criterion of congruence is not met and, further, there is no practice of legality.168
Interactional theory’s understanding of congruence, and of practices of legality,
goes beyond simple conformity; it includes “a wider range of practices through which all
participants in the international legal system demonstrate adherence to the norm as well
as support its legality.”169 Some degree of non-conformity does not necessarily mean that
legality is destroyed: “the congruence requirement can be met even when some actors
violate or distort existing legal norms, provided that other participants in the legal system
work to maintain those norms.”170 But disputing or rejecting norms can change their
status: “depending on the circumstances, patterns of contestation may result in
strengthened, modified, or new norms,” and “[w]idespread failures to respect and uphold
a given norm … will eventually erode it.”171
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In the case of animal protection, though, there is a real possibility that the lack of
action reflecting stated principles may make it impossible to say that global animal law is
really law, or even on the way to becoming law.
As Brunnée and Toope observe:
the requirement that a norm meet the legality criterion that official
action must match the norm is a particularly tough-minded aspect of the
interactional analysis, as is the need to study the subsequent practice of
legality surrounding the norm. In standard accounts of international
law, it has been too easy to argue that a rule exists despite widespread
failure to uphold it simply because states try to justify their breaches or
keep them secret.172
Applying this “tough-minded” requirement, Brunnée and Toope conclude that the
prohibition against torture, despite widespread protestations of approbation and
adherence, has not in fact attained the status of a legal norm because there is widespread
and well documented noncompliance with it.173
The requirement of congruence of official action with norms is a high hurdle for
principles of animal protection, especially (but not only) at the international level. In
interactional theory, widespread noncompliance with a purported international norm –
which means both a lack of congruence of official action with declared norms and the
absence of a practice of legality – means that it loses or never attains the status of law.
Unpunished, unmonitored noncompliance and lack of enforcement are ubiquitous
problems when it comes to laws whose stated purpose is to protect animals.
Underenforcement is pervasive across domestic jurisdictions, as well as at the
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international level. With respect to US law, Cass Sunstein emphasizes the contrast
between the extensive animal protection laws that exist on paper and their ineffectiveness
in practice due to official inaction:
U.S. law has come to recognize a wide array of protections for animals.
Indeed, it would not be a gross exaggeration to say that federal and state
laws now guarantee a robust set of animal rights. A major problem is
that the relevant laws are rarely enforced. They exist, but for too many
animals they are not worth the paper they are written on.174
Similarly, at the international level, noncompliance with animal protection laws is
common, and the meagre protections that exist for individual animals are (in Sunstein’s
words) often not worth the paper they are written on. For example, Michael Bowman
notes that the animal welfare provisions of CITES are “routinely disregarded in the
practices of many of the parties.”175
In other writing, I have argued that the problem of meeting the congruence
requirement might be a limitation of interactional theory when it comes to explaining the
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transformation of ethical, essentially non-self-interested values, including animal
protection, into international law:
Practice compliant with norms that protect the powerless – such as
torture victims and animals – is always going to be an unlikely
occurrence, unless human beings change a great deal. Does this mean
we must accept that we must accept that only law that suits the interests
of the powerful can really become, and remain, binding international
law? … When it comes to animal welfare, a theory in which state
practice plays such a defining role is unlikely to have much room for
recognizing legal principles that protect animals for their own sake. For
human nations, rules of this type always require, at least to some extent,
that self-interest yields to a perceived ethical imperative. 176
Animal protection may be a case that calls for a modified application of the ideas
of congruence and the practice of legality, because these concepts proceed from the
proposition that law is generated and maintained by the reciprocal, collective efforts of
the interactions of participants in the legal system177 – and animals, the beings who are
most affected by the existence or absence of laws to protect them, have no capacity to
participate directly in the system.
The interactional model, especially the requirement of congruence of official
action with norms, suggests that it could be implausible for animal protection norms to
truly become law as the model defines it. This is a possibility that, disappointingly, does
reflect the practical reality of a world full of animal-protective laws not worth the paper
they are written on. However, interactional theory also proposes that law is “constructed”
and “can partly exist,” and that its creation is an aspirational activity.178 So while
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interactional theory may ultimately lead to a conclusion that evolving international norms
of animal protection have only a very limited place in law, it also permits useful
discussion of the process of constructing and aspiring to create new legal norms in the
realm of global animal law.
Finally, there is a connection here, too, to international trade law. In the WTO
context, animal protection is not a positive obligation, but only (at most) an exception to
the system’s core obligations concerning trade. But modern trade agreements outside the
WTO system (that is, preferential trade agreements) routinely include positive obligations
on environmental protection that are connected to meaningful compliance mechanisms,
and these provisions are increasingly recognized as including norms that fit into the
category of animal protection or global animal law. These developments are discussed in
more detail in Chapter Eight. For now, it is enough to say that a stronger legal
mechanism for enforcing animal protection norms in the trade context could supply part
of what is missing from global animal law, and contribute to developing and reinforcing
its legal character.

4.7

Conclusion

This chapter has presented an overview of the various animal-protective rules and
initiatives that together make up global animal law. This collection of legal and almostlegal phenomena may be described as piecemeal, incoherent, fragmented and
inconsistent. But the picture is somewhat less discouraging if we look at it as the
evidence and product of a process of constructing international law.
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Using the categories of interactional IL theory, global animal law has a place on
the “continuum of legality,”179 but it is not well established at the more definitively legal
end of the continuum. Much of the process of formation of global animal law is still
taking place at the stage of working to establish shared understandings. There are,
however, examples of law based in the traditional international legal sources (treaties and
general principles) built on those shared understandings. The extent to which these
principles are truly legal in the interactional sense, including being built and maintained
through practices of legality, remains questionable. In the case of stronger animalprotection principles, especially animal rights, even shared understandings have not
emerged supporting their instantiation in international law, but the work of persuasion
and norm entrepreneurship, and the research of epistemic communities associated with
international animal rights advocacy, have contributed to the gradual evolution of shared
understandings that are to some extent influenced by animal rights discourse.
The remaining chapters elaborate on the proposition that international trade law is
contributing to the formation of global animal law, in a way that makes up part of the
particular deficiencies that interactional theory diagnoses in this new area of international
lawmaking. Chapter Five (the next chapter) lays the groundwork for that discussion by
explaining the history and structure of the multilateral trade regime.
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Chapter 5
The International Trade Regime: Origins,
Fundamental Doctrines, and Norm Creation
5.1

Introduction

This chapter sets out an overview of the basic structure and treaty obligations of
WTO law, in order to explain their interaction with animal protection and global animal
law. The chapter begins with an account of the historical development of the trade regime
from the GATT to the WTO and the place of the trade regime in the broader landscape of
global governance. It also outlines the evolution of the trade dispute settlement system
from the GATT era to the WTO. It goes on to describe key provisions of WTO law that
are relevant to trade-related animal-protection initiatives.
The international trade regime was created to increase economic welfare, and its
justificatory and theoretical foundations come from economic theory, starting with the
classical liberal economists of the eighteenth century. But trade and trade law are bound
up with questions of international politics, distributive justice and the pursuit of
noneconomic values that economic theories do not fully address. The chapter touches on
some of those questions: why an international regime for regulating trade exists, how the
benefits and burdens of liberalized trade are allocated, and how to deal with tensions
between trade and non-trade policy objectives.
Finally, this chapter considers the WTO, in particular the DSB, as a “practice of
legality” as defined by Brunnée and Toope.1
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5.2

The History of the International Trade Regime

5.2.1 Origins: Classical Economic Arguments for Liberalized Trade
The intellectual foundations of free trade and international trade regulation begin
with theories formulated by the classical economists. The starting point is Adam Smith’s
theory of absolute advantage.2 Even more important is the theory of comparative
advantage, generally credited to David Ricardo.3 Both theories were elaborated on by
John Stuart Mill.4
Before Smith and Ricardo, the predominant political-economic theory concerning
international trade was mercantilism, which Winham sums up succinctly as a zero-sum
competition between nations to maximize their exports: “countries sought to export more
than import, and thereby to accumulate wealth and presumably power.”5 Exporting
goods in exchange for capital amounted to winning this game, and importing goods and
paying capital for them amounted to losing.6
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Smith challenged the mercantilist model by showing that nations can increase
their economic wellbeing by concentrating production where they have the most strength
and importing other products, rather than maximizing exports across the board. The
theory of absolute advantage extends to nation states Smith’s concept of the division of
labour,7 according to which each worker specializes at the task he or she does best
leading to an aggregate increase in efficiency of production. Similarly, nations have
advantages in the production of some commodities, in that they can produce those
commodities more cheaply.8
Smith argued that what is in the best interests of a nation is not simply ensuring a
favourable balance of trade (more exports than imports).9 Instead, Smith argued, nations
should purchase from foreign countries those commodities that can be imported more
cheaply than they can be made at home, and should export the commodities they can
produce efficiently.10
Smith illustrates the principle with the example of Scottish wine. While it would
be possible, by using “glasses, hotbeds and hot walls” to grow good grapes in Scotland
and make good wine out of them, it would be “at about thirty times the expense for which
at least equally good can be bought from foreign countries.”11 The example makes it
obvious that it would be unreasonable, and not conducive to accumulating greater wealth,
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for Scotland to prohibit the import of foreign wine in order to have a very expensive
domestic wine industry.12
The rise of economic liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
coincided with England’s emergence as a dominant economic force after the Napoleonic
wars.13 As a result, England had absolute advantage in the production of a lot of goods,
so in a sense, for England at least, Smith’s theory pointed to the same end result as
mercantilism, although for different reasons: England should export a lot of things and
not import very many things.
This is where Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage introduced a
counterintuitive innovation into the economic analysis of trade. Ricardo showed that
greater aggregate welfare can be realized through specializing in production of the goods
that a country is relatively best at producing, as compared to other goods, and importing
those other goods. Ricardo supports the argument with an example showing that Portugal
should import cloth from England, even if Portugal could produce the cloth at less
expense (expressed by Ricardo in terms of labour) than England could, if Portugal could
deploy that same labour more beneficially to produce wine:
To produce the wine in Portugal, might require only the labour of 80
men for one year, and to produce the cloth in the same country, might
require the labour of 90 men for the same time. It would therefore be
advantageous for her to export wine in exchange for cloth. This
exchange might even take place, notwithstanding that the commodity
12
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imported by Portugal could be produced there with less labour than in
England. Though she could make the cloth with the labour of 90 men,
she would import it from a country where it required the labour of 100
men to produce it, because it would be advantageous to her rather to
employ her capital in the production of wine, for which she would
obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by diverting a
portion of her capital from the cultivation of vines to the production of
cloth.14
In Ricardo’s example, Portugal has the absolute advantage in wine production and
cloth production. Portugal can produce wine for 80 units of labour (versus 90 in
England) and the cloth for 90 units of labour (versus 100 in England). But comparative
advantage favours using the resources to produce wine, and importing cloth. The
resources that would have been used on wine production (90 units of labour) are freed up
to be used more efficiently on cloth production (which only takes 80 units of labour.
Ricardo’s theory takes into account the opportunity cost of expending resources on the
production of cloth when those resources could be more efficiently deployed in
producing wine.
Ricardo’s theory showed that aggregate welfare increases through specialization
of production based on comparative advantage, and supports openness to imports of other
goods.15 Ricardo argued that removing obstacles to free trade between nations would
enhance both the prosperity of individual nations and collective wellbeing, and increase
international harmony:
Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally
devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are most
beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably
connected with the universal good of the whole. By stimulating
14
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industry, by rewarding ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the
peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes labour most
effectively and most economically; while, by increasing the general
mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together by
one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal society of
nations throughout the civilized world.16
The ideas of the classical economists, especially the theory of comparative
advantage, are still an important part of the justificatory basis for trade liberalization. As
Dani Rodrik, a prominent critic of economic globalization, puts it, “[t]hese ideas were
elegant, powerful, and could be stated with logical precision.”17 Contemporary accounts
of trade regulation, such as the comprehensive text by Howse, Trebilcock and Eliason,
habitually observe that the theory of comparative advantage remains “the basis of
conventional international trade theory” today.18
Classical trade theory shows how reducing regulatory barriers to trade leads to
economic benefits. Perhaps the more important insight it is the logical converse of that
statement: there are economic costs associated with restrictions on trade.
As Ricardo’s reference to “bind[ing] together … the universal society of nations
throughout the civilized world,” theories of free trade also gesture towards a less
instrumentalist proposition as well: that liberalized trade is a moral good, and that it
promotes the integration of world societies in a deeper sense.19 These arguments (both
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the purely economic arguments and the broader proposition that trade liberalization
brings about other good ends) suggest that governments should reduce barriers to trade by
lowering or eliminating tariffs and removing other regulatory obstacles to the free
movement of imports and exports across borders.
5.2.2 Bilateralism and the Most-Favoured Nation Network
British tariffs and other trade barriers on imported grains referred to as the Corn
Laws were repealed in 1846, marking an important unilateral shift towards trade
liberalization.20 In 1860, Britain and France concluded the Cobden–Chevalier treaty,
under which the two countries agreed to give each other better access to their respective
markets by lowering tariffs and barriers to imports.21 The Cobden–Chevalier treaty
included an unconditional most-favoured nation (MFN) clause.
Under the MFN obligation, each party to the treaty promises to offer the other
party (or parties, in the case of a multilateral treaty) the most favourable trade treatment
that it grants to any other country, including under agreements it may enter into with third
countries in the future.22 Cobden–Chevalier incorporated the unconditional version of the
MFN principle: Britain automatically received the most favourable treatment granted by
France in any agreement with a third country C, even if C offered no concessions to
Britain (and, reciprocally, France received the same unconditional commitment from
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Britain).23 The MFN obligation has the effect of ratcheting down barriers to trade, as the
most favourable terms agreed to between trading partners automatically extend across
any other trading relationships they are party to that include an MFN provision.
Cobden–Chevalier set off a rapid spread of bilateral trade treaties. Lazer
describes the spread of these bilateral MFN treaties, which created an “explosion of
economic openness” in the 1860s, as an “epidemic” that spread in a manner analogous to
contagion.24 The result was, in effect, a system of global free trade under a decentralized
network of bilateral treaties connected through their MFN clauses, without any
supervening institution for oversight or governance.
5.2.3 Interwar Protectionism and the Turn to Multilateral Trade
Governance
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw swings between periods of
protectionism and economic globalization.25 The economic depression of the 1870s
pushed European countries to adopt protectionist measures and raise tariffs. The MFN
treaties remained in place, but the countries that had signed up to them simply ignored
them and imposed tariffs anyway. The United States, the rising economic power, had
never been part of the free trade network, and protected its nascent industries with tariffs
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and other trade barriers.26 The nineteenth century MFN network broke down completely
in the First World War.27
Following the 1914-18 war, economic production resumed and there were new
efforts to cooperate internationally on trade. These included a 1927 treaty, the Geneva
Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, that
was an early step towards multilateral regulation of trade measures.28
In the 1930s, there was a global turn to protectionism that is widely seen as an
economic disaster. Economists generally agree that protectionism in the 1930s was both
a reaction to the Great Depression and a contributing factor to making the economic crisis
worse, and that it shares part of the blame for the descent into totalitarianism and war that
followed.29 In 1930, The US passed the Smoot-Hawley Act, imposing high tariffs on
imports.30 Other countries retaliated with their own raised tariffs in a process of
“competitive protectionism” that ratcheted trade barriers up around the world.31 A severe
downturn in global trade ensued. Trade decreased by about two thirds from 1929 to
1934.32 Trade scholars capture the mutual destruction of this protectionist arms race in
the term “beggar-thy-neighbour” protectionism.33
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Reaction to these events – a desire never to repeat them – is probably the strongest
factor motivating the creation of an international trade regime after the Second World
War.

The editors of the Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization reflect the

near-universal view among trade scholars (including those who are critics of stronger
forms of economic globalization) that 1930s-style protectionism was catastrophic:
The cataclysmic costs of ignoring this wisdom [that is, that trade
barriers damage economic growth] were illustrated most visibly in the
interwar years, when the beggar-thy-neighbour policies across nations
worsened the Great Depression and set the stage for the Second World
War. The hard lessons of rampant protectionism struck deep, and
leading negotiators of the post-war economic system displayed an
explicit recognition of the wide-ranging costs that illiberal trade policies
could yield.34
As Benvenisti might put it, the protectionist arms race and its results were a sobering
lesson on the interdependence of the inhabitants of the global high-rise.35
Beginning at the end of the Second World War, the Allies and later the wider
international community set out to create an architecture for international economic
governance. The drive to regulate global finance and trade came from shared desire to
avoid recurrence of the mutually destructive competitive protectionism of the 1930s. It
was also part of a broader project of international cooperation and institution-building in
a “period of international idealism.”36

34

Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton & Robert Stern, “Introduction” in Amrita Narlikar, Martin
Daunton & Robert Stern, eds, The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012) 1 at 3.
35
Eyal Benvenisti, “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to
Foreign Stakeholders” (2013) 107:2 AJIL 295 at 295.
36
Robert L McGeorge, “An Introduction and Commentary: Revisiting the Role of Liberal Trade
Policy in Promoting the Idealistic Objectives of the International Legal Order (1994) 14 N Ill U L Rev 305
at 306.

133

The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire in 1944, brought in the system of international financial governance known as
the Bretton Woods system, which lasted until the 1970s and aspects of which are still in
place today.37 The Bretton Woods framework was created to govern monetary policy and
currency exchange as well as trade. Two global institutions emerged from Bretton
Woods: the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, now the World Bank.38
A third institution was planned: the International Trade Organization (ITO). The
ITO, however, was blocked by opposition in the US Congress and never came into
existence.39 One of the treaties that was to have been part of the ITO legal architecture,
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),40 was provisionally concluded and
became the basis of a multilateral legal regime of trade governance, albeit one that was
quite different from and more limited than what the architects of the ITO had
envisioned.41
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5.3

The GATT Era

The term “GATT,” confusingly, can refer to more than one thing. First, there is
the treaty itself. As explained in Section 5.2.3 above, the GATT was originally
conceived as “an off-shoot of the broader and more ambitious ITO project.”42 GATT was
to have been just one part of the more extensive ITO trade regulatory architecture, but
when the US Congress declined to ratify the ITO Charter and that project came to an end,
the GATT survived. Rather than a true international economic institution, GATT was
merely “a provisional agreement, administered by the parties themselves, … that
originally was intended to address only a narrow range of tariff issues” until the process
of negotiating the ITO was completed.43
There is an element of historical accident in the fact that GATT was the only
piece of the post-war international trade regime to enter into force. At the same time,
there is also a certain logic to the survival of GATT, as it cements the parties’
commitment to the bedrock objectives that had motivated them to set up a multilateral
framework for regulating trade. The GATT parties agreed to keep tariffs at or below
fixed levels set out in schedules to the agreement, to refrain from imposing trade
restrictions arbitrarily, and to engage in successive rounds of negotiations to roll back
existing trade restrictions.44 It reversed the direction of trade policy, from the ratcheting
up of protectionism in the 1930s to a cooperative effort to progressively reduce trade
barriers. The “paramount goal” of multilateral cooperation on trade, as Howse writes, “is
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the avoidance of a protectionist summum malum – the situation where domestic social or
economic pressures lead some states to increase or reinstate barriers to trade, thus
triggering a competitive reaction in kind by other states and eventually a ‘race to the
bottom’ that is disastrous for the global economy.”45
In addition to referring to the treaty itself, the term “GATT” can also refer to what
was, in effect if not de jure, the institutional framework regulating international trade
from 1947 to 1995.46 As John Jackson, arguably the WTO’s most important intellectual
architect, wrote in his proposal to reform the international trading system in 1990, GATT
was then “generally recognized as the principal international organization and rule system
governing most of the world’s international trade.”47 Technically, GATT was not
actually an international institution, but it did roughly function as one. Because the
planned ITO structure never came into effect, GATT “had to fill the vacuum,”48 and this
happened mainly through ad hoc and improvised solutions that Jackson describes as
“makeshift arrangements.”49 The initial GATT text grew to incorporate “an interlocking
series of over 100 agreements, tariff schedules, protocols and codes of conduct.”50 The
continuing project of negotiation rounds and interpretation and management of the legal
framework also produced a kind of institutional infrastructure: a staff that became a
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Secretariat, and, eventually a GATT Council that was “the principal permanent institution
for the GATT” and had the main responsibility for directing it.51
One of the “makeshift arrangements” was a system for the settlement of disputes.
As Jackson recounts, disputes between the GATT parties were generally dealt with
through diplomatic means in the early years.52 Beginning in the 1950s, the parties
adopted a system of arbitration by a panel of experts.53 The GATT panel system retained
some of the characteristics of a diplomatic process – what Weiler has termed the “ethos
of diplomats”54 – in that it was confidential and consensus-seeking.55 Importantly, GATT
panel decisions were adopted by the parties only by consensus (if no party objected to
adoption), which meant that each GATT party had a veto over the adoption of the panel’s
decision. This naturally created an impetus for panels to craft interpretations that would
be acceptable to all, including the party that could be considered the loser in the dispute.
At the same time, the GATT arbitration system was also a move towards an
adjudicative and adversarial mode of dispute resolution. As Jackson argues, the
procedure was “more juridical … designed to arrive impartially at the truth of the facts
and the best interpretation of the law.”56 The decisions of GATT panels remain an
important source for interpretation of the treaty language. Some of the key GATT
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decisions concerning environmental measures, which are also significant for the
relationship between trade and animal protection, are discussed in Chapter 6.
Finally, the term “GATT” refers not just to the 1947 treaty, but also to the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1994,57 which incorporates into the new WTO
legal architecture both the original GATT and its accretion of side agreements, waivers,
and interpretive understandings. Technically, this component of the WTO treaties is a
distinct legal instrument from the original GATT.58 In WTO terminology, the two
agreements are referred to as GATT 1947 and GATT 1994, respectively. In this thesis
(and commonly in international trade scholarship) the term “GATT” is used for both
interchangeably, since there is (by design) continuity in the substantive legal provisions.

5.4

The WTO

The most profound and far-reaching change in the multilateral system of trade
regulation so far was the creation of the WTO in 1995. On January 1, 1995, a suite of
new treaties concluded during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (defined in the
WTO treaties as the “covered agreements”) came into force.59 They included an
agreement to bring into being a new international organization to govern world trade, the

57
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WTO.60 In the words of John Jackson, one of the architects of the WTO,61 the Uruguay
Round “fundamentally overhauled the world trading institutional system.”62
Although the creation of the WTO involved, in Jackson’s apt term, an “overhaul”
of international trade regulation, there was also continuity with the GATT era. One
important example of that continuity is the incorporation of GATT itself into the covered
agreements.63
In terms of institutional structure, the changes were significant. By contrast with
the GATT’s improvised and “makeshift” structure, the WTO is a formally constituted
international organization with personality in international law,64 specified decisionmaking processes, and a full-fledged institutional infrastructure. The new WTO
framework also included new agreements extending trade rules into new areas that had
not been covered by GATT, with its narrow focus on trade in goods.
5.4.1 The New WTO Agreements
GATT remains the primary agreement regulating trade in goods, and is therefore a
significant source of WTO legal provisions concerning animals – since live animals,
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animal parts and animal products are classified as goods.65
The WTO covered agreements extending trade rules into areas that previously had
not been regulated (or had been only minimally addressed, like agriculture66). The
adoption of these new agreements was a significant achievement in modernizing the trade
regime, bringing in areas of increasing importance in the global economy such as services
and intellectual property that were not addressed by GATT. The WTO covered
agreements include the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights67 (known as TRIPS), the General Agreement on Trade in Services68 (GATS) and
the Agreement on Agriculture.69
The WTO also brought in new agreements specifying rules on specific issues
concerning trade in goods. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade70 (TBT
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Agreement) builds on a GATT Standards Code that was signed by 32 of the then GATT
parties in 1979 following the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations.71 It applies to
technical standards and regulations, such as labeling requirements, to the extent that they
are barriers to trade. In the last decade, evolving WTO jurisprudence on the TBT
Agreement has emerged as an important area of WTO law for the trade-animal protection
relationship, because it disciplines the use of technical regulations and consumer-oriented
labeling related to the way animals were treated in the production of goods.72
In addition, the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures73 (SPS
Agreement) sets out detailed rules concerning health and safety regulations. This thesis
for the most part does not address the disputes and case law under the SPS Agreement.
This is so despite the fact that in raw numbers the highest volume of case law dealing
with animal products in WTO law is probably under the SPS Agreement. The SPS
Agreement deals with food safety, and there have been trade disputes on safety measures
adopted to restrict imports of, for example, hormone-treated beef, low-cost chicken meat,
and live pigs.74 But these disputes are of little interests from the point of view of animal

71
Arkady Kudryavtsev, “The TBT Agreement in Context” in Tracey Epps & Michael J
Trebilcock, eds, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2013) 17 at 19.
72
These cases, including the panel decision in EC – Seal Products, are discussed in Chapters 6 and
7.
73
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 493 (SPS Agreement).
74
Charlotte Blattner, “An Assessment of Recent Trade Law Developments from an Animal Law
Perspective: Trade Law as the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?” (2016) 22 Animal L 277 at 290; see also Clive
JC Phillips, The Animal Trade: Evolution, Ethics and Implications (Wallingford and Boston: CABI, 2015)
at 37-38 (on chicken import bans). See also the discussion in Section 6.4 below of WTO disputes that deal
with the way animal-derived food is made and sold, but not in a way that has to do with the welfare of the
animals.

141

protection, because animals feature in them only as products, with no consideration of the
animals as beings with their own interests.
Specific provisions of these treaties (especially GATT and the TBT Agreement)
that have been applied and interpreted in case law relevant to animal protection are
summarized in Section 5.5 below.
5.4.2 The WTO Dispute Settlement Body
One of the most important new trade institutions that was created in 1995 is the
WTO’s dispute settlement body (DSB). As discussed in Section 5.3, GATT had
developed, or improvised, a partly judicialized system for arbitrating disputes between
the parties. That system was significantly reformed when the WTO was created.
The WTO covered agreements include a new treaty on dealing with disputes, the
Dispute Settlement Understanding75 (DSU). The changes from the GATT practice on
dispute settlement are important. Members of the WTO accept compulsory and exclusive
jurisdiction of the WTO DSB over all disputes arising under the covered agreements.76
The DSU also established an Appellate Body to hear appeals from panel decisions.77
The creation of the Appellate Body was one of the most significant innovations of
the WTO dispute settlement system, and marked a more definitive move in the direction
of judicialized, court-like resolution of disputes.78 Decisions of panels (unless appealed)
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and of the Appellate Body are adopted unless there is a consensus decision not to adopt.79
This “reverse consensus” rule is the opposite of the GATT approach, where a positive
consensus was required and any party could veto adoption. As a practical matter, the
reverse consensus rule effectively makes it certain that DSB decisions will be adopted.
In a recent article looking back on twenty years of the WTO Appellate Body,
Howse emphasizes that the Appellate Body has “creat[ed] itself as an independent, semiautonomous judicial branch of the WTO system” and functions as an international trade
court.80 Other features of the dispute settlement system, including compulsory
jurisdiction and binding decisions, also represent a move towards a “rule-of-law” ethos.81
Weiler, similarly, argues that the changes to dispute settlement represent a shift
away from the diplomacy-infused GATT culture and towards judicialization and the rule
of law.82 As Weiler contends, the WTO must deal with the simultaneous challenges of
both “internal” and “external” legitimation, by which he means, respectively, legitimacy
as judged by the trade insider community and legitimacy as judged by the outside world
and by the various constituencies for whom the trade regime has “deep social and
political consequences.”83 Howse asserts that the Appellate Body “viewed itself as being,
in some sense, accountable to those out in the world, stakeholders representing other
values and interests than those given primacy by the trade policy insiders.”84
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The DSB, and in particular the Appellate Body, have a critical role in interpreting
and applying the sometimes opaque or deliberately vague language of the WTO covered
agreements. This task also involves balancing the values prioritized by trade insiders, on
the one hand, and other constituencies (including advocates of social justice,
environmental stewardship, and animal protection) on the other.
Getting this balance right has been essential to preserving the legitimacy of WTO
rulings and even the multilateral trade regulatory system itself. There is generally
consensus among scholars that the Appellate Body has so far been successful in steering
this course, and the dispute settlement mechanism enjoys a reputation as the most
effective WTO institution.85 The WTO dispute settlement panels and especially the
Appellate Body are an important place for the articulation and refinement of norms in
WTO law, in interaction and dialogue with other norms, including those of non-WTO
international law.86

5.5

Key Legal Provisions Relevant to Animal Protection

The WTO covered agreements are extensive. There are many provisions and
agreements that could potentially be at issue in trade controversies that touch in some
way on animal protection. But particular provisions of two of the agreements, GATT and
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the TBT Agreement, have turned out to play the most important role in GATT and WTO
cases involving measures aimed at animal protection. In different ways, these treaty rules
express the central dilemma of international trade disputes: the balance between the
multilateral commitment to liberalized trade and nondiscrimination, on the one hand, and
the ability to regulate in furtherance of nontrade policy objectives (including animal
protection), on the other.87
5.5.1 GATT
GATT sets out the core commitments of participants in the multilateral trading
regime. Barriers to trade at the borders are either prohibited or allowed only in
accordance with agreed limits. For the most part, tariffs are allowed (as long as they are
within agreed-on levels), but non-tariff barriers are supposed to be removed. Existing
tariffs are to be reduced through rounds of negotiation. Within national borders imported
goods have to be treated in a nondiscriminatory way, so that states cannot get around
their commitments to provide access at the border by imposing additional taxes or other
disadvantageous treatment on imported goods once they are inside.
An essential companion of and companion to these disciplines is the principle that
sovereign states retain their right to regulate on matters of public interest. GATT and
WTO jurisprudence reflects an ongoing effort to achieve the right balance between these
basic norms.
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5.5.1.1

Border Measures

Under Article II of GATT, the GATT parties (now WTO members) agree to be
bound by tariffs set out in schedules to the agreement, which are updated reflecting the
results of ongoing rounds of negotiation. Barriers other than tariffs imposed at the border
such as outright bans or quotas on imports and exports, are prohibited under Article XI.
GATT’s nondiscrimination rules concern the conditions that products are subject
to when they are in commerce in the internal market within a country. While the rules on
tariffs and non-tariff barriers discipline what can be done at the border, the Article I and
III nondiscrimination rules prevent end-runs around those commitments by, for example,
subjecting imports to an additional sales tax once they are inside the border, or subjecting
them to materially more difficult internal marketing conditions.
5.5.1.2

Nondiscrimination

Nondiscrimination can be divided into two subsidiary principles. One is the MFN
principle, introduced in Section 5.2.2 above: each party to the treaty agrees
unconditionally to give all the other parties treatment at least as favourable as that which
it extends to any other trading partner. As a behind-the-border nondiscrimination
principle, MFN means that countries cannot, for example, treat imports from one country
better than imports from another when it comes to internal taxes, regulations and
conditions for the placement of the product on the internal market. Article I:1 of GATT
establishes the MFN rule: any “advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” granted to
products originating from or destined for another country, whether in the form of internal
taxes and other charges or any kind of law or regulation that affects the sale of the
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product, must be granted to all “like” products coming from or going to all other GATT
contracting parties.
The companion nondiscrimination principle is national treatment (NT). The NT
principle set out in Article III of GATT provides that internal taxes and regulations
cannot be used in a protectionist manner, and WTO members cannot apply extra internal
taxes to imports that are not also applied to similar domestic products. Imported goods
imported from another WTO member must be accorded “treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin.”
In short, NT requires WTO members to refrain from discriminating against other
WTO members for the benefit of their domestic producers and industries, and MFN
requires each WTO member not to discriminate between other WTO members, to
disadvantage one in a way that benefits another. All the participants in the system commit
to ensuring a level playing field.
These commitments could give rise to problematic limits on the freedom of
domestic governments to regulate in pursuit of legitimate public policy objectives. An
important factor that has increased the risk of trade rules impinging on regulatory
sovereignty is the tradition of interpreting GATT’s nondiscrimination rules to mean that
de facto or differential impact discrimination, as well as facial discrimination, is prima
facie prohibited.88 Therefore, the NT and MFN obligations could apply to a potentially
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very extensive universe of regulations that make distinctions between products without
deliberately targeting imports, but in a way that happens to affect imported products more
than domestic ones, or to affect imports from one country more than imports from
another.
The prohibition of de facto discrimination has been a consideration in the area of
animal protection, where a WTO member might (for example) want to adopt relatively
high welfare requirements for animal food production and require that products cannot be
sold in its domestic market unless they comply with those standards. Imports from
lower-welfare jurisdictions would be disproportionately affected by such a restriction, as
compared to domestic goods produced in compliance with the local welfare standards.
Although such a differential impact would not, at least not directly, arise from the fact
that the imported goods are imported, but rather from the lower welfare standards under
which they were produced, it would probably give rise to a prima facie violation of the
GATT NT rule as it is currently interpreted.89
5.5.1.3

The General Exceptions

Given the far-reaching scope of the nondiscrimination norms, there is a need for a
counterbalancing principle that creates enough space in WTO law for members to pursue
legitimate policy objectives. In GATT, that principle is set out in the general exceptions
in Article XX. As Hoekman notes, “[d]eference to domestic regulation is built into the
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system,”90 and GATT Article XX is one of the key places where this deference appears in
the WTO covered agreements.
Article XX sets out an enumerated list of objectives in the furtherance of which
states are permitted to adopt regulatory measures notwithstanding the other GATT rules.
The following subsections are relevant to animal protection:
•

Article XX(a): measures necessary to protect public morals;

•

Article XX(b): measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; and

•

Article XX(g): measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources.91

The Article XX exceptions are limited by the proviso in the text that introduces
the list, which is referred to as the “chapeau.” The chapeau requires that such measures
not be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade.”
This combination of provisions sets up what seems to be a somewhat logically
peculiar framework: discrimination and restrictions on trade are or may be a prima facie
violation of GATT rules, but they are permissible if they fit into one or more of the
general exceptions – but, in turn, the exceptions are only available if the measure is
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applied in a way that is not discriminatory (at least, not arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminatory) or restrictive (at least, not stealthily restrictive).
The chapeau has been interpreted by the Appellate Body as limiting the
availability of the exceptions to situations where they are used in good faith, reflecting a
form of abus de droit principle.92 Compliance with the chapeau has been the decisive
question in some important WTO animal cases, including EC – Seal Products.93
5.5.2 The TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement establishes rules about what WTO members are allowed to
do with respect to technical rules that affect traded goods, especially labelling. In recent
case law, it has emerged as an important source of law in trade matters concerning
animals.
The TBT Agreement aims to reduce barriers to trade that arise from inconsistent
technical standards internationally, and from the imposition of technical standards that
are unnecessarily trade-restrictive.94 The most important TBT Agreement provisions in
the case law that is relevant to animal protection are Articles 2.1 and 2.2. These rules
apply to “technical regulations” as defined in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement: a
document “which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and
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production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which
compliance is mandatory.”
Whether a measure at issue in a WTO dispute is a technical regulation is a
threshold question, and there is some uncertainty (and an evolving approach in the case
law) on this question.95 It does at least appear clear that these articles apply to many
(maybe all) product labeling schemes; “labelling requirements” are expressly mentioned
as an example of something that may be included in the term “technical regulation.”96
These provisions may, therefore, apply to programs such as labeling schemes informing
consumers about the animal welfare impact of food products, or requirements to label
real animal fur as such and disclose what species it came from.
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides that in respect of technical
regulations, WTO members “shall ensure that … products imported from the territory of
any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.” This
provision establishes both MFN and NT obligations regarding technical regulations, but
without a GATT Article XX-like exceptions clause in the text. The WTO case law has,
however, interpreted the provision to mean that legitimate regulatory distinctions are
permitted.97
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Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement requires members to ensure that technical
regulations “are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade” and that technical regulations “shall
not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account
of the risks non-fulfilment would create.” Article 2.2 lists some examples of legitimate
regulatory objectives, but, unlike the enumerated exceptions in GATT Article XX, it is
not a closed list. Legitimate objectives include “protection of human health or safety,
animal plant life or health, or the environment.”
It is probably evident from this brief summary that the TBT Agreement is quite
similar in its structure to GATT. There is a prohibition on discriminating against other
WTO members and creating unnecessary obstacles to trade, coupled with exceptions that
provide space for regulating in the furtherance of legitimate policy objectives. The
difference is that it applies to “technical regulations,” which may include measures to
which GATT does not apply. The following chapters go into more detail on how the
TBT Agreement has been interpreted and applied in animal protection cases. Chapter Six
discusses the WTO Appellate Body’s interpretation of these provisions in the context of
the third tuna-dolphin case, which dealt with the US regulatory requirements for labeling
tuna as “dolphin safe.”98 Chapter Seven looks in detail at the WTO panel and Appellate
Body decisions on the TBT Agreement in EC – Seal Products, and what that decision
says about the relationship between the TBT Agreement and GATT.99
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5.5.3 Other Provisions: Sustainable Development and Agriculture
Some other provisions in the WTO covered agreements deserve mention here
because they are potentially significant to the discussion of trade and animal protection.
The first paragraph of the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization indicates that part of the overarching purpose of international
trade and economic endeavours is “the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development.”100 The reference to sustainable
development in the introductory text of WTO’s founding document – what amounts to its
mission statement – may be a place in the WTO treaties for a connection to animal
protection.
The connection is perhaps not immediately obvious, if sustainable development is
thought of only as a question of balancing economic prosperity with environmental
protection. But Rawles has argued that animal welfare should be recognized as a “pillar”
of sustainable development, along with the economic, environmental and social justice
pillars. Rawles argues that the real challenge of sustainable development is about
articulating values, and the values of sustainability indispensably include animal welfare:
[Sustainability] is about articulating our vision, or visions, of an
ethically decent society. At a minimum, this must be one in which all
people, rather than just a minority, are enabled to achieve a basic
quality of life; and one in which the non-human world is respected and
looked after … Part of this respect involves … [acknowledging] that the
living world is not just a set of resources for the benefit of one
species…The idea of an ethically decent society is simply not
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compatible with a society that systematically treats sentient animals in
its care merely as things.101
Agriculture is a sector that obviously has a significant impact on animals and
animal welfare. Animals are not expressly mentioned in the Agreement on
Agriculture,102 but the preamble to the agreement states that members should pursue
reforms of agricultural trade “having regard to non-trade concerns, including food
security and the need to protect the environment.” Animal welfare is such a “non-trade
concern” at least for some WTO members. In 2000, the EU brought a proposal to the
WTO Committee on Agriculture on “Animal Welfare and Trade in Agriculture.”103 The
proposal notes that
There is an increasing awareness among consumers and producers
about the effects that breeding and farming techniques may have on
animals, on their health and welfare and, not least, on the environment.
More and more, consumers claim their right to make informed choice
between products, including products produced to different welfare
standards. To enable them to make such a choice they want to be
informed about how farm animals are kept, transported and slaughtered.
The producers, on whom such demands are made, want a stable and
coherent basis on which to provide such information.104
The EU proposed addressing animal welfare as an emerging trade concern not just
in the context of the agricultural trade discussions but “globally” and “in a consistent
manner within the WTO.”105 One suggestion was to pursue “multilateral agreements
dealing with the protection of animal welfare” with a view to achieving “greater legal
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clarity on the relationship between WTO rules and trade measures taken pursuant to
provisions of multilateral animal welfare agreements.”106 Although the EU’s proposal
was not taken up, mainly because of opposition from developing country members,107 the
concerns raised about animal welfare in the WTO context remain and have only become
more prominent in the years since it was put forward.

5.6

Theoretical Questions About the International Trade

Regime
Classical economics sets out an elegant and persuasive case for liberalized trade
as an instrument of economic welfare maximization, but international relations involve
much more than just maximizing wealth, and the emergence of the multilateral trade
governance framework implicates numerous other complex and challenging normative
and political questions. Here I address three questions about the theoretical basis for
international trade regulation. First, why should there be international regulation of
international trade? Second, what is the relationship between international trade law and
problems of distributive justice and economic inequality? Third, how does trade law
limit the freedom of nation states to regulate in furtherance of their own domestic policy
objectives?
These questions connect the traditional economic theories of trade to our current
debates about economic globalization and the relationship between trade rules and noneconomic values (one of which, importantly for the present analysis, is animal
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protection). They are also relevant to understanding the nature of the WTO as an
institution that brings global governance and the rule of law to international trade
regulation, making it a place of extensive, ongoing interaction around the interpretation,
application and contestation of legal norms – in other words, in interactional theory’s
language, the site of a practice of legality.
5.6.1 Why International Regulation of Trade?
The first question is why we have a multilateral legal regime regulating
international trade. The economic theory of comparative advantage, discussed above,
supports the removal of trade barriers, but it is not a theoretical foundation for a regime of
international trade law. The theory suggests that it is in each nation’s individual interest
to open its own markets. This would be the case whether or not other nations do the
same; the theory predicts that the nation will be better off if it focuses production where it
has a comparative advantage and imports where it does not, although the advantages
would logically be increased if other nations reciprocally reduced trade barriers and
increased the efficiency of production.108
Because comparative advantage says that unilateral elimination of trade barriers
makes sense for every nation state individually, it does not explain why there should be a
system of reciprocal international legal obligations whereby the community of nation
states commits multilaterally to the reduction of barriers.109 A nation’s decision on
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whether or not, purely as a matter of self-interest, it should follow the logic of
comparative advantage and open up its own markets to imports is a self-interested, selfregarding decision, to the extent that such a concept makes sense for a collectivity.
To return to Benvenisti’s metaphor, this kind of decision-making framework is
appropriate for a nation understood as being like the owner of “a large estate separated
from other properties by rivers and deserts.”110 But we no longer live in such a world; we
are now in the “densely packed high-rise,”111 where states are more interdependent and
where the effects of their actions are not isolated. The cascading disaster of competitive
protectionism in the 1930s demonstrated the need for a cooperative, multilateral
governance regime to contain such damaging impulses.
Modern trade law has additional, and even more complex, challenges to deal with
in the relationship between trade rules and other aspects of global and domestic
governance, including fairness to developing countries in the global trade system and the
balance between trade liberalization and regulatory sovereignty. It would be almost
unimaginable to deal with these complex governance problems without a sophisticated
global institution to oversee them and provide the infrastructure for negotiating and
addressing them.
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5.6.2 What is the Relationship between Trade and Distributive
Justice?
The second important justificatory question for the international trade regime is
whether it really makes people in general better off in a way that is fair and just. There
has been criticism of economic globalization on this basis for as long as there has been
economic globalization. Such criticisms have new prominence today in the popular
backlash against free trade. However elegant and compelling comparative advantage
may be as a theoretical demonstration of the benefits of trade liberalization, in the real
world it is a more complex matter to evaluate its effects in increasing people’s economic
welfare, and especially in terms of distributive justice.
Freer trade may produce a net increase in aggregate economic welfare, but there
are costs associated with taking away protection from domestic industries. The benefits
and costs tend to be unevenly distributed. Specific industries and individual workers may
be adversely affected by the loss of protection from foreign competition, even if there are
diffusely dispersed beneficial effects to consumers and the economy overall.112
Many critics of globalization believe that liberalized trade is disproportionately
harmful to developing countries, because it exposes them to global competition without
the benefit of a period of protection that would enable domestic industries to establish
themselves.113 Rodrik argues that classical economic theory presents a simple case for
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the benefits of trade liberalization, while the real picture is more complex: sustainable
prosperity and stability require markets embedded in a robust infrastructure of effective
regulation.114 Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel prize winner in economics and former chief
economist of the World Bank, who is one of the most prominent critics of economic
globalization, argues that globalization has exacerbated inequalities both within and
between countries.115
The economic benefits and burdens of trade are not directly related to the
relationship between animal protection and trade, but they form part of the background
against which trade governance efforts have to be understood. For example, new PTAs
(discussed in Chapter Eight) are often very controversial, because they may be thought to
exploit developing countries or to damage legacy industries in developed ones. Efforts to
mitigate these concerns have inspired trade lawmakers to pay more attention to the
connections between trade and social policy, which is addressed in the next Section.
5.6.3 How Does Trade Law Constrain Regulatory Sovereignty?
The third point is the most directly relevant to the relationship between trade and
animal protection. To the extent that sovereign states take on international legal
obligations to reduce trade barriers and allow imported goods access to their markets,
they also accept constraints on the choices they can make both in the pursuit of non-trade
objectives. Therefore, trade disciplines can be, and arguably to some degree are
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inherently, in some degree of tension with the pursuit of non-trade policy goals, including
animal protection.
This tension has been a central focus of debates about international trade
regulation for many years, and in a more visible way since the creation of the WTO in
1995. That period saw two important developments: the emergence of a strong
framework of multilateral trade governance, and the rise of environmentalism as a policy
priority internationally as well as domestically for many countries. The potential for
trade law to hold back progress on protecting the environment, the apparent tension
between trade values and environmental values, and the possibility for solutions that
reflected both sets of values and even made them mutually reinforcing, were all
prominent themes of the 1990s (and subsequent) debates about trade and the
environment.116 Trebilcock describes the trade-environment relationship as still “one of
the most controversial issues on the current trade policy agenda.”117
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Analogous controversies arise out of the relationship between international trade
law and other important value-infused policy areas, including labour rights,118 human
rights more generally,119 development,120 and health and safety.121 This broader category
of policy problems that are not directly about trade, but are implicated by trade law and
policy, is sometimes referred to as the “trade and…” debate (trade and environment, trade
and labour, and so on), or alternatively as “linkages” between trade and other global
challenges.
The linkages debate raises problems of a different order from the controversies
concerning the economic benefits and disadvantages of trade and how they are
distributed. It is concerned with what may be lost or compromised in the way of non-
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economic values, whatever the results of trade liberalization in terms of economic welfare
may be. As Joost Pauwelyn, one of the leading scholars of conflicts between trade and
non-trade international norms, puts it, there is
more to life than money. The statistics show that trade liberalisation
does increase welfare … But at the same time, trade is but an
instrument to achieve nobler goals: the prevention of war; raising
standards of living and the creation of jobs, not just in the rich countries
but also in the developing world; political freedom and respect for
human rights; social protection and an equitable distribution of wealth;
the fight against environmental degradation and the protection of public
health; etc.122
A quarter of a century after the creation of the WTO, the literature on linkages
between trade and other policy areas is extensive and multifaceted. The interaction
between trade disciplines and regulatory autonomy in the pursuit of non-trade policy
goals is of great significance for the institutional legitimacy of the WTO and of the very
idea of multilateral trade governance.
The linkages between animal protection and trade are a relatively new part of this
discussion, but there is already an extensive literature on the question.123 But it remains
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the case that animal protection has so far been a marginal subject compared to the
headline issues such as the environment and human rights. And prior to the EC – Seal
Products decision, since there was no WTO jurisprudence expressly and primarily
dealing with regulation to protect animal welfare, much of the discussion was necessarily
speculative. Part of the purpose of this thesis is to bring animal protection more visibly
and more fully into the “etc.” at the end of Pauwelyn’s list of “nobler goals” that the trade
linkages debate is concerned with.

5.7

Trade Law and Practices of Legality

In Chapter Four, I argued that global animal law is currently at an early stage of
development as law in part because there are limited opportunities for it to be articulated,
interpreted and maintained through sustained interaction of a characteristically legal type
– what Brunnée and Toope describe as a practice of legality.124 Interactional theory
posits that this is a necessary condition for authoritative and legitimate law to emerge.
By contrast with global animal law, international trade law is a much more
mature, more institutionally robust area of international law. It has well established
structures where interaction in a characteristically legal mode regularly takes place.125
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The WTO’s dispute settlement body is the most significant of these. Also important,
although they are still new and much less institutionally established than the WTO, are
the mechanisms for consultation, cooperation and enforcement under new PTAs,
discussed in Chapter Eight.
The WTO DSB exhibits the characteristics of a practice of legality. It is a
judicialized dispute settlement system that organizes itself in accordance with what Fuller
would call the criteria of legality. In Howse’s words, it adheres to a “rule-of-law”
ethos.126 The DSB, especially the Appellate Body, has established its independence from
the policy agenda of WTO insiders, and has successfully navigated the need to uphold its
own legitimacy both internally and externally. The discussion of major trade and animal
protection cases in Chapter Six, and of EC – Seal Products in Chapter Seven, expands on
how the DSB in those disputes has achieved a careful balance between trade and nontrade objectives, and has insisted on adherence to rule-of-law criteria like nonarbitrariness and transparency.
Understanding the WTO DSB as the site of a practice of legality adds insight into
the importance of the WTO’s engagement with animal welfare in EC – Seal Products.
Certainly, it is surprising, and heartening, that an institution many observers thought of as
an enemy to progress on animal protection has engaged with the problem in a
sympathetic and positive way. But that is not what is most important about the decision.
It is more significant that it adds to the development of global animal law in the specific
way that only the interpretation and application of norms through interaction in a practice
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of legality can – because it is precisely this kind of lawmaking through interaction that
has been in short supply for global animal law so far.

5.8

Conclusion

This chapter has set out a basic account of how and why the international trade
regime evolved, and of the main provisions of WTO law that are especially significant in
the relationship between trade law and global animal law. This background information
is presented mainly to set the stage for the more in-depth analysis of specific trade
disputes and cases that follows in Chapters Six and Seven. A background explanation of
the key treaty provisions and doctrines is required for that analysis to make sense.
In addition, I have proposed that international trade law is the site of specifically
legal forms of interaction that are more relevant to the formation of global animal law
than they might seem. International trade law is not about animal protection; animal
protection is at most a peripheral “non-trade concern” that has a place in the category of
“linkages” along with other policy objectives such as human rights, labour, and the
environment. But international trade law does provide opportunities for shaping animal
protection norms in the context of a practice of legality. From the perspective of
interactional law, those opportunities have significant potential to support the
development of global animal law as law.
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Chapter 6
6.1

Animal Protection Controversies and
International Trade Law

Introduction

Some of the most important cases and controversial disputes in the history of the
international trade system have been about laws adopted – or proposed, but not adopted –
to protect animals. This chapter is an overview of some of the key trade-animal conflicts
that came up before the EC – Seal Products decision.
The chapter covers, first, the landmark GATT and WTO cases on dolphin and sea
turtle protection. Although these disputes are usually considered “trade and
environment” cases, I argue that they both illustrate and build links between animal
welfare and the environment. Jurisprudentially, these cases are important precursors to
EC – Seal Products.
The chapter then goes on to consider controversies about animal welfare and trade
prior to EC – Seal Products. These are conflicts that have arisen when the EU, trying to
uphold its own relatively strict animal welfare standards, sought to restrict imports of
lower-welfare products. The products in question are fur from animals caught using cruel
trapping methods, animal agriculture products from countries with lower standards of
welfare for farmed animals, and cosmetic products tested on animals.
Because the dolphin and sea turtle by-catch disputes were litigated and resulted in
decisions from the GATT and WTO dispute settlement systems, most of the legal
analysis in this chapter focuses on those cases. The other controversies (fur, farmed
animal welfare and cosmetics testing) can be described as disputes in the broad sense –
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that is, disagreements between participants in the trade system about what was and was
not allowed. But they did not result in formal proceedings or judicial decisions. The
discussion therefore looks at the arguments and negotiations that took place between the
parties involved about how to balance trade with the protection of animal welfare.
I argue that the disputes analyzed in this chapter are case studies in the formation
of international legal norms, using the interactional theoretical framework of Brunnée and
Toope.1 The interaction between states, domestic lawmakers, trade institutions, NGOs
and other participants in these controversies has resulted in the generation of norms based
on shared understandings. While the normative overlapping consensus that emerges is
limited in ways that can be frustrating for animal advocates, it is the kind of common
ground that interactional theory says is needed as a foundation for binding law.
Furthermore, the scrutiny and discussion of these norms in the context of trade
conflicts has begun a process of articulating them within a “practice of legality” in a way
that exhibits the distinctive characteristics of legal norms. This type of interaction,
according to Brunnée and Toope’s theory, is exactly what is required for norms to
develop into international law.

6.2

The By-catch Cases

The first category of cases to be discussed involve efforts to limit by-catch of
marine animals – dolphins and sea turtles – in commercial fishing. Such efforts have
included trade measures targeting products from countries with different or lower
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standards on by-catch. Conflicts over such measures began in the GATT period and
continued after the creation of the WTO.
“By-catch” means unintentional capture of mraine animals which are not the
target of a commercial operation.2 Fisheries by-catch is a serious challenge to the
conservation of marine species. It has been described as “the single greatest threat to
many populations of marine mammals in the United States and elsewhere.”3 Guidelines
for by-catch reduction created in 2011 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations refer to “growing concern that levels of fishing mortality as a result of
bycatch and discards threaten the long-term sustainability of many fisheries and the
maintenance of biodiversity in many areas.”4
The central problem in this cluster of trade disputes arises when one WTO
member adopts legislation banning fishing methods that involve a high risk of by-catch,
and at the same time also restricts trade in products from other countries that were fished
using methods that are not as strict on reducing by-catch risk. This situation illustrates
that domestic legislation alone is not enough to deal with transboundary animal
protection problems, and that trade measures may be an effective, perhaps essential, way
to make animal protection laws effective. Fishing takes place across and beyond national
jurisdictional limits, and the marine animals that these measures seek to protect also
straddle and migrate over international borders. The regulation of fisheries by-catch is
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therefore what Bruce Wagman and Matthew Liebman categorize as a problem that calls
for an international solution because it involves “international animals”:
Just as international problems require international solutions, so too do
“international animals.” Geographic borders between nations are
artificial human creations, produced by geopolitical shifts in power and
cartography. Animals do not recognize or respect international
boundaries, and their ranges may traverse these artificial constructs.5
Countries affected by trade measures aimed at reducing by-catch suffer
disadvantages. Their products may be shut out of the market of the country that enacted
the legislation, or the products may be seen as less desirable by consumers because they
cannot be sold with a “safe” label. From their point of view, these initiatives can seem
like an attempt to legislate extraterritorially, using trade penalties as a way for the
legislating country to manipulate or pressure others into adopting its preferred standards.
The two key WTO disputes, each of which is really a series of connected disputes,
concern dolphin by-catch in tuna fishing, and by-catch of endangered sea turtles in
shrimp fishing.
6.2.1 Tuna and Dolphins
The tuna-dolphin disputes6 began before the creation of the WTO, when the
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dispute settlement system under GATT was still relatively weak and could only issue
non-binding decisions.7
When the tuna-dolphin saga began in the early 1990s, toward the end of the
GATT period, two important developments were unfolding in global society. One was
the growth of global environmental consciousness and a sense of a pressing need for
action to protect nature and the environment.8 The second was the Uruguay Round of
GATT negotiations that would eventually culminate in the remaking of the multilateral
trade regime and the creation of the WTO.9 The tuna-dolphin disputes illustrate the tug
of war between trade liberalization and environmental protection.
The tuna-dolphin disputes started with a fishing technique known as “setting on”
dolphins. In the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) – an area that extends from the
coast of Southern California south to Chile and west to Hawaii10 – certain species of
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dolphins are known to associate with large yellowfin tuna.11 Fishermen in the region
exploit this association by chasing and herding dolphins at the surface in order to locate
tuna schools, which they then catch using large purse-seine nets, encircling the dolphins
at the surface and then drawing in the top of the net to trap the fish below.12 After
fishermen have started to bring the net on board, the dolphins are released through a
“back-down” procedure where the fishing vessel is reversed to let the dolphins out when
the net is about halfway in.13 The association of dolphins and tuna only occurs in the
ETP, so the “setting-on” method is not used in other fisheries.
Setting on dolphins combined with purse-seine fishing involves a number of
different risks of harm and mortality to dolphins:
Sudden strong currents can collapse the net, trapping the dolphins
inside. Dolphins sometimes panic at the sight of the boats and become
entangled in the net’s sides. When setting the nets at night … it is
difficult for fishermen to see the dolphins or predict their movements,
and dolphins can become entangled in the net as it is set. Additionally,
nets lost or abandoned in rough weather … can continue to trap
dolphins as they float unattended through the ocean.14
In the 1980s, an American marine biologist went undercover as a cook on a Panamanian
tuna vessel and documented the slaughter of dolphins from purse-seine tuna fishing;
based on that evidence, the practice was described by one scholar as “brutal
annihilation.”15
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association Southwest Fisheries Science Center, “The
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US lawmakers adopted a strict approach on marine mammal by-catch under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 197216 (MMPA).17 The MMPA prohibits all
incidental “taking” of marine mammals in commercial fishing – defined to include
harassment, hunting, capture and killing – except by permit, with the aim of ensuring that
the rate of mortality and serious injury in marine mammals approaches zero.18
But the MMPA moratorium only applies to American fishing vessels and to
foreign vessels in American waters.19 Dolphin mortality caused by the US tuna fishing
fleet reduced significantly in the 1980s as the US fleet shifted to the Western Pacific,
where the “setting on” dolphins method is not used. Other countries’ fishing fleets
moved into the gap. Mexico, Venezuela, Vanuatu and Colombia took over dominance of
the tuna fishery in the ETP.20
In the 1980s, the US amended the MMPA to ban imports of yellowfin tuna that
did not meet US standards of marine mammal protection. The MMPA as amended
provides that “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of commercial
fish or products from fish which have been caught with commercial fishing technology
which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in
excess of United States standards.”21 For yellowfin tuna fished in the ETP using purse
seine nets, the exporting nation had to show that it had a program in place to reduce
incidental taking of dolphins comparable to the US program, and that the average rate of

16
17

58-61.

16 USC §1361 et seq.
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dolphin by-catch was comparable to the average rate of incidental taking of dolphins by
US fishing vessels.22 The MMPA also imposed requirements for imports from
intermediary nations (defined as nations that import tuna and tuna products from nations
subject to the US ban and also export those products to the US), embargoing all imports
of tuna from those nations unless they prohibited imports of products covered by the US
ban.23
The embargo of yellowfin tuna under the MMPA, in turn, triggered a rule known
as the Pelly Amendment (adopted in 1971 as an amendment to fisheries legislation
predating the MMPA).24 A certification under the Pelly amendment empowers the
President to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to ban imports of all fish and fish
products from a country that has been determined to be diminishing the effectiveness of
an international fishery conservation program.
The US also adopted a “dolphin safe” labelling scheme. In 1991, the Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act25 (DPCIA) took effect. The DPCIA states that it is
US policy to “eliminate the marine mammal mortality resulting from the intentional
encirclement of dolphins and other marine mammals in tuna purse seine fisheries” and
ensure that the market of the US does not act as an incentive to use fishing methods with
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a high risk to dolphins.26 It created a voluntary labeling program, under which tuna
exported from or offered for sale in the US could be labeled as dolphin safe if it met
certain conditions. Generally, tuna could not legally be marketed as dolphin safe if it
contained tuna fished in the ETP using the purse-seine method. There was an exception
to this general prohibition if certain statements were provided that no dolphins were
intentionally encircled in the fishing trip.27
The MMPA and the DPCIA effectively penalized ETP tuna fishing nations for not
meeting US standards on dolphin protection, by limiting their access to the lucrative US
market – or cutting it off completely. These measures are an example of what Charnovitz
calls a “stick” to incentivize cooperation on environmental matters.28 More precisely,
Charnovitz categorizes domestic measures of this type as “external” sticks, not contained
within an international environmental agreement or regime, but imposed separately. 29 In
this case, the “stick” was used at least in part not to enforce international environmental
law at all, but, rather, to enhance the efficacy of US domestic standards.30
6.2.1.1

Tuna-Dolphin I: First GATT Panel Decision

Mexico, one of the countries affected by the MMPA embargo and the DPCIA
dolphin-safe labelling rules, requested consultations under GATT and then proceeded to a
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panel hearing. The panel issued its report in September 1991.31 This first tuna-dolphin
report may be the most famous GATT decision,32 even though it was not adopted by the
GATT parties and much of its legal analysis is at least questionable today.
Mexico wanted the panel to find that the US measures were both discriminatory
measures and import restrictions prohibited under GATT. The panel agreed with Mexico
that the US legislation was inconsistent with GATT.
The panel found that the import bans on certain yellowfin tuna and tuna products
were quantitative restrictions on importation prohibited under Article XI of GATT.33 The
US had argued that these rules were internal regulations applied at the point of
importation,34 and therefore should be examined as internal measures under Article III
(allowed as long as they are not discriminatory) and not as quantitative restrictions
(which are per se impermissible).
The panel’s view was that only measures “applied to the product as such”35
should be considered internal regulations applied at the point of importation. Because the
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rules about fishing methods concerned the way the tuna was fished, but not differences in
the products themselves, they were not in this category.
This was an important finding. Its logic – the idea that regulating the way
something was produced was more difficult to defend under GATT – had a profound
effect on the trade-environment relationship, and also the trade-animal protection
relationship.
In international trade law terminology, these kinds of differences – that is,
differences in the methods or processes of producing something, rather than the thing
itself – are referred to as production and processing methods (PPMs). PPMs that do not
result in a perceptible difference in the end product are called non-product related PPMs,
or NPR-PPMs. The debate over NPR-PPMs was a high-profile and controversial one in
trade law discourse for many years, and it remains live today. I argue below that it really
should not be, since later WTO case law has effectively clarified that it is not per se
prohibited for WTO members to differentiate between goods based on PPMs.36 But the
risk, or at least the perceived risk, that regulating PPMs will create trade law problems
remains. This is an important and sensitive matter in environmental regulation, because
the method of producing something can have significant externalized effects on the

36

See Section 6.2.2.2.
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environment that make no difference to the physical characteristics of the ultimate
product.37 The same is true of animal protection.38
The second critically important aspect of the panel’s decision was its analysis of
justification under Article XX.39
The key question here was whether trade measures aimed at affecting what
happens outside the enacting country’s borders – with extraterritorial effect – can be
justified under the policy exceptions. The GATT panel’s answer was that they cannot.
As with the PPM issue, the panel’s approach on this problem still has a somewhat
zombie-like staying power in the discourse on trade and the environment (and trade and
animal protection), even though the US-Tuna I decision has no precedential force and
subsequent WTO decisions have moved a long way from its analysis.
The US argued that the measures it had adopted to protect dolphins in the ETP
were justified under both Article XX(b) (necessary to protect animal life or health) and
Article XX(g) (relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources). The GATT

37
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panel disagreed. The panel’s view was that the Article XX(b) exception could be
invoked to protect animal life and health only within US borders, not outside:
The Panel considered that if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b)
suggested by the United States were accepted, each contracting party
could unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies from
which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing
their rights under the General Agreement. 40
If this were allowed, the panel reasoned, GATT “would then no longer constitute
a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting parties” but would ensure free
trade only “between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal
regulations.”41
Furthermore, Article XX(b) justified only measures “necessary” to protect animal
life and health. The necessity requirement, the panel indicated, could not be met in these
circumstances unless the US first tried and failed to find a negotiated multilateral solution
to dolphin conservation:
The United States had not demonstrated to the Panel - as required of the
party invoking an Article XX exception - that it had exhausted all
options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection
objectives through measures consistent with the General Agreement, in
particular through the negotiation of international cooperative
arrangements, which would seem to be desirable in view of the fact that
dolphins roam the waters of many states and the high seas.42
On the Article XX(g) exception for conservation of natural resources, the panel
again said that the US could not adopt trade measures triggered by conservation problems
outside its own jurisdiction. As for the protection of animal life and health, “[t]he Panel
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considered that, if the extrajurisdictional interpretation of Article XX(g) suggested by the
United States were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the
conservation policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without
jeopardizing their rights [under GATT].”43
Mexico had also argued that Article XX(g) did not apply because dolphins were
not “exhaustible natural resources.”44 Mexico’s position was that the term was not
intended to cover living beings, but only natural resources “which once taken cannot be
renewed,” such as petroleum, uranium and other fuels.45 In the alternative, if Article
XX(g) covered living beings then it could only include those that were demonstrably in
danger of extinction – and the spotter, spinner and common dolphins in the ETP that were
protected by the US measures were not in danger of extinction.46 The panel did not
address these arguments. Its decision rejecting the US position on Article XX(g) was
based mainly on the problem of extra-jurisdictional effect. Another problem was that the
US rules for permitting tuna imports operated in an unpredictable way. There was a cap
on incidental dolphin take of 1.25 time the average take by US vessels, which meant
Mexico could not know in advance whether it was meeting US standards.47
The panel decided that the possibility of an embargo on all fish and fish products
under the Pelly Amendment was not a violation of GATT, because a statutory provision
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that only authorized, and did not require, the imposition of an embargo was not
inconsistent with GATT.48
The panel also found that the criteria for legal “dolphin-safe” labelling under the
DPCIA were not a violation of GATT, because they did not restrict trade in Mexican
tuna: tuna products could “be sold freely both with and without the ‘Dolphin Safe’ label,”
and any advantage resulting from access to the label came from “the free choice by
consumers to give preference” to tuna labeled dolphin safe, rather than from government
action.49
6.2.1.2

Tuna-Dolphin II: Second GATT Panel Decision

In 1994, a second GATT panel ruled on the US dolphin by-catch regime. This
time the panel was dealing with a challenge by the EEC (the predecessor of the EU) and
the Netherlands to the US rules that restricted imports from intermediary countries.50
In the interim, the US-Tuna I panel report had attracted a lot of criticism from the
environmental movement. The panel’s analytical approach exemplified the somewhat
technocratic and insular frame of reference of the GATT world, and the difficulty of
reconciling it with ascendant global environmental values. The US arguments before the
panel emphasized the increasingly high profile of the interaction between trade and the
environment, and pushed for recognition that its dolphin-protection initiatives were
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categorically different from the economic protectionism that trade law traditionally
sought to constrain:
The United States argued that the issues involved in this dispute would
become even more important over time, in light of the fact that
environmental issues were increasingly recognized as global in nature,
including transboundary effects and effects on the global environment.
More and more, actions in one part of the world would have
significance for other parts of the world. In this respect, this dispute was
not a typical trade dispute. This was not an instance, for example, where
one contracting party was concerned about actions by another party to
protect its market … Indeed, all sides agreed that the United States
restrictions on tuna imports were based on conservation concerns
shared by governments, including the parties to this dispute, nongovernmental organizations, and private citizens around the world.51
The second panel did acknowledge the importance of sustainability and protecting
the environment, in a more explicit way than the US-Tuna I panel had done. It noted that
“the objective of sustainable development, which includes the protection and preservation
of the environment, has been widely recognized by the contracting parties to the General
Agreement.”52 The issue was “not the validity of the environmental objectives of the
United States to protect and conserve dolphins,” but “whether, in the pursuit of its
environmental objectives, the United States could impose trade embargoes to secure
changes in the policies which other contracting parties pursued within their own
jurisdiction.”53 Thus, an interpretation of Article XX(g) that encompassed the protection
and conservation of animals (something later hailed as a landmark development in
international trade law when the WTO Appellate Body confirmed that interpretation in
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the US-Shrimp case54) was recognized before US-Shrimp by the GATT dispute settlement
system.
The second panel also did address the question of whether living creatures like
dolphins – including species not at risk of extinction – could be an “exhaustible natural
resource” within the meaning of Article XX(g). (Recall that the US-Tuna I panel had not
made a decision on this point.) The US-Tuna II panel did think that policies to conserve
living creatures could come within Article XX(g). The panel noted that “dolphin stocks
could potentially be exhausted, and that the basis of a policy to conserve them did not
depend on whether at present their stocks were depleted.”55
Keeping in mind that the US-Tuna I report was not adopted by the GATT parties
and was not binding on this panel, it was open to the US-Tuna II panel to take a different
approach to interpreting the treaty even though the dispute raised essentially the same
questions. And the panel did, to some extent, depart from the US-Tuna I panel on the
matter of extra-territorial effects of legislation and the application of the Article XX
policy exceptions. The panel recognized that the text of Article XX(g) “does not spell
out any limitation on the location of the exhaustible natural resources to be conserved,”56
and that “the policy to conserve dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, which the
United States pursued within its jurisdiction over its nationals and vessels, fell within the
range of policies covered by Article XX (g).”57 In other words, a policy was not

54
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automatically outside the scope of Article XX(g) just because it had to do with protecting
creatures outside the domestic jurisdiction of the US.
The panel found, however, that this particular policy operated in a way that was
not permitted under GATT because it could only be effective if ETP fishing nations –
countries other than the US – changed their rules on dolphin conservation. The question
was whether the policies covered by Article XX(g) could “include measures taken so as
to force other countries to change their policies with respect to persons or things within
their own jurisdictions, and requiring such changes in order to be effective,”58 and the
panel decided that it could not. In so ruling, it closely echoed the logic of the first panel:
If … Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to take
trade measures so as to force other contracting parties to change their
policies within their jurisdiction, including their conservation policies,
the balance of rights and obligations among contracting parties, in
particular the right of access to markets, would be seriously impaired.
Under such an interpretation the General Agreement could no longer
serve as a multilateral framework for trade among contracting parties.59
The panel’s language and analysis are almost identical to the US-Tuna I panel’s
approach. The panel’s reasoning on why the embargo was not justified under Article
XX(b) (protection of animal life and health) was substantially similar to that under
Article XX(g).60
Like the first GATT panel report, the US-Tuna II decision was not adopted by the
GATT contracting parties.
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6.2.1.3

The International Dolphin Conservation Program and the

IDCPA
Meanwhile, as the tuna-dolphin disputes were proceeding through the GATT
dispute settlement system, there were parallel developments in both international efforts
to address the tuna-dolphin issue and in related US domestic laws. The US was
motivated to seek an internationally negotiated approach in part by the decisions of the
GATT panels against it. Although the rulings were not adopted and not binding, they
could still be taken as statements that the US was failing to comply with its international
treaty commitments.61
The international initiative was driven by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC), an international advisory board responsible for conserving and
managing tuna fisheries in the ETP.62 The IATTC members involved in ETP tuna fishing
negotiated a multilateral approach under a voluntary Agreement for the Conservation of
Dolphins (also known as the La Jolla Agreement), concluded in 1992.63 The La Jolla
Agreement set maximum limits on dolphin mortality and provided for observer coverage
on tuna fishing vessels.
In 1995, the La Jolla Agreement was formalized under the Panama Declaration.64
The US agreed to remove the embargo in return for the ETP fishing nations’ commitment
to a treaty on dolphin protection, the Agreement on the International Dolphin
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Conservation Program (AIDCP).65 The AIDCP was a compromise between the tough
US unilateral stance on dolphin protection and more lenient rules negotiated with the ETP
fishing countries. The US Congress implemented this agreement into domestic law in the
International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA), which was passed in 1997
and came into effect in 1999.66
Reflecting the AIDCP compromise, new rules under the IDCPA allowed tuna
fished in the ETP tuna to be labeled dolphin safe even if it had been caught using the
setting-on method, subject to certain conditions. The captain of the ship had to provide
written certification that tuna were not fished using a purse-seine net intentionally
deployed to encircle dolphins, or if an approved observer on the vessel for the entire trip
had certified that the ship did not use a purse-seine net intentionally to encircle
dolphins.67 Implementing regulations adopted under the IDCPA further relaxed the
standards, permitting access to the dolphin-safe label if an on-board observer stated that
no dolphins were killed or seriously harmed.68
The changes were controversial, with some environmental organizations seeing
them as an indefensible retreat on meaningful dolphin protection. Environmentalists
argued that the rules did nothing to address the stress caused to dolphins by encirclement
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techniques (as distinct from adverse effects on populations).69 The conflict led to
litigation, with environmental groups suing US authorities and arguing that the
regulations departed from the legislative intention of Congress.70 As a result of the
litigation, some stricter requirements were reinstated, with the end result that access to the
dolphin-safe label under US domestic legislation ended up being different from and less
easily obtained than envisioned under the AIDCP.71
Despite the efforts to reach a multilateral solution to the problem, a basic conflict
remained between the AIDCP and the US legislation on dolphin-safe labelling. The US
approach reflected policymakers’ concerns about harm to dolphins in the broad sense,
including individual stress, injury and mortality, and the desire of consumers to know
whether they were buying tuna fished in ways that caused that kind of harm, but it still
lacked buy-in and support from the ETP fishing nations.
6.2.1.4

Tuna-Dolphin III: WTO Decision72

This conflict eventually led to another trade dispute over the US rules and
regulations under the DPCIA that set the conditions for access to the US dolphin-safe
labelling scheme. By this time, the GATT had been replaced by the WTO and its less
arbitration-like, more court-like dispute settlement system.73 The next tuna-dolphin
dispute also came through the WTO system several years after the landmark US-Shrimp
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Appellate Body decision, which is discussed in Section 6.2.2. US-Shrimp was the
harbinger of a more progressive, open-textured approach to trade and environment
conflicts at the WTO. But the advent of the WTO also meant new trade agreements and
new trade liberalization rules, over and above those in the GATT. In the third tunadolphin case, the key treaty was the TBT Agreement.74
The GATT US-Tuna I panel had addressed the GATT-compatibility of the US
dolphin-safe labeling scheme. The panel said that if tuna products could be legally
imported into and sold in the US without the label, there was no GATT problem. Any
advantages the label conferred were a matter of consumer choice, not governmentgranted advantage. The TBT Agreement added new, cumulative restrictions for
regulatory labelling schemes. Rules establishing criteria for labels and marks are the type
of technical regulations that the TBT Agreement was intended to address.75 It would be
possible for the dolphin-safe labelling regime to be GATT-compliant but still violate
WTO rules by reason of failing to conform with the TBT Agreement.
The preamble of the TBT Agreement states WTO members’ desire “to ensure that
technical regulations and standards, including packaging, marking and labelling
requirements, and procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations and
standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade.”76 The preamble
also recognizes that WTO members should not be prevented from taking measures
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necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or the environment, at levels
they deem appropriate, provided that such measures “are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.”77
When the third tuna-dolphin case came to the WTO, the TBT Agreement had
been in force for more than a decade, but there was relatively little case law interpreting
it. The Appellate Body had tended to resolve disputes under GATT rather than the TBT
Agreement – as Jason Houston-McMillan argues, because GATT was “more familiar
territory.”78
But in 2011 and 2012 the body of WTO law interpreting and applying the TBT
Agreement expanded significantly. In 2012, the Appellate Body issued three reports
dealing with disputes under the TBT Agreement (following prior panel reports in each of
the cases in 201179), all of which concerned US regulatory schemes: one on country-oforigin labeling rules for meat,80 one on health warnings on clove cigarettes, 81 and the
decision on Mexico’s claims concerning the dolphin-safe tuna labeling regime.82 These
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cases, known as the TBT “trilogy,”83 established a framework for balancing the two
principles reflected in the preamble: technical regulations should not create unnecessary
obstacles to trade, but WTO members should still be able to use them for legitimate
regulatory purposes.84
The US rules on which tuna could be labeled “dolphin safe” were complex. They
were set out in the DPCIA and associated regulations, as modified following the GATT
disputes, the negotiation of the AIDCP, and litigation by environmental groups.
The rules were different depending on the geographical area where the fishing
took place, the type of fishing vessel, and the fishing method. For large purse-seine
vessels in the ETP, there had to be both a certification that no purse seine net was
intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the fishing trip, and that no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured.85 By contrast, the AIDCP regime allowed tuna
to be considered dolphin-safe with certification that dolphins were not killed or seriously
injured during the fishing trip. In other words, tuna caught in the ETP using purse-seine
encircling of dolphins could not, by definition, be dolphin-safe under the US legislation.
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It could, however, meet the definition of dolphin-safe under the more lenient AIDCP
approach, as long as dolphins were not killed or seriously injured.
The most important TBT Agreement provisions at issue in US-Tuna III were
Articles 2.1 and 2.2. As discussed in Chapter Five,86 Article 2.1 establishes a nondiscrimination norm similar to the national treatment and most-favoured nation rules
under GATT, and Article 2.2 prohibits the use of technical regulations to create
unnecessary obstacles to trade. Article 2.2 provides that technical regulations “shall not
be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of
the risks non-fulfilment would create,” and gives a non-exhaustive list of legitimate
objectives that includes animal or plant life or health.
Mexico argued that the US rules discriminated against its tuna exports. Because
the Mexican tuna fishing industry was based on purse-seine fishing in the ETP, it could
not use the dolphin-safe label. Mexico argued that it had “maintained a sound and
environmentally sustainable method for fishing for tuna and participated in all
multilateral initiatives to protect dolphins while fishing for tuna,” but was prohibited from
using the dolphin-safe label while other fisheries that had “not adopted comparable
measures to protect dolphins” could use it.87 Although the US had lifted the embargo on
Mexican tuna, it had “found a new way to prevent Mexican tuna from competing in the
US market.”88 Mexico emphasized that fishing outside the ETP “results in the killing of
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many dolphins and other cetaceans” and argued that it made no sense to impose such
tight regulations only targeting tuna caught in the ETP.89
A threshold question was whether the dolphin-safe labelling regime was a
“technical regulation” within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, or a “standard,” which
is still subject to TBT commitments but not to the more stringent requirements of Articles
2.1 and 2.2. The definitions of a “technical regulation” and of a “standard” are set out in
Annex I of the TBT Agreement. The key distinction for purposes of this analysis is that a
regulation is something “with which compliance is mandatory,” whereas standards
include “rules, guidelines or characteristics … with which compliance is not
mandatory.”90 Here – as the GATT US-Tuna I panel had pointed out – the dolphin-safe
was not “mandatory” in the sense that it was legal to sell tuna in the US without it.
But the WTO Appellate Body (upholding the panel’s decision on this point)
considered the regulations “mandatory” for purposes of Annex I of the TBT Agreement,
based on a consideration of the overall nature of the labeling scheme. It was a formal and
comprehensive scheme for regulating the use of the term “dolphin safe,” consisting of
“legislative and regulatory acts of the US federal authorities,” prescribing “in a broad and
exhaustive manner the conditions that apply for making any assertion on a tuna product
as to its ‘dolphin-safety,’” and setting out enforcement mechanisms for penalizing illegal
use of the label.91
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This finding was an expansive interpretation of the term “technical regulation” as
defined in the agreement. On an ordinary understanding of what “mandatory” means (an
understanding that the GATT US-Tuna I panel appeared to subscribe to), the dolphin-safe
labeling scheme was not mandatory.92
Since the labeling scheme was found to be a technical regulation, Articles 2.1 and
2.2 did apply. With respect to Article 2.1, the Appellate Body applied a two-part test.
First, it looked at whether the measure modified the conditions of competition to the
detriment of Mexican tuna products. If so, it went on to ask whether the detrimental
impact stemmed “exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.”93
The text of Article 2.1 does not set out express policy exceptions (in the manner
of the Article XX exceptions to the GATT non-discrimination norms), but this criterion
of “stemming exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction” has been read in by
the Appellate Body as an interpretation of Article 2.1 in light of the purpose and
principles of the TBT Agreement. That is, it reflects the balance between trade
liberalization and regulatory sovereignty expressed in the preamble.
The Appellate Body found that the US dolphin-safe labelling regime did not stem
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. The problem was that it was not
“calibrated” to a distinctive risk to dolphins specific to purse-seine fishing in the ETP.94
There were adverse effects on dolphins from other fishing methods in other fisheries.
The US scheme “fully addressed” the risks from setting on dolphins in the ETP, but for
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risks to dolphins that come from fishing methods other than setting on dolphins outside
the ETP, it was more lenient.95 As a result, the disadvantage to Mexican products did not
arise exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction because it was not “even-handed
in the relevant respects.”96
On Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, however, the Appellate Body overruled the
panel and found that the dolphin-safe labeling scheme was necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective. That objective was the protection of animal life and health.
What is especially significant about the Article 2.2 analysis from the point of view
of animal protection is the consideration it gives to protection of individual animals from
harm, including distress, as distinct from adverse effects on dolphin populations.
The legislative history of the DPCIA amendments indicates that US lawmakers
were not concerned only that dolphin populations would be reduced by by-catch, but also
that chasing and encirclement were also distressing and harmful to dolphins even if they
were not killed or seriously injured during the set.97 This category of adverse effects is
described in the panel report as “unobserved consequences.”98 During the panel
proceedings, the panel asked the US to clarify whether its objective was a certain
maximum level of dolphin mortality or conservation of dolphin populations. The US
responded that its objective was to protect dolphins from “adverse effects” – not just
mortality or population decline.99 Those adverse effects meant not just the death of a

95

Ibid (emphasis in the original).
Ibid.
97
See discussion in Section 6.2.1.3.
98
US-Tuna III Panel Report, supra note 71 at para 7.484.
99
Ibid at para 7.485.
96

193

dolphin or injury during the encirclement but also “stress resulting from chase and
capture,”100 including separation of dolphin calves from their mothers.101
In the panel report, the adverse effects on dolphins are discussed in the context of
population-level harms: distress from chase and capture may damage the animals’ health,
leading to death over the longer term (thus, unobserved during the fishing trip) and
ultimately to reduction of the overall dolphin population. But, as the US stressed before
the panel, the purpose of the dolphin-safe labeling scheme was to give consumers
confidence that the tuna they purchased was not fished in a manner harmful to dolphins –
not just to dolphin populations but to individual dolphins.102 The wellbeing of individual
animals as well as conservation of population levels, was part of the concern motivating
the legislation and the challenged trade measures.
The Appellate Body’s decision that the labeling scheme was not more traderestrictive than necessary to achieve its objective thus suggests that reducing harm to
animals independent of population-level threats can be a “legitimate objective” and an
aspect of “animal life and health” within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. It even
suggests that protecting animals from emotional or psychological harm (such as would be
caused by the separation of mothers and calves) – not just physical harm – is also a
cognizable objective.
Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason see the US-Tuna III decision as a significant
development and a precursor of EC-Seals in allowing space for animal welfare as a
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recognized policy objective in WTO law. As they argue, the panel clearly indicated that
the concept of animal life or health in the TBT Agreement extends to “animal welfare as
an intrinsic good,”103 an interpretation that was confirmed by the Appellate Body. Kelch
shares this assessment of the importance of the decision:
This is a significant statement since the previous WTO and GATT cases
dealing with animal issues can all be seen … as environmental cases
dealing with the protection of species of animals that are threatened or
endangered. The WTO is now recognizing that it is a legitimate
objective of member states to protect not only endangered or threatened
animals with their regulations, but also to protect individual animals or
species that are not threatened or endangered.104
In 2013, following the Appellate Body decision on the dolphin-safe labelling
scheme, the US made changes to the rules in order to bring them into compliance with the
WTO ruling. The WTO dispute settlement system includes a compliance oversight
mechanism. The complainant can return to dispute settlement if it is not satisfied that the
steps taken by the respondent have done enough to bring the measures complained of into
compliance. In the third tuna-dolphin dispute, there were two compliance proceedings.
In the first, the Appellate Body found that detrimental impact on Mexican tuna under the
modified US regime still did not stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction, and also that it violated non-discrimination obligations under GATT.105 The
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US changed the rules again in 2016, and once again Mexico pursued compliance
proceedings, but this time the Appellate Body ruled that the labelling regime was
consistent with WTO law.106
The amended rules continued to require that tuna fished in the ETP large purseseine fishery have certification from the ship’s captain and an observer that the tuna was
fished without encirclement of dolphins, and that no dolphins were killed or seriously
harmed. In other words, tuna fished in the ETP by setting on dolphins still was not
permitted to be labelled dolphin safe. The changes that were made to comply with the
WTO ruling all related to tuna fished using the purse seine method outside the ETP,
adding some certification requirements for those products. 107
What this means is that complying with the WTO ruling did not require the US to
change its dolphin-safe labeling rules with respect to the ETP large purse-seine fishery
(the rules that affected Mexican tuna exports) at all. A requirement to be even-handed
cuts both ways; it can be met by being uniformly more lenient or uniformly stricter. In
this case the US made its rules more even-handed by imposing tougher requirements on
non-ETP tuna.
Although the encounter between trade rules and animal protection is often thought
of as creating pressure to water down animal-protective regulations, in the end the longrunning dispute over dolphin by-catch has actually had the opposite effect, allowing the
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US to keep a stricter dolphin-safe labeling regime than the one negotiated by ETP fishing
nations under the AIDCP, while requiring it to do more to address harm to dolphins from
tuna fisheries beyond the ETP.
The final Appellate Body decision on compliance is very recent (December
2018), so it is too early to be certain how Mexico may alter its fishing methods in order to
sell tuna in the US market under the dolphin-safe label. Reuters reports that a Mexican
trade official stated on a local radio program that she did not think the industry would
modify its fishing methods “because it’s a sustainable, responsible method.”108 What the
final WTO ruling does confirm is that the US can, consistent with its WTO obligations,
refuse to permit tuna caught using dolphin encirclement to be labeled dolphin safe –
provided that it also addresses other risks and harms to dolphins in a reasonably nonarbitrary and consistent way.
6.2.2 Shrimp and Sea Turtles
The second significant trade case involving by-catch is the landmark US-Shrimp
WTO Appellate Body decision.109 It would be difficult to overstate the importance of
US-Shrimp as a watershed in the relationship between trade and the environment, and
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also in the evolution of the new WTO dispute settlement system. Philippe Sands classed
the WTO Appellate Body report in the US-Shrimp case alongside the case concerning
Spain’s request to extradite former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to be tried for
human rights violations as “transformational,” a case that “challenges some of the most
basic assumptions that have dominated international legal relations for much of the past
century and beyond,” and one that demonstrates “how new actors, new rules, and new
international courts are transforming the landscape of international law.”110 Howse has
argued, in an overview of twenty years of WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence, that no
decision is more significant than US-Shrimp “for marking the evolution of the Appellate
Body as a judicial system independent of, and operating at a distance from, the WTO as
an institution and from the ideological and policy orientations that tend to drive it.”111
This case confirmed that the new WTO dispute settlement system had moved
trade-environment conflicts out of the purview of the “trade policy elite” or “insider
network,” the “specialized policy elite insulated from, and not particularly interested in,
the larger political and social conflicts of the age,”112 to an adjudicative body that is more
open to the perspectives of environmentalists and other non-trade communities.
6.2.2.1

Sea Turtle Conservation and TEDs

Sea turtles are charismatic, threatened, highly migratory marine animals. Susan
Sakmar describes sea turtles as “natural wonders” that live up to eighty years, can weigh
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as much as 1400 pounds, and “swim vast distances during their life spans, with females
returning to the beach of their birth to nest.”113 There are seven recognized sea turtle
species (green, loggerhead, flatback, hawksbill, leatherback, olive ridley and Kemp’s
ridley).114 All sea turtle species except the flatback (which lives only in Northern
Australia, Southern Indonesia, and Southern Papua New Guinea) are found throughout
the ocean and migrate over long ranges.115 Sea turtles are under threat from a number of
human activities. Since the 1990s, fisheries by-catch, especially from shrimp fishing, has
been recognized as “a foremost threat to many sea turtle populations.”116 Turtles get
entangled in fishing nets, they cannot surface to breathe, and they drown.
Beginning in the 1980s, marine scientists have developed a technology to allow
sea turtles to escape from fishing nets and reduce turtle by-catch: the turtle excluder
device, or TED. A TED is essentially a “turtle escape hatch” inserted into a shrimp trawl
net.117 The basic design is an oval frame with bars inserted into the top or bottom of the
trawl net. The target shrimp are small enough to go through the bars and be caught in the
mesh bag at the end of the net. The TED stops larger animals, including turtles, from
entering the back of the net. The turtles can then swim either up or down to an opening
in the net and escape.118 TEDs are an especially important tool for sea turtle conservation
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because they reduce mortality in adult sea turtles, whereas other conservation measures
that focus on turtle nests and hatchlings can have less impact.119
In the US, beginning in 1987, regulations under the Endangered Species Act of
1973120 required all shrimp trawlers to use TEDs in all fishing nets.121 As was the case
with tuna fishing and dolphin by-catch, US regulators and the domestic industry saw the
necessity of doing something to address imports of shrimp from other countries that did
not require similar protections. In 1989, Congress passed Section 609 of US Public Law
101-162, which encourages negotiation with foreign countries towards treaties to protect
sea turtles. Section 609(b) restricts imports of shrimp unless the President has provided
specified certifications to Congress. The required certification must attest either that the
harvesting nation has adopted a program governing the incidental capture of sea turtles in
its commercial shrimp fishery comparable to the program in effect in the United States
and has an incidental take rate comparable to that of the United States, or that the fishing
environment in the harvesting nation does not pose a threat of the incidental taking of sea
turtles.122 The authority to make these certifications is delegated to the Department of
State.
The Department of Commerce published guidelines in 1991 and 1993 on the
application of Section 609(b). Environmentalists criticized the revised guidelines for
focusing on only a few shrimp-exporting countries, thus not providing enough protection
for turtles, and a coalition of environmental groups sued the government at the US Court
119
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of International Trade.123 The Court ruled that the guidelines were too narrow and had to
cover all shrimp-harvesting nations. After that, new guidelines were published in 1996.
The new rules applied to all shrimp-exporting countries, but they had a loophole. Shrimp
imports were conditioned on provision of a declaration “that the shrimp or shrimp
product in question was harvested in a country with regulations comparable to those
adopted in the United States” or, alternatively, “that the particular shipment of shrimp
had been harvested in a manner that did not adversely affect sea turtles.”124
Environmental groups sued again.125 The deficiency in the guidelines, they
argued, was that exporting nations could fit TEDs to just a “handful” of shrimping vessels
in order to export the shrimp from those vessels to the US, while continuing to harm sea
turtles with the rest of their (non-TED-equipped) fleet.126 The Court of International
Trade agreed, ruling that the embargo in Section 609(b)(2) required “the requirement of
TEDs on all vessels of a harvesting nation at all times.”127 For a country to be eligible for
certification and avoid the embargo, its entire commercial shrimp fishery had to be
subject to regulations to protect turtles comparable to those in the US, which essentially
meant that TEDs must always be required, unless the country fished shrimp in waters
where turtles were unaffected, such as colder areas where turtles are not found.
In 1996, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, all nations whose shrimp and
shrimp products were embargoed under Section 609(b)(2), requested consultations with
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the US in accordance with the WTO dispute settlement rules. The dispute went to a
WTO panel, which, in 1998, ruled in favour of the complainants.128
The reasons for the panel’s conclusion are familiar from the tuna-dolphin GATT
decisions. The US, the panel said, could not have a trade embargo which effectively
required other WTO members to adopt the same policies it had adopted if they wanted to
access its market. The language of the decision quite closely tracks that of the GATT
tuna-dolphin rulings:
if an interpretation of … Article XX were to be followed which would
allow a Member to adopt measures conditioning access to its market for
a given product upon the adoption by exporting Members of certain
policies, including conservation policies, GATT 1994 and the WTO
Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade
among Members as the security and predictability of trade relations
under those agreements would be threatened.129
The panel acknowledged the importance of protecting sea turtles and the efficacy of
TEDs as part of a turtle conservation strategy. But it considered that the best way to
advance turtle protection would be “to reach cooperative agreements on integrated
conservation strategies, covering, inter alia, the design, implementation and use of TEDs
while taking into account the specific conditions in the different geographical areas
concerned.”130
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6.2.2.2

The US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report

The US appealed the panel decision to the Appellate Body. The result was a
technical win for the complainants. The Appellate Body determined that certain aspects
of the way Section 609(b) was applied did not comply with the requirements of the
Article XX chapeau. In substance, however, the Appellate Body decision was more of a
victory for the US, and for proponents of a more liberal approach to environmental
exceptions in WTO law. Appleton notes that when the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
debated and voted to adopt the Appellate Body’s report, “[i]n an unusual reversal of form
the appellees, who prevailed, were critical of the decision, while the losing party, the
appellant, welcomed the decision and urged its adoption.”131 That kind of result is no
longer so very unusual in WTO law. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the outcome in EC
– Seal Products followed a similar pattern.
The Appellate Body report departs significantly from the Panel’s analysis, and it
stands for a fundamentally different approach to resolving trade-environment conflicts.
Three points about the Appellate Body’s analysis are especially important. First,
the Appellate Body determined that the US embargo was provisionally justified under
Article XX(g) of GATT (measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources), rejecting the complainants’ argument that this terminology applied only to
non-living resources like minerals.
The complainants argued that “exhaustible natural resources” means minerals,
and excludes living things that can reproduce. The Appellate Body disagreed. It noted
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that living creatures could be both “renewable” and “exhaustible,” referring to scientific
evidence that “living species … are in certain circumstances indeed susceptible of
depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human activities.’132
The Appellate Body’s interpretation of Article XX(g) was based in part on taking
into account non-trade international legal instruments and other expressions of
internationally shared concerns and values. The Appellate Body stated that the language
of GATT must be “read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of
the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment.”133
The WTO side agreement that creates and governs the dispute settlement system,
the DSU, provides that the WTO treaties should be interpreted “in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”134 In prior case law, the
Appellate Body had determined that the treaty interpretation principles set out in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties135 have the status of customary international
law, and are therefore part of the customary rules required to be considered under the
DSU.136 Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention provides that treaties are to be
interpreted in light of “relevant principles of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.” Based on these authorities, the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp
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looked to non-WTO public international law for “interpretive guidance, as appropriate,
from the general principles of international law.”137
The meaning of the text of the WTO treaties, interpreted in accordance with these
principles, was “not static but evolutionary,” and informed by “modern international
conventions and declarations.”138 The Appellate Body report references numerous treaties
and international instruments concerning the environment, including the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea,139 the Convention on Biological Diversity,140 the Rio
Declaration,141 and the UN plan of action on sustainable development, Agenda 21.142
Interpreted in this light, the Appellate Body found, Article XX(g) is understood to
cover measures adopted for the protection of biological diversity and endangered species.
In its reasons the Appellate Body also took note of the direction in the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization that optimal use of the world’s
resources should be made in accordance with the objective of sustainable development
seeking to protect and preserve the environment,143 and of the creation of the Committee
on Trade and Environment by WTO members in 1995.144
The second important point is that the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp rejected the
idea, which was central to both the panel’s analysis and the GATT tuna-dolphin
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decisions, that so-called “extra-territorial” trade measures categorically cannot be
justified under the GATT policy exceptions. The US embargo was designed to be a
“stick” (in Charnovitz’s terminology) to incentivize other countries to require the use of
TEDs.145 The Appellate Body permitted the US to use that stick. It considered that the
legislation was “directly connected with the policy of conserving sea turtles” and was
“not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach” in relation to that policy objective.146
The Appellate Body avoided directly confronting the question of
extraterritoriality, stating “[w]e do not pass upon the question of whether there is an
implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g).”147 What it did say was that if a
jurisdictional limit existed, the US embargo did not violate it, because “in the specific
circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and
endangered marine populations involved and the United States.”148
As a practical matter, the Appellate Body’s reasoning means that there probably is
no jurisdictional limit or prohibition on extra-territoriality – at least, not one that would
matter very much. WTO members do generally choose to adopt rules and laws that have
extra-jurisdictional effect precisely because there is a nexus of some kind to their own
territories. In the case of migratory endangered species, the animals themselves, because
they physically move across borders, can be the connection. (And, as EC – Seal Products
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subsequently confirmed, the moral concerns of citizens within a WTO member’s territory
can also be a sufficient nexus.149)
Accordingly, the Appellate Body indicated that neither “extra-territorial” nor
“unilateral” measures are categorically excluded from justification under Article XX,
because to exclude them categorically would verge on rendering the Article XX
exceptions meaningless:
The Panel, in effect, constructed an a priori test that purports to define a
category of measures which, ratione materiae, fall outside the justifying
protection of Article XX’s chapeau. … It appears to us, however, that
conditioning access to a Member’s domestic market on whether
exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies
unilaterally prescribed by the Member may, to some degree, be a
common aspect of measures falling within the scope of one or another
of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX … It is not necessary to
assume that requiring from exporting countries compliance with, or
adoption of, certain policies … prescribed by the importing country,
renders a measure a priori incapable of justification under Article XX.
Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific exceptions
of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of
interpretation we are bound to apply.150
This does not mean that the extra-territorial / unilateral approach does not raise
difficulties under GATT, but the difficulty concerns applying requirements in a fair and
non-arbitrary way – a chapeau question. Under the Article XX chapeau, the Appellate
Body did find that a WTO member cannot require other members to adopt its preferred
policy without taking into account differences between the different contexts.151 This is
very different, however, from saying that such a measure categorically cannot be justified
under Article XX. One of the most important consequences is that (as in US-Tuna III),
149
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the remedy for a chapeau problem may to adopt a stricter policy across the board, rather
than having to water down or abandon the policy.
The third and final point of significance to note in the US-Shrimp decision
concerns the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs from NGOs. In the wake of the GATT
tuna-dolphin decisions, and because of the high-profile nature of the sea turtle dispute,
non-governmental environmental organizations wished to submit arguments to the panel.
The panel received two amicus curiae briefs, one of them a joint submission from the
Center for Marine Conservation and the Center for International Environmental Law, and
the second a brief from the World Wide Fund for Nature. 152 The panel did not accept
these submissions from non-parties. It interpreted the DSU as permitting it to request
supplemental information, but not allowing it to accept non-party submissions it had not
asked for.153
The Appellate Body disagreed, finding that the DSU did permit WTO tribunals to
accept unrequested information and submissions from NGOs.154 This determination is
notable as one more instance of the opening up of WTO adjudication to perspectives and
arguments from outside the world of trade insiders. NGO submissions in important WTO
cases are now standard practice. Because animals have virtually no representation in
domestic political systems155 or in interstate relations, this mechanism for giving voice to
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animal concerns in trade disputes may be especially important for animal advocacy
organizations.
One more point to touch on about the Appellate Body decision in US-Shrimp
concerns PPMs.156 The Appellate Body did not expressly address whether trade
measures that distinguish between products based on PPMs can be WTO compliant. By
implication, however, its analysis seriously undermines the argument that they cannot.
The embargo that was challenged in US-Shrimp did exactly that, and it is clear from the
Appellate Body decision that it was legitimate and justifiable for the US to treat shrimp
from countries with adequate sea turtle protection programs in place differently from
shrimp from countries without such programs (despite there being no difference in the
final product), provided that it did so fairly. The concern about a clash between WTO
law and PPMs, whether environmental or animal-welfare based, should have been laid to
rest by US-Shrimp.157
Ultimately, the Appellate Body determined that Section 609(b) was not consistent
with GATT. This is where the technical win for the complainants comes in. The
decision turned on the Article XX chapeau. The chapeau prohibits application in a
manner which constitutes “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.”
The Appellate Body found flaws in these respects in the way that Section 609(b) was
applied and enforced.
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First, in effect US government officials would only certify shrimp-exporting
countries if there was a regulatory program in place requiring the use of TEDs that was
essentially the same as the rules in the US.158 This practice failed to take into account
different conditions that might occur in the other WTO countries, and failed to “inquire
into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those
exporting countries.”159
A second indication of unjustifiable discrimination was that the US had not
engaged in “serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding
bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles”
before enforcing its embargo on the complainants.160 A multilateral, cooperative
approach would be an effective way to protect sea turtles and in keeping with the
emphasis on globally cooperative solutions in the international environmental instruments
that the Appellate Body had looked at interpretive supplements, such as the Rio
Declaration and Agenda 21.161 As Howse emphasizes, however, this finding did not
imply a free-standing obligation to negotiate,162 but reflected requirements of fairness and
even-handed treatment. The US had concluded a regional convention on the protection
and conservation of sea turtles with Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua and
Venezuela,163 and the fact that it had negotiated the issue seriously “with some, but not
all” WTO members amounted to unjustified discrimination.
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The Appellate Body also found that, because Section 609(b) imposed a “single,
rigid and unbending requirement” that countries applying for certification adopt
essentially the same regulatory program as the US, there was “little or no flexibility in
how officials [made] the determination for certification” and this lack of flexibility
amounted to arbitrary discrimination.164 Furthermore, there were defects in terms of
procedural fairness in the way certification decisions were made. There was no
“transparent, predictable” process or “formal opportunity for an applicant country to be
heard, or to respond to any arguments that may be made against it” in the process.165
6.2.2.3

Compliance Proceedings

In response to the Appellate Body ruling, the US revised the guidelines for
certification under Section 609, but it did not remove the embargo. The new guidelines
permitted shrimp-exporting countries to be certified even if they did not require the use of
TEDs, provided that they demonstrated that they had adopted and were enforcing a
“comparably effective” turtle conservation program.166 The new guidelines also required
officials to take into account demonstrated differences in the shrimp fishing conditions
between the country applying for certification and the US.167
Malaysia complained that the revised regime still failed to comply with WTO law.
A panel determined that the US was now applying Section 609 in a way that no longer
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constituted a “means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail,”168 and the Appellate Body upheld that decision.169
The Appellate Body confirmed the panel’s finding that the US had made goodfaith efforts to negotiate a multilateral approach to turtle protection and conservation that
included Malaysia in a manner that was fair as compared to its negotiations on the matter
with other WTO members. This was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
chapeau.170
The Appellate Body also upheld the panel’s determination that the new guidelines
requiring countries seeking certification have a sea turtle conservation and protection
program comparable in effectiveness to that of the US were flexible enough to comply
with the chapeau.171 It rejected Malaysia’s argument that the new guidelines
discriminated arbitrarily or unjustifiably because they conditioned access to the US
market on compliance with policies unilaterally prescribed by the US.172 Indeed, the
Appellate Body underlined that its statement in its decision on the merits in US-Shrimp
that this may in fact be a common aspect of measures covered by Article XX was “a
principle that was central to [its] ruling.”173
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Because of the move in the first US-Shrimp Appellate Body report to be more
open to receiving submissions from non-parties, there was now a window available for
animal protection NGOs to provide submissions in the compliance proceeding and
contribute to the final chapter of this dispute. Two related animal welfare organizations,
the American Humane Society and Humane Society International, submitted a joint brief
directly to the Appellate Body in the Article 21.5 dispute (and also provided the brief to
the US, which submitted it as an attachment to its own submission).174
Leah Butler’s empirical study of amicus submissions by NGOs at the WTO
indicates that the effects NGOs achieved by making amicus submissions in US-Shrimp
dispute included: representing interests that are not represented by WTO member states;
bringing the concerns of the NGO to a global audience; and providing expertise on
scientific and technical information.175 All of these effects are important ways that
NGOs, including those that advocate for animals, can have some influence on the process
of norm creation and dissemination that takes place in connection with WTO disputes.
The interests of animals are chronically under-represented politically and by governments
in the international system. Concerns about animal protection are rising in prominence in
global discourse, and animal protection NGOs are capitalizing on opportunities to express
them in international fora. And animal protection NGOs are often in a position to
provide evidence and research about the situation of animals that may not be fully
reflected in the materials submitted by the disputing WTO members.
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6.2.3 The By-catch Cases as Animal Protection Cases
Both US-Shrimp and the tuna-dolphin series of cases are famous controversies,
widely known and discussed beyond trade law and international law circles, that are
typically thought of as “trade and environment” conflicts. But there is another aspect of
these conflicts that is, in my view, under-analyzed: they are also “trade and animal
protection” cases.
To be sure, both the tuna-dolphin and shrimp-turtle disputes can be classified
under the species conservation sub-heading of animal protection, where animal protection
overlaps with environmentalism. But in both cases the by-catch prevention efforts of the
US were not just about conservation in the narrowest or most anthropocentric sense of
conserving the supply of a species for its usefulness to humans. Rather, dolphins and sea
turtles are charismatic animals that policymakers and the public wanted to protect in part
for their own sake.
Doctrinally, these cases, especially US-Tuna III, suggest that there are not hard
divisions but rather conceptual links between “conservation of natural resources,”
“animal life and health,” and animal welfare. It is now (after EC – Seal Products) clear
that domestic measures based on concerns about animal welfare can fit into the category
of public morals Article XX(a) of GATT, and animal welfare can be a valid basis for
justifying trade effects even where there is no problem of species conservation. The USTuna III ruling anticipated this outcome by indicating that individual animal wellbeing is
included in “animal life and health” in the TBT Agreement and GATT Article XX(b).
The old assumption that conservation was covered by international trade law policy
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exceptions while welfare was not no longer holds. Indeed, the WTO case law suggests
commonalities between the categories and the regulatory objectives they cover. For
example, both animal welfare legislation and laws to protect biodiversity reflect moral
concerns about destroying and harming individual animals, which are connected to
understanding of animal sentience and recognition of the intrinsic moral significance of
animals.

6.3

Fur

Global norms concerning the morality of using animal fur for clothing and other
consumer items are evolving. Fur has for a long time attracted criticism as an
unnecessary luxury that causes animal suffering. Harrop notes that “controversy relating
to the moral issue of wearing fur, not for utilitarian purposes but for the sake of cosmetic
adornment, plagues this subject.”176 There are some indications that moral objection to
luxury furs is gaining traction and becoming more of a mainstream position. For example,
several leading fashion houses, including Chanel and Versace, have announced that they
will no longer use fur,177 and a number of American cities have adopted municipal bans
on the sale of fur.178
Yet certainly there is no global consensus about the morality of fur. Fur has
cultural importance for communities where its production and use have traditionally been
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part of the economy and way of life, including Indigenous communities.179 The
environmentalist and animal rights movement of opposition to hunting for fur is
enmeshed in struggles over cultural imperialism and Indigenous rights.180
Notwithstanding these profound and difficult conflicts, however, there has been some
gradual progress towards internationally accepted parameters and basic standards
concerning the welfare of animals hunted for fur.181
Trade in fur has a long history,182 and the emergence of transnational legal norms
in fur hunting is intertwined with global trade and international trade law. The EC – Seal
Products case is the most recent example of the interplay between fur, morality,
regulation and trade. Before EC – Seal Products, the most important controversy was
over efforts to stop the use of leghold traps.183 Although the regulation of trapping
standards is analytically separate from the controversy over the morality of cosmetic fur
use (since the standards for trapping apply to animals trapped for any purpose), as Harrop
points out, in practice the debates are inextricably connected: “the legislation, politics and

179

Wearing fur has especially important (and was once a matter of survival) for human
populations in cold climates, benefiting from “the unparalleled insulating qualities” of the pelts of furbearing mammals. Harrop, supra note 176 at 334.
180
Tamari Kitossa, “Same Difference: Biocentric Imperialism and the Assault on Indigenous
Culture and Hunting” (2000) 28:2 Environments 23.
181
Fur farming accounts for about 85% of fur production (Clive JC Phillips, The Animal Trade:
Evolution, Ethics and Implications (Wallingford: CABI, 2015) at 71). It is an industry with a disturbing
animal welfare record. Fur farming is outside the scope of this discussion because (so far at least) there
have not been significant disputes involving international trade law and the regulation of fur farms.
182
Phillips, ibid at 70-71, tracing the history of the fur trade back 1000 years to the use of rivers in
Siberia to establish trading posts for furs.
183
See also Gary Miller, “Exporting Morality with Trade Restrictions: The Wrong Path to Animal
Rights” (2008-2009) 34 Brook J Int’l L 999, for a discussion of US legislation banning the importation and
marketing of dog and cat fur. Like the US, the EU has banned sales and imports of cat and dog fur (EC,
Regulation 1523/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council banning the placing on the market
and the import to, or export from, the Community of cat and dog fur, and products containing such fur,
[2007] OJ, L343/50).

216

the ensuing debates all arise primarily out of the original fur controversy” and have to do
mainly with the welfare of animals trapped for fur.184
Harrop writes that Europeans probably first developed the iron leghold trap in the
sixteenth century, combining their own technology with what they learned from the
sophisticated trapping and snaring methods of North American Indigenous peoples.185 A
leghold trap is a trap designed to capture an animal by the leg or foot. They are cheap,
portable trapping devices, so convenient for humans to use, but the convenience comes at
a high price in animal suffering.186 These traps “snap tightly shut on the animals’ limbs,
crushing or lacerating them so that the animals are left to bleed to death.”187 Trapped
animals “may suffer for several days before the trapper returns and face death by
freezing, dehydration, predation or starvation.”188 Animals trying to escape from the trap
may “chew or pull their own limbs off or attack the trap, breaking teeth and rupturing
gums.”189
In response to widespread public objection to the use of these devices, the EC (the
predecessor of the EU) began considering a prohibition on them in the mid-1980s.190 In
1991, the EC adopted a regulation banning the use of steel-jawed leghold traps in its
territory (the Leghold Trap Regulation).191 This prohibition became effective on January
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1, 1995.192 The Leghold Trap Regulation also banned the introduction into EC territory
of any furs or goods incorporating pelts from thirteen listed species (beaver, otter, coyote,
wolf, lynx, bobcat, sable, raccoon, muskrat, fisher, badger, marten and ermine) unless the
European Commission determined that the country of origin either had prohibited the use
of the leghold trap, or used trapping methods for the listed species that met
“internationally agreed humane trapping standards.”193 The EC’s aim was “induce
changes in [fur] exporting countries,” either by way of changes in their domestic laws or
through multilateral agreement.194
The import ban under the Leghold Trap Regulation was originally supposed to
come into force at the beginning of 1995, at the same time as the internal ban on the use
of leghold traps.195 Concerns that the regulation might violate GATT rules “if it accorded
different treatment to fur from animals caught by means other than the use of the leghold
trap and fur from animals whose capture involved the use of that trap” led the EC to
review its position and suspend application of the ban to the three main fur exporters:
Russia, the US and Canada.196
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The EC negotiated with the three countries and concluded two treaties on agreed
humane trapping standards: one with Canada and the Russian Federation197 and a
separate agreement with the US.198
These treaties proclaim the parties’ commitment to improving the welfare of
trapped animals,199 and set out standards (substantially identical between the two
agreements200) on which trapping methods will be deemed to be humane, based on
consideration of whether the welfare of the animals is “maintained at a sufficient level,
although it is acknowledged that in certain situations with killing traps there will be a
short period of time during which the level of welfare may be poor.”201 The agreements
require “conventional” steel-jawed leghold traps to be phased out over time (the phaseout periods differ between the two agreements).
Restraining trapping methods, which are designed not to kill the animal
immediately but to keep it immobile until a human gets to it, are allowed as long as the
traps used are certified as meeting the standards annexed to the agreements. The
standards take into account the length of time that the animal is conscious and trapped,
and indicators of poor welfare such as self-mutilation, fractures, spinal cord injuries,
fractures of the teeth exposing the pulp cavity, and eye injuries.202 This means that the
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agreements still allow the use of what would ordinarily be called leghold traps (that is,
traps that work in the same way as the traditional leghold trap), as long as the traps have
been certified as meeting the humane trapping standards. The adverse effect on animal
welfare can be mitigated by design features such as padding and lamination. Even with
such modifications, however, this is of course a painful and terrifying way for an animal
to die.
The agreements on humane trapping standards have been criticized as “much
weaker than the original E.U. regulation,”203 potentially locking in “lowest common
denominator requirements” and holding back or halting progress (even nationally) on
better welfare standards in trapping.204 They certainly represent a significant compromise
compared to the EU’s original position. On the other hand, the agreement of multilateral
standards on humane trapping is an important landmark in international regulation of
animal welfare. Before these treaties, “there were no provisions in international law
(beyond the regional) designed to deal solely with the issue of animal suffering.”205 (As
discussed in Chapter Seven, there have been European treaties on animal welfare since
1968, but they are regional agreements.206) These agreements are the product of
“changing attitudes” about the treatment of animals and “set the scene, potentially, for the
wider international regulation of animal welfare.”207
The EU’s dilemma concerning the Leghold Trap Regulation and its import ban
was similar to the quandary of the US in the by-catch cases. A ban on a practice that
203
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harms animals within the enacting state’s territory is not very effective if the practice is
displaced outside its borders (or already happened mainly outside its borders, as in the
case of trapping fur animals), and there may even be a degree of contribution to or
complicity in the practice if the products can still be sold to consumers in the state that
put the ban in place. Using trade restrictions to solve this problem engages the same
fundamental question underlying the tuna-dolphin and shrimp-turtle disputes: to what
extent can countries “pursue policies to protect … animals … located in the territory of
other countries,” while at the same time signing up to “a legal system that protects states’
sovereign rights to determine for themselves whether or not to protect such values”208?
In the case of the Leghold Trap Regulation, which did not result in a formal
dispute at the WTO, the navigation between these two competing principles was worked
out through a form of settlement. It is an imperfect compromise that provides less
protection for animals than the EU originally aimed for, but, at the same time, it does
contribute something to the evolution of internationally agreed baseline standards about
what is morally acceptable in the treatment of animals.

6.4

Farmed Animal Welfare

By far the majority of sentient animals that humans use – by far the majority of
sentient animals that humans have any interaction with – are farmed animals used for
food (and, to a lesser extent, for other products such as wool and fur).209 The quality of
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these animals’ lives is completely in the control of their human owners and caretakers
from birth, throughout their lives, up to and including their death. Different countries
have different levels of welfare protection for farmed animals. Indeed, some countries,
including the US and Canada, effectively have no regulations at all that apply to farmed
animal welfare specifically.210 Divergence in national welfare standards leads to a
tension between the desire to ensure that higher standards are not diluted or undermined
by imports from lower welfare countries, and the obligation not to discriminate against
products from other WTO members.211
So far there has not been a WTO case concerning farmed animal welfare
standards. Some important WTO disputes have addressed measures that regulate the way
farmed animals are raised and how the products derived from them are marketed. ECHormones concerns EU regulations aimed at curtailing the use of synthetic hormones in
raising beef cattle.212 The US-COOL case concerns regulations that meat products be
labelled to indicate their country of origin.213 These matters may well be indirectly
related to animal welfare: administering hormones to cattle to promote growth can affect
their level of welfare or at least be associated with relatively intensive, lower-welfare
methods of meat production, and country-of-origin labelling gives consumers information
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that they may be interested in in part because the origin of a product tells them something
about the welfare conditions that the animals are likely to have been raised in. But since
the cases focus on human health and safety and on consumer information, and do not
address animal welfare or animal protection directly, they are only peripherally connected
to the discussion here.
Although there has not yet been a WTO case directly addressing welfare
standards for farmed animals, the potential for a dispute has been apparent for some time.
Perhaps the most obvious place where a dispute could arise is the difference in welfare
standards between the EU and many of its trading partners. The EU has relatively high
standards of animal welfare generally, including for farmed animals. Article 13 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union recognizes animals as sentient beings,
and requires regard to be given to animal welfare in formulating certain EU policies.214
The EU has enacted an extensive corpus of legislation and regulations laying down
specific requirements for farmed animal welfare both overall and in a wide variety of
specific contexts.215
Two laws that have prompted discussion of their interaction with WTO rules are
the EU’s legislation on egg-laying hens and on broiler chickens. The Egg-Laying Hen
Directive phased out battery cages for egg-laying hens over a period of thirteen years, and
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outlawed them completely beginning in 2012.216 The Broiler Chicken Directive set out
welfare requirements including maximum stocking densities, for chickens raised for
meat.217
The Egg-Laying Hen Directive and the Broiler Chicken Directive regulate welfare
conditions inside the EU, but do not impose import restrictions on eggs or chicken meat
from other jurisdictions. When the Broiler Chicken Directive was proposed by the
European Parliament in 2006, the proposal included an amendment concerning imports of
chicken from outside the EU: “Imports of chicken from third countries, which come from
holdings that do not observe rules on the welfare of chickens for meat production
equivalent to those effective in the E.U., should also be regulated and, where appropriate,
prohibited.”218 Similarly, the egg industry in Europe saw lower-cost, lower-welfare
imports as a threat to its survival. An unsigned article in the UK industry publication
Poultry World in 2003 calculated the cost differential of producing eggs in accordance
with the EU rules once fully in effect in 2012, and argued “[t]hat is enough to enable eggs
from third countries, without meeting any of these welfare and food safety standards, to
undercut those produced in the UK” and that the domestic industry could only survive if
“meaningful animal welfare measures are built into the WTO agreement, or if tariffs are
kept at a level to compensate for the EU’s costs for going it alone on legislation.”219
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The Broiler Chicken Directive calls for a report from the European Commission
by 2009 on “the possible introduction of a specific harmonised mandatory labelling
scheme for chicken meat, meat products and preparations based on compliance with
animal welfare standards.”220 The Directive provides that the report “shall consider …
compliance of such a labelling scheme with World Trade Organisation Rules.”221
The report produced by the Commission in 2009 takes a cautious approach,
proposing that a voluntary labelling scheme would be permitted under WTO law if
“proportionate and open to third party producers,” whereas a mandatory scheme “would
face more controversy in the WTO framework.”222 The feasibility study that this
recommendation was based on pointed out that no WTO case to that point had recognized
animal welfare as a legitimate basis for restricting trade. The study concluded that “it is
not possible to predict whether a … mandatory animal welfare labelling scheme could be
successfully challenged and, thus, become incompatible with WTO law.”223 At present,
the EU has adopted a compulsory welfare labelling scheme for eggs, but does not plan to
introduce additional mandatory labelling rules.224 The lack of an associated rule
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restricting imports, or a labelling requirement, may have watered down the effectiveness
of the Broiler Chicken Directive, but even aside from this concern it has been criticized
as a weak rule that “has simply provided industrial broiler production with a cloak of
legislative respectability, while failing to impose any significant welfare requirements on
the industry.”225
As WTO jurisprudence has evolved, it has become more apparent that it is
possible to craft animal welfare-based measures, whether labelling schemes or import
restrictions, that can withstand WTO scrutiny. Before the adoption of the Broiler
Chicken Directive, Edward Thomas argued that welfare-based import restrictions (as
proposed by the European Parliament) could be found consistent with WTO law if
carefully designed.226 Thomas points out that WTO adjudicators had by that time already
moved away from GATT panels’ strict approach concerning PPMs and extrajurisdictional effects, and proposed that the public morals exception under Article XX(a)
of GATT could apply to a measure adopted to improve animal welfare.227
Thomas proposes that one important component of creating a WTO-proof
measure would be to “attempt to negotiate bilateral or multilateral agreements with
nations that export chicken to the European Union,” arguing that this would be “an
important step toward showing that the import ban is ‘necessary’ due to the exhaustion of
other alternatives, and that the ban is not a protectionist measure.”228 As noted in the
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discussion of US-Shrimp above, negotiation (or attempted negotiation) of internationally
agreed approaches is in fact not a free-standing requirement under WTO precedent.229
But WTO case law does tend to encourage and look favourably upon such efforts, and
they can be an indication that a policy is being applied fairly and without the unjustifiable
discrimination or arbitrariness that would implicate the Article XX chapeau. Thomas
also suggests that an import ban could be upheld if paired with a reasonably flexible
certification process for exporting countries to gain access to the European market if their
standards of animal welfare are comparable.230
Concerns about WTO compatibility have held EU lawmakers back from going as
far as they might have on animal welfare legislation, arguably to a greater extent than the
law actually requires. The EU has made efforts to address the question through
negotiation and law reform at the WTO. In 2000, it submitted a proposal at the WTO
Committee on Agriculture to negotiate new multilateral agreements in the WTO context
to deal with the protection of animal welfare.231 The proposal highlighted concerns about
the effect of animal agriculture on the health and welfare of animals and on the
environment. The EU suggested that the protection of animal welfare could be dealt with
through subsidiary multilateral agreements on animal welfare that clarified the
relationship between animal welfare standards and WTO rules.232 Since then, the EU
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has focused instead on including provisions relating to animal welfare in its non-WTO
trade agreements. These initiatives are discussed in Chapter Eight.233

6.5

Cosmetics Testing

As is the case for fur, there is disagreement about whether the use of animals for
research on cosmetic products it is ever morally justified. Research on animals for
medical research and to test the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals is different; for
these purposes, the mainstream consensus probably is that using animals for testing is
justifiable, but should be regulated so as not to cause more suffering than necessary. But
cosmetics are much less important than life-saving medical procedures or drugs.
Complete rejection of cosmetics testing on animals has spread in a manner similar to the
rejection of fur.234
The EU and some EU member states were early adopters of the position against
cosmetic testing. But, once again, concerns about compliance with WTO obligations and
the risk of WTO litigation caused the EU to move more slowly and less boldly than it
might otherwise have done.
In 1993, the EU adopted a Directive that amended its existing regulatory regime
for marketing cosmetic products, with a view to ending the sale of animal-tested
products.235 The 1993 Cosmetics Directive banned marketing of cosmetics products
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containing ingredients tested on animals. The ban was supposed to come into force in
1998, but the 1993 Cosmetics Directive provided for a delay in implementation if there
had been “insufficient progress in developing satisfactory methods to replace animal
testing.”236
Since the marketing ban would have applied equally to domestic and imported
products, implementing it would have meant a risk of trade tensions and possibly WTO
litigation with countries that export cosmetics products to the EU. The EU “became wary
of GATT rules, fearing that the rules prevented it from distinguishing in its marketing
rules between cosmetics tested on animals and those not so tested, because such a
distinction revolves around PPMs.”237 It delayed implementing the marketing ban and
considered replacing it with abolition only of the practice of testing cosmetics on animals
within EU territory, even though, as Stevenson argues,
only to ban the testing of cosmetics on animals within the E.U. (rather
than, as first intended, the marketing of such cosmetics) is to
significantly dilute the original directive as multi-national cosmetics
companies may well simply do their animal testing outside the E.U. and
then import the products for sale within the E.U.238
By the late 1990s, following the US-Shrimp decision, there was a solid basis in
WTO jurisprudence to defend such a measure and less reason to fear that the GATT-era
PPM analysis would be relevant.239
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The EU revisited the issue in 2003, when it adopted a new Directive240 that
applied both to animal testing within the EU and to marketing imported animal-tested
products. It required member states to abolish animal experiments on cosmetics (either
the ingredients going into the products or the finished products) inside their territories.241
It also required member states to prohibit the marketing of cosmetic products where the
final formulation had been tested on animals or where ingredients or combinations of
ingredients had been tested on animals, whether the testing happened inside or outside the
EU. 242 These prohibitions were phased in over ten years, with different deadlines for
different types of test.243
The 2003 Directive was fully implemented as of 2013. However, there does
remain a loophole for so-called “dual purpose” products or ingredients that are used both
in cosmetics and in other contexts (pharmaceutical, detergents, food) where animal
testing is still allowed.244 Potential noncompliance with WTO rules no longer seems to
be a serious concern, given that the legislation has an important purpose and does not
protect domestic industry or create different rules for products from different countries.245

240
EC, Directive 2003/15/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (27 February 2003)
amending Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to
cosmetic products, 2003 OJ, L 66/26 [2003 Cosmetics Directive].
241
Ibid, Art 2.
242
Ibid.
243
See summary of the timelines in Jennifer Klein, “EU Cosmetics Directive and the Ban on
Animal Testing: Compliance, Challenges and the GATT as a Potential Barrier to Animal Welfare” (2012)
21 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 251 at 258-261.
244
Kristian Fischer, “Animal Testing and Marketing Bans of the EU Cosmetics Legislation”
(2013), 6 EJRR 613.
245
See discussion in Klein, supra note 243 at 268-272 (concluding that a challenge under GATT
could succeed at least temporarily, until alternatives to animal testing are in place so that concerns over
human health effects are reduced, but that it is unlikely that the WTO would invalidate the 2003 Directive
completely).

230

In 2018, the European Parliament passed (by 620 votes to 14, with 18 abstentions)
a non-binding resolution calling for negotiation of a UN treaty banning cosmetic animal
testing worldwide.246

6.6

The Emergence of Animal Protection Norms and

Trade Law as a Practice of Legality
The history of animal protection disputes and controversies that intersect with
international trade law shows that critics of the trade system have good reason for arguing
that it has held back progress on animal protection, and that apprehension about trade
disputes has discouraged bold moves on animal-protective policy.247 GATT panel
decisions that prioritized trade over animal protection efforts have cast a long shadow,
even though those reports were not adopted and even though WTO Appellate Body
jurisprudence has taken a significantly different approach. WTO law today is more
hospitable to animal protection measures. The WTO dispute settlement system does still
insist on requirements of even-handedness, procedural fairness and transparency, limiting
the room that domestic legislators have to move in what is already a difficult area where
finding acceptable compromises among stakeholders can be challenging.
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But to see the effect of the trade system on animal protection initiatives as only a
hindrance to their development is to miss much of its significance, in particular when it
comes to the dissemination of animal protection norms internationally. Viewed through
the lens of Brunnée and Toope’s interactional theory, the interplay between animal
protection and trade is an example of the formation of new international legal norms in
progress – although the direction of progress is not (and is never) inevitably and always
forward – characterized by the development of norms based on shared understandings
and the articulation of those norms in a distinctively legal form through a practice of
legality.
6.6.1 Norms and Shared Understandings
The international trade system – not just the WTO as an institution, but the
overarching system in which states interact, negotiate and debate with one another over
trade and trade-related matters – can be thought of as a “community of practice,” as
Brunnée and Toope use the term, “in which state and non-state actors participate in
international law and policy processes.”248 Through interaction in this community of
practice, international norms of animal protection are being proposed, contested, and
even (to a more limited extent) agreed on. This process has put animal protection on the
international law and policy agenda. The efforts of NGOs and scholars proposing
declarations of rights for animals, international treaties for animal protection and the like
are important, because they help to expand what might be envisioned for global animal
law, but they have not had much practical effect. The trade community of practice,
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however, has gone some way in translating that work of norm entrepreneurship into
common ground on which legal norms could be built.
Sometimes the results have been more symbolically significant than genuinely
beneficial to animals. The conclusion of two international treaties on humane trapping
standards meant little meaningful change in the kinds of traps used in the US, Russia and
Canada. But it is certainly important that the dispute over leghold traps led to the
conclusion of the first international treaties (at least, the first ones not limited to European
countries) concerned expressly and only with reaching a consensus on animal welfare
standards. This milestone is the direct result of the influence of the trade system and the
desire to avoid a trade dispute.
In some cases, the cross-fertilization of animal welfare norms between nations
may (even if in limited ways) meaningfully advance animal protection. The use of trade
measures by the US to support its efforts to protect dolphins and sea turtles has
contributed to the acceptance of TED technology around the world and raised doubts
about the continued viability of dolphin encirclement as a fishing method. The EU’s
moves to disseminate higher farmed animal welfare through bilateral and preferential
agreements, like the trade agreement with Chile, have resulted in some legislative
progress.
These are not resounding victories, and they do not go as far as animal advocates
might wish. But they do look very much like evolving norms based on shared
understandings, generated through interaction in a particular social context: the context of
interacting as trading partners and participants in the international legal system (including
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the international trade law arm of it). Norms based on shared understandings reflect
overlapping consensus, and that usually means compromise. They are likely to be
watered down from the strongest or the most progressive expression of the normative
position. Criticisms about the lowest common denominator being locked in place249 are
not unfounded. But interactional theory suggests that something like the lowest common
denominator, or at least a baseline position that is genuinely reciprocal rather than
imposed, is a prerequisite for the emergence of binding international law.
Indeed, Brunnée and Toope suggest that international law-makers “may have to
be modest in their aspirations if a sustainable community of legal practice is to emerge,”
and that meaningful international law “may have to track what little common ground
there is.”250 This is a trade-off between the bolder ideals of lawmakers and the creation
of a robust foundation of shared understandings. Interactional theory indicates that a true
global animal law that commands fidelity will not develop without a foundation in shared
understandings, very possibly at the cost of curtailed aspirations and limited common
ground. Concerning animal protection, even the emergence of common ground around
the idea that animal welfare and the intrinsic value individual animals are serious matters
for international discussion is an important, and new, development.
A notable feature of the evolution of shared understandings about animal
protection in the trade context is the cross-pollination of ideas between epistemic
communities and norm entrepreneurs. The pre-WTO GATT system was characterized by
a siloed epistemic community of trade specialists, the community that Howse describes as
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the “trade policy elite” or the “insider network,” that (consistent with its normative
orientation) prioritized trade liberalization and was not very cognizant of perspectives
from outside the community. As Harrop and Bowles argue, the segregation of trade from
other issues reflected – and to an appreciable extent still reflects – separation of
responsibility for different mandates within domestic bureaucracies:
These conflicts [between trade and other values] are compounded by
contradictory priorities within the boundaries of individual states. For
instance, government officials representing a trade portfolio could have
mandates and instructions which conflict with those given to officials
with conservation or environment portfolios, leading to departmentspecific policies being decided in virtual isolation. Trade has
historically been seen as more important than environmental or animal
welfare issues. Thus, there may be a tendency for trade and
environment delegates to operate on separate, unconnected issues, at
best, in a state of dynamic tension without attempting to solve these
cross-sectoral challenges through a multidisciplinary approach.251
Howse argues that the institutional transformation from the GATT to the WTO
opened up cross-pollination between the trade epistemic community and global civil
society, as the “impermeability and homogeneity” of the insider network began to be
“compromised” by the infiltration of a new generation of trade professionals with training
in public international law, environmentalism or development studies, and by the
participation of NGOs in trade law-making.252 What Howse saw emerging from this
interaction was a process of truly democratic international law-making:
As the various constituencies confront each other directly, new ideas
will percolate, and we will witness the beginnings of a genuine
transnational democratic deliberation-not above, or autonomous from,
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deliberation within domestic polities, but deeply intertwined with the
domestic and the local.253
6.6.2 WTO Jurisprudence as a Practice of Legality
If interaction in the trade community of practice is generating new norms
concerning animal protection, based on a foundation of shared understandings, then we
can say that this process is creating the underpinnings for what could become true global
animal law. But interactional theory tells us that this is only a necessary, not a sufficient,
condition for the emergence of international law, which can only arise “when shared
understandings come to be intertwined with distinctive internal qualities of law and
practices of legality.”254
WTO DSB jurisprudence is a “practice of legality,” in precisely the sense in
which Brunnée and Toope use the term, that has articulated animal-protective norms in
distinctively legal terms. This process that can be seen happening in the US-Shrimp and
US-Tuna III decisions, and was further developed in EC – Seal Products (discussed in the
next chapter).
The DSB, especially the Appellate Body, is institutionally built to engage in a
practice of legality. An important feature of the change from the GATT arbitral system
to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is that disputes became comparatively
“juridified.”255
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The Appellate Body’s approach to delineating the parameters of policy exceptions
within the constraints of WTO treaty obligations adheres to the criteria of legality that
Fuller and Brunnée and Toope identify. In the context of animal-protection trade cases,
this discourse recognizes the legitimacy of animal protection as a policy objective, while
weaving animal protective norms into the distinctive characteristics, constraints and
vocabulary of law.
The Appellate Body has recognized that WTO members can legitimately pursue
animal protection policies. They can do so in ways that have an effect on other members’
access to their markets, and they can do so with the avowed aim of changing standards of
animal protection outside their own borders. To be able to do this in a way that conforms
with WTO law, however, members must observe the requirements of the Article XX
chapeau (and chapeau-like implied obligations under the TBT Agreement) not to
discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably and not to disguise protectionism as legitimate
policy. In this connection, the Appellate Body has emphasized the importance of
extending substantially equal opportunities (for certification as not being subject to the
shrimp embargo in US-Shrimp, for eligibility for the dolphin-safe label) to all similarly
situated trade partners, a requirement that reflects Fuller’s criterion of generality: there
must be rules of general application, not just ad hoc determinations that vary with each
case.256 The Appellate Body criticized the process of making certification decisions in
US-Shrimp because it lacked transparency and because applicants were not sure what was
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required of them or how they could put their arguments to the decisionmakers; in other
words, it failed on Fuller’s criteria of promulgation and clarity.
The Appellate Body’s focus on the chapeau in both cases also foregrounds the
way the law is applied, reflecting Fuller’s criterion of congruence between declared rules
and official action; even if legislation is, on paper, appropriately calibrated to furthering a
legitimate goal in a way that complies with WTO law, the DSB will scrutinize the way it
is applied by officials to ensure that official practice does not taint the legal framework
with unfairness.
In short, the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence underlines that animal protection
norms have a place in trade law, but only if they are articulated and applied in a way that
conforms with a system governed by the rule of law.

6.7

Conclusion

This overview of trade controversies concerning animal protection before EC –
Seal Products has shown that animal protection norms have been proposed, debated and
to some extent agreed on in the international trade arena. The limited normative
consensus that has survived this process is much less ambitious than some of the moves
proposed by the states that have acted as norm entrepreneurs in this area (the EU and to a
lesser extent the US), and by animal advocates and animal-protection NGOs. In this
sense, the trade controversies examined here can be seen as examples of trade law
holding back progress on animal protection. But the analytical lens of interactional
international law suggests a different conclusion: this is the beginning of the difficult and
contested process of generating norms based on shared understandings that could become
238

the foundation for binding international law. The WTO dispute settlement system has
contributed to articulating and circumscribing these norms in a distinctively legal way.
In the disputes covered in this chapter, we can see animal protection starting to
find a place as a recognized value in international trade law. The EC – Seal Products
case, discussed in the next chapter, was a significant next step in the construction of
global norms of animal protection through a process of legal interaction in the
international trade regime.
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Chapter 7
7.1

EC – Seal Products

Introduction

This Chapter examines the EC – Seal Products1 case through the lens of
interactional theory, as a landmark moment in the development or construction of animal
protection norms in WTO law.
WTO law is economic law, but the values at stake in the seals case are deeper and
more sacrosanct than just money. The clash over sealing implicates a number of different
values, sometimes overlapping and sometimes competing: the ethical treatment of
animals, the special significance of an iconic and appealing species, and the struggle of
small coastal communities to keep their identity and their traditions alive. And there is an
even more challenging aspect of the conflict: its implications for Inuit peoples who have
hunted seals for centuries, and who see the restriction of trade in seal products as an
attack on their traditions and an act of cultural imperialism.
This conflict began long before the EC – Seal Products case at the WTO, and the
WTO decision has not (of course) resolved it. But the WTO dispute has brought the
struggle over sealing into the formal structure of international adjudication, and that has
had a significant effect on the evolution of shared international norms concerning seal
welfare and animal protection more generally.

1
European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products (Complaints by Canada and Norway) (2013), WTO Docs WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R,
WT/DS400/R/Add1, WT/DS401/R/Add1 [EC – Seal Products Panel Report] and European Communities
— Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (Complaints by Canada and
Norway) (2014) WT/DS401/AB/R [EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Report] [together, EC – Seal
Products].
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Nikolas Selheim’s comprehensive study of the seal hunt very effectively explains
the clash of values and cultures involved in this dispute.2 On the one hand, as Selheim
observes, seals are iconically “cute,” beloved, and adorable, and for many urbanites it is
“truly unthinkable to hunt a seal.”3 In this sense, seals stand for our recognition of the
intrinsic value of animals, and of the ethical significance of animals as sentient beings.
On the other hand, for seal hunting communities, seals are seen as so essential an
economic resource that the EU, because of its actions against seal hunting, “is considered
an adversary to the continuation of livelihoods in these communities.”4 Selheim writes
that in the Canadian Arctic and Northern Newfoundland “it is advisable not to use the
term “European Union” or “EU.”5 From one point of view, the seal case is about the
prohibition of the unthinkable. And from the other, that prohibition is so outrageous that
it is best not to speak of it.
Such contested territory may not seem like a promising place to look for the
emergence of consensus-based norms, or “shared understandings” in the terminology of
interactional theory.6 But, without meaning to minimize the deep divisions that still exist
over EC – Seal Products, I argue here that the WTO DSB has made important progress in
identifying common ground – even if it is narrow – on animal protection. Further, the
dispute settlement process produces an articulation of this area of consensus as the
foundation of legal norms (in the specific sense of interactional theory) partly through the

2

Nikolas Selheim, The Seal Hunt: Cultures, Economies and Legal Regimes (Leiden & Boston:
Brill Nijhoff, 2018).
3
Ibid at 1.
4
Ibid at 271.
5
Ibid.
6
See Section 3.3 above on the argument that binding legal norms are based in shared
understandings.

241

important work of identifying what is required for compliance with the criteria of
legality.
EC – Seal Products is an important case in WTO law on many core doctrinal
matters, among them the relationship between the TBT Agreement and the GATT, the
nature of discrimination under the GATT MFN and NT principles, and the scope and
meaning of the public morals policy exception.7 Not surprisingly for a case that
developed the law in significant ways on these systemic questions, it has inspired a large
amount of scholarly commentary.8 My analysis here covers some of the same territory
that other scholars have addressed, but my particular focus is on what EC – Seal Products
means for the development of international legal principles concerning animal protection.
I evaluate that question using the analytical framework of interactional theory.
This chapter begins with a detailed description of the EU legislation that was
challenged in EC – Seal Products, including the exceptions to the overall ban on trade in
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seal products, the most important of which is the exception for seal caught by traditional
Inuit hunting. Next, it explains the landscape of animal protection laws in Europe, an
important part of the background to the EU’s action on seal hunting. Section 7.4 is an
overview of the characteristics of seal hunts in the three jurisdictions that are implicated
in this dispute: Canada, Norway and Greenland. Section 7.5 provides a history of the
genesis and development of the EU legislation. This background material helps to
contextualize the WTO dispute and to explain the values, traditions and beliefs that were
at stake on both sides.
In Section 7.6, I summarize the decisions of the WTO panel and Appellate Body
in the EC – Seal Products case. Section 7.7 explains the amendments to the EU
legislation made after the Appellate Body’s decision.
Section 7.8 discusses Inuit traditional seal hunting, and argues that the EU’s
attempt to assign it to a separate category, beyond the scope of the ban on seal products
and the animal welfare concerns that it reflects, is an example of what Will Kymlicka and
Sue Donaldson call a “strategy of avoidance”: a way of eliding conflicts between animal
rights and Indigenous people’s rights that is inherently unstable and ultimately not
sustainable.9
In Section 7.9, I consider the significance of the EC – Seal Products decision for
norms of animal protection in the context of WTO law. This section applies Brunnée and
Toope’s interactional framework to what happened in EC – Seal Products. I look at

9

See Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, “Animal Rights and Aboriginal Rights” in Peter Sankoff,
Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes, eds, Canadian Perspectives on Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin, 2015)
159 (and discussion in Section 7.8).
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where the formation of norms around animal protection, based on a process of social
interaction, stands after this case. And I analyze the panel and Appellate Body reports as
manifestations of a practice of legality that contributes to the construction of potential
legal norms from a basis in shared understandings, exhibiting the distinctive
characteristics of law.

7.2

The EU Seals Measure

The EC – Seal Products case was a WTO challenge to rules adopted by the EU in
2009 and 2010 that banned sales and imports of seal products. The rules consist of a
regulation, together with implementing legislation that specifies how the regulation is to
be applied, and, subsequently, some modifications that were put in place after the WTO
ruling. The whole complex of rules is referred to here as the “Seals Measure.”
7.2.1 The 2009 Seals Regulation
In 2009, the EU adopted a regulation that prohibits products made from seals
from being placed on the market in the EU, and also prohibits imports of seal products
from outside the EU (the Seals Regulation).10 This general ban has exceptions. The first
and most significant exception is for products resulting from traditional subsistence
hunting by Inuit and other Indigenous peoples.11 This will be referred to here as the
Indigenous Exception.

10

EC, Commission Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 September 2009 on trade in seal products [2009] OJ, L 286/36 [the “Seals Regulation”].
11
Ibid, Art 3(1).
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The second exception is for occasional, non-commercial imports of personal
goods belonging to travellers and their family members (the Travel Exception).12 The
third is for by-products of regulated seal culls “conducted for the sole purpose of
sustainable management of marine resources” (the Marine Management Exception).13
7.2.2 The 2010 Original Implementing Regulation
In 2010, the EU adopted an implementing regulation that set out rules for
implementing the Seals Regulation, including specific criteria for products to be eligible
for the three exceptions (the Original Implementing Regulation).14 The Seals Regulation
was later amended, in 2015, reflecting the outcome of the WTO dispute and so as to bring
the measure into compliance with WTO rules; at the same time, the Original
Implementing Regulation was repealed.15 Also in 2015, the European Commission
adopted a new implementing regulation designed to comply with the WTO ruling.16
In the rest of this section, I set out a detailed description of the Seals Measure as it
stood in 2010, after the adoption of the Original Implementing Regulation. This the
regulatory regime that was evaluated by the WTO in EC – Seal Products. In Section 7.7,

12

Ibid, Art 3(2)(a).
Ibid, Art 3(2)(b).
14
EC, Commission Regulation (EU) No 737/2010 of 10 August 2010 laying down detailed rules
for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council
on trade in seal products, [2010] OJ L 216/1 [the “Original Implementing Regulation”].
15
EC, Regulation (EU) 2015/1775 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October
2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and repealing Commission
Regulation (EU) No 737/2010, [2015] OJ L 262/1 [the “Amended Seals Regulation”].
16
EC, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1850 of 13 October 2015 laying down
detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of
the Council on trade in seal products, [2015] OL 271/1 [the “New Implementing Regulation”].
13
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I describe changes that were made to the Seals Measure after the EC – Seal Products
rulings, in order to bring it into compliance with WTO law.
7.2.3 The Exceptions
7.2.3.1

The Indigenous Exception

The most important exemption from the overall ban on seal products was the
Indigenous Exception. The rationale for the exception was that the “fundamental
economic and social interests of Inuit communities engaged in the hunting of seals as a
means to ensure their subsistence should not be adversely affected.”17 Recognizing the
seal hunt as “an integral part of the culture and identity” of Inuit peoples protected by the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the EU determined that
products of traditional subsistence hunts by Inuit people should still have access to the
market despite the general ban.18
“Inuit” was defined in the Seals Regulation as “indigenous members of the Inuit
homeland, namely those arctic and subarctic areas where, presently or traditionally, Inuit
have aboriginal rights and interests, recognised by Inuit as being members of their
people.”19 It included specific communities: Inupiat, Yupik (Alaska), Inuit, Inuvialuit
(Canada), Kalaallit (Greenland) and Yupik (Russia).20

17

Seals Regulation, supra note 10, Preamble para 14.
Ibid.
19
Ibid, Art 2(4).
20
Ibid. This definition mirrors that in Article 6(1) of the Inuit Circumpolar Charter, online:
https://web.archive.org/web/20161115211401/https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/icc-charter.html (“‘Inuit’
means indigenous members of the Inuit homeland recognized by Inuit as being members of their people
and shall include the Inupiat, Yupik (Alaska), Inuit, Inuvialuit (Canada), Kalaallit (Greenland) and Yupik
(Russia)”).
18
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The Original Implementing Regulation established the specific rules for this
exemption. The preamble stated that seal products should be permitted to be placed on
the market if they came from “hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous
communities and which contribute to their subsistence … where such hunts are part of
the cultural heritage of the community and where the seal products are at least partly
used, consumed or processed within the communities according to their traditions.”21
The conditions for the Indigenous Exception were as follows:
•

The products had to result from hunts by Inuit or other indigenous
communities that “have a tradition of seal hunting in the community and
in the geographical region.”22 “Other indigenous communities” meant
communities descended from the inhabitants of their country or region at
the time of conquest or colonization who retain their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions.23

•

The seal products had to result from hunting the products of which were
“at least partly used, consumed or processed within the communities
according to their traditions,”24 and

•

The products had to come from hunts that “contribute to the subsistence of
the community.”25

21

Original Implementing Regulation, supra note 14, Preamble para 3.
Ibid, Art 3(1)(a).
23
Ibid, Art 2(1).
24
Ibid, Art 3(1)(b).
25
Ibid, Art 3(1)(c).
22
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The kind of seal hunting that made products eligible for the Indigenous Exception
had to be for subsistence and cultural purposes, as distinct from commercial motivations.
But products from such hunts, provided that they met the criteria of the exemption, could
be sold and marketed for profit as commercial products without losing exempt status.
There was also no hard limit on the quantity of seal products that could enter the stream
of commerce. This space in the Indigenous Exception to allow in products from hunts
with a partly commercial character was to become an important issue in the WTO case.
7.2.3.2

The Travel Exception

The Travel Exception was available for people traveling into the EU bringing seal
products (for example, clothing, meat or nutritional supplements) for their own use rather
than resale. It applied to seal products brought into the EU for the personal use of
travelers or their families, if any of the following applied:
•

The seal products were worn by the travelers or brought in with their
personal luggage,26

•

The traveler was moving his or her personal residence to the EU and
brought the products in along with his or her personal property,27 or

•

The products were purchased in a third country and imported at a later
date, as long as the imported products were accompanied by
documentation showing that they were bought in the third country.28 So,
for example, an EU resident could buy a souvenir or an item for personal

26

Ibid, Art 4(1).
Ibid, Art 4(2).
28
Ibid, Art 4(3).
27
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use made out of seal while on vacation, and ship it home separately with
the required documentation.
The Travel Exception was a narrow exemption, limited to products that were not
brought into the stream of commerce inside the EU.29
7.2.3.3

The Marine Management Exception

The Marine Management Exception permitted occasional sales of products from
seals culled as part of regulated, ecosystem-based seal population management. If seals
were killed for population management purposes, this exception meant that they did not
have to be discarded and go to waste if they could be sold.30 The conditions for this
exception were:
•

The products must come from a hunt “conducted under a national or
regional natural resources management plan which uses scientific
population models of marine resources and applies the ecosystem-based
approach,”31

•

The hunt must not go over the total allowable catch set under the
management plan,32 and

•

The products must be “placed on the market in a non-systematic way on a
non-profit basis.”33

29

Howse & Langille, supra note 8 at 385.
See discussion (referencing the EU’s submissions on this point before the WTO panel) in
Nielsen & Calle, supra note 8 at 46.
31
Original Implementing Regulation, supra note 14, Art 4(1)(a).
32
Ibid, Art 4(1)(b).
33
Ibid, Art 4(1)(c).
30
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Both the Travel Exception and the Marine Management Exception restricted
imports (in the case of the Travel Exception) and sales (in the case of the Marine
Management Exception) in a non-commercial, not-for-profit context. Although these
exceptions did not set numerical limits on the quantity of eligible seal products, they are
inherently limited to allowing in only a small number of products. There are only so
many items that travelers will bring in with them for personal use, or that will result from
regulated seal population management.
The Seals Regulation and the Original Implementing Regulation both came into
effect on August 20, 2010.

7.3

Animal Protection Law and Pro-Animal Values in the

EU
The EU decided to ban seal products because of public concerns about animal
suffering in the seal hunt. The preamble of the Seals Regulation notes that seals “are
sentient beings that can experience pain, distress, fear and other forms of suffering,”34
and that seal hunting “has led to expressions of serious concerns by members of the
public and governments” about the suffering involved.35
This legislative response to animal suffering is in line with an established tradition
in EU law of fairly progressive legislation for animal protection, as well as recognition of
animals as sentient and morally significant beings. An “extensive body of law governs
the treatment of different classes of animals,” and legislation on animal welfare “has
34
35

Seals Regulation, supra note 10, Preamble para 1.
Ibid, Preamble para 4.
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mitigated much of the harshness with which especially farm animals used to be
treated.”36 European nations and lawmaking institutions have adopted a number of
instruments concerning animal protection.
The first European animal protection treaties date from the 1960s, under the
Council of Europe. The Council of Europe, which is distinct from the EU, is an
international organization with 47 member states. 28 of the current members are the EU
member states.37 The Council describes itself as “a forum for examining common social
problems”38 for its members, with a primary focus on human rights.
Council of Europe member states have concluded six animal protection treaties:
five dealing with animal welfare in contexts including farming, slaughter and research,
and one dealing with wildlife protection.39 The first of these treaties is the 1968
Convention for the Protection of Animals during International Transport.40 It is probably
the first international treaty dealing with animal welfare.41 When this treaty was adopted,

36
Bart Driessen, “Fundamental Animal Rights in European Law” (2017) 23(3) European Public L
547 at 551. See also the discussion of EU animal welfare standards in Section 6.4 above.
37
Council of Europe, “Who We Are,” online: https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are.
38
Elaine L Hughes & Christiane Meyer, “Animal Welfare Law in Canada and Europe” (2000) 6
Animal L 23 at 42. The treaties are: the European Convention for the Protection of Animals During
International Transport, Eur TS 65 (1968) as amended by Additional Protocol Eur TS 103; the European
Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, Eur TS 87 (1976) and Protocol of
Amendment, Eur TS 145; the European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, Eur TS 102
(1979); the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Eur TS 104
(1979); the European Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and
Other Scientific Purposes, Eur TS 123 (1986) and Protocol of Amendment, Eur TS 170; and the European
Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals, Eur TS 125 (1987).
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Hughes & Meyer, ibid at 43.
40
European Convention for the Protection of Animals During International Transport, supra note
38. A revised version of this Convention (CETS 193) was opened for signature on 6 November 2003 and
entered into force on 14 March 2006. As of April 10, 2019, 19 Council of Europe member states have
signed and 13 have ratified the treaty (see chart of signatures and ratifications available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=193&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG).
41
As discussed in Chapter Six, the 1998 agreements on humane trapping standards have been
called the first example of truly international (not just regional) law on animal welfare. See Section 6.4
above.
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one commentator said that for the first time the protection of animals had been
recognized as “a matter which can be subject to international regulation.”42
In more recent history, the EU has enacted an extensive array of animal protection
instruments. The EU is an integrated supranational political and lawmaking institution,
with the power to adopt regulations that automatically become enforceable as law in the
EU member states, as well as Directives that the member states are then legally bound to
enact as domestic law.43
Recognition of animal sentience and a commitment to reflecting animal protection
in policy initiatives are built into the constitutive law of the EU. A protocol concerning
animal welfare was adopted in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam,44 which amended the
Consolidated Treaty on European Union.45 The relevant provision, the Protocol on
Protection and Welfare of Animals,46 states:
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
DESIRING to ensure improved protection and respect for the welfare
of animals as sentient beings,
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provision which shall be
annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

42
Per von Holstein, “Protection of Animals by Means of International Law, with Special
Reference to the Convention for the Protection of Animals during International Transport” (1969) 18 Int’l
& Comp L Q’ly 771 at 771.
43
Hughes & Meyer, supra note 38 at 43.
44
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and certain related acts, 2 October 1997, [1997] OJ C 340/110, 37 ILM 56
(entered into force 1 May 1999).
45
[2010] OJ C 83/13.
46
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European
Communities and certain related acts - Protocol annexed to the Treaty of the European
Community Protocol on protection and welfare of animals, 1997 OJ C 340 [Amsterdam Protocol].
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In formulating and implementing the Community's agriculture,
transport, internal market and research policies, the Community and the
Member States shall pay full regard to the welfare requirements of
animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions
and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious
rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.
In 2007, Article 13 of the Lisbon Treaty added this provision to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.47
Much of the EU legal architecture for animal welfare is concerned with farm
animals, and is part of the legal framework for the Common Agricultural Policy.48 These
laws include a Directive concerning multiple aspects of farm animal welfare,49 Directives
establishing minimum animal welfare standards for specific animals, including pigs,50
broiler chickens (chickens used for meat)51 and egg-laying hens,52 Directives on the use

115/47.
above.

47

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2008] OJ C

48

See also the discussion of the EU’s policy and laws on farmed animal welfare in Section 6.4
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EC, Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for
farming purposes, [1998] OJ L221/23.
50
EC, Council Directive 2008/120/EC of 18 December 2008 laying down minimum standards for
the protection of pigs, [2009] OJ L 47/5. This Directive establishes minimum space requirements for pigs
and prohibits keeping sows alone in very small gestation or farrowing crates.
51
EC, Council Directive 2007/43/EC of 28 June 2007 laying down minimum rules for the
protection of chickens kept for meat production [2007] OJ L 182/19. This Directive regulates conditions
including maximum stocking densities for broiler chickens. See discussion in Section 6.4.
52
EC, Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the
protection of laying hens, [1999] OJ L 203/53. This Directive requires phasing out of highly intensive
“battery” farming of egg-laying hens. See discussion in Section 6.4.
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of animals in research,53 a regulation on the protection of animals during transportation,54
and legislation aimed at minimizing pain and suffering during animal slaughter.55
In 2012, the EU released its most recent strategy document, the EU Strategy on
Animal Welfare for the period 2012-2015 (the Strategy).56 The Strategy announced the
European Commission’s plan “to consider the need for a revised EU legislative
framework based on a holistic approach,”57 consolidating responses rather than adopting
specific legislation to address specific problems. Observing that in recent years the EU
had spent “on average 70 million Euros per year to support farm animal welfare,” the
Strategy aimed to improve the effectiveness of this investment in improving animal
welfare outcomes.58 The Strategy reported that, according to an EU-wide survey, animal
welfare “is a significant issue for 64% of the population.”59 One aspect of the Strategy is

53
EC, Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes, 2010 OJ L 276. See also EC, Directive
2003/15/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (27 February 2003) amending Council
Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic
products, 2003 OJ L 66/26. EU law now prohibits testing cosmetic products on animals. See discussion in
Section 6.5.
54
EC, Council Regulation (EC) 1/2005 of 22 December 2004, on the protection of animals during
transport and related operations and amending Directives 64/432/EEC and 93/119/EC and Regulation
(EC) No 1255/97, [2005] OJ L 3/1. This Regulation limits long journeys for animals (including in
transportation to slaughter) and requires regular feeding and watering during transportation.
55
EC, Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time
of slaughter or killing, [1993] OJ L 340/21; EC, Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September
2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing [2009] OJ L 303/1. These rules require slaughter
methods that minimize pain and distress to the animals, including stunning before killing (subject to
religious exemptions).
56
EC, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee on the European Union Strategy for the Protection and Welfare
of Animals 2012-2015 (Brussels: EC, 2012) [Strategy].
57
Ibid at 6.
58
Ibid at 3-4.
59
Ibid at 5.
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international cooperation: a “level playing field on animal welfare is important at [the]
international level to ensure global competitiveness of EU operators.”60
The European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution in 2016 calling on the
European Commission to draw up a “new and ambitious” animal welfare strategy for
2016-2020.61 So far this has not happened, but the Commission stated in late 2018 that it
plans to revise and update its animal welfare strategy.62
In 2018, the European Court of Auditors published the results of its assessment of
the impact and implementation of the EU Strategy.63 The report begins with the
observation that the EU “has some of the world’s highest regulatory animal welfare
standards, which include general requirements on the rearing, transport and slaughter of
farm animals and specific requirements for certain species.”64 It is a strategic goal of the
European Court of Auditors to “examine performance in areas where EU action matters
to citizens,”65 and the report notes that animal welfare “is an important issue for EU
citizens.”66
Overall, this audit concluded that there had been good progress on animal welfare,
although there were still weaknesses in applying minimum standards set out in EU
legislation, as well as in compliance and coordination.

60

Ibid at 10.
EC, European Parliament resolution of 26 November 2015 on a new animal welfare strategy for
2016-2020 [2015] 2015/2957(RSP).
62
Peter Teffer, “EU to review animal welfare strategy” (14 November 2012) EU Observer, online:
https://euobserver.com/environment/143374.
63
European Court of Auditors, Special Report: Animal welfare in the EU: closing the gap between
ambitious goals and practical implementation (European Union, 2018).
64
Ibid at 5.
65
Ibid at 19.
66
Ibid at 47.
61

255

Some of the EU member states also have relatively strong domestic animal
protection laws. Germany amended its constitution in 2002 to add a reference to
protecting animals. As amended, Article 20(a) provides that “the state shall protect the
natural foundations of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and
justice, by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional
order.”67 Austria’s federal animal protection statute refers to the ethical significance or
intrinsic value of animals, stating that its aim is to protect “the life and well-being of
animals based on man’s special responsibility for the animal as a fellow creature.”68
The federal animal welfare statute of Switzerland protects “the dignity and
welfare of animals.”69 “Dignity” is defined as follows:
Inherent worth of the animal that has to be respected when dealing with
it. If any strain imposed on the animal cannot be justified by overriding
interests, this constitutes a disregard for the animal’s dignity. Strain is
deemed to be present in particular if pain, suffering or harm is inflicted
on the animal, if it is exposed to anxiety or humiliation, if there is major
interference with its appearance or its abilities or if it is excessively
instrumentalised.70
The UK generally takes legal protection of animals seriously. This was
highlighted recently as the UK prepares to exit from the EU. The legislation that
provides for devolution of laws and regulations from the EU to domestic authorities, the

67

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949, online:
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amendment); see also Claudia E Haupt, “The Nature and Effects of Constitutional State Objectives:
Assessing the German Basic Law’s Animal Protection Clause” (2010) 16 Animal L 213.
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BGBL. I Nr. 118/2004, §1. English text available at
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European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018,71 did not include a proposed amendment that
would have provided for transition of the principle of animal sentience recognized in
Article 13 of the Lisbon Treaty.72 As a result, concerns were expressed that UK law
following withdrawal from the EU would not adequately reflect the sentience of animals
or provide for animal protection. The government issued a statement confirming that it
would continue to recognize animal sentience and would strengthen protections for
animals following exit from the EU.73
Europe is not a paradise for animals. Animals are exploited, and suffer, in high
numbers there, as they do elsewhere in the world. The EU Strategy estimated that about
two billion birds and three hundred million mammals were used for farming purposes,
and about 12 million a year were used for research.74 Nevertheless, it is evident from this
brief survey of European animal protection law that both substantive legal protections for
animals and the institutional framework for coordination, oversight, evaluation and
continuous improvement of animal protection law are robust by global standards. Animal
welfare is a matter of concern to the public in Europe. European institutions, as well as
domestic legislators and authorities in at least some EU member states, take the legal
protection of animals seriously. They devote resources, both money and institutional
work, to supporting it.
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Colin Tudge has argued that the protection of animals is integral to a specifically
European “version of civilization,” and that the treatment of the vulnerable – both
vulnerable human beings and non-human species – is to a significant extent a measure of
“the worth of the European ideal.”75
The next two sections look at the historical background to the EU’s adoption of
the Seals Measure: first, the history and current status of sealing in Canada, Norway and
Greenland (section 7.4)76 and then the legislative history of the Seals Measure (section
7.5).

7.4

Seal Hunting in Canada, Norway and Greenland

This section outlines how the conflict of values between the EU and sealing
nations came about. It focuses on three locations: Canada, where the world’s largest seal
hunt takes place; Norway, which joined Canada as a complainant in the EC – Seal
Products WTO dispute; and Greenland, whose access to the EU market through the
Indigenous Exception was a key point of comparison in EC – Seal Products. There is
seal hunting in other places,77 but these three hunts are the most relevant to the EC – Seal
Products case.
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7.4.1 Canada
Harp, hooded and grey seals spend time on the Eastern shores of Canada during
their annual migrations, stopping there to give birth to and nurse their young.78 They
have been hunted for centuries for their fur, skins, meat and oil, first by Indigenous
populations and then, more intensively, by Europeans.79 The seal hunt and its products
played an important part in the economic development of coastal areas in Canada,
including the Magdalen Islands in Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador.80 By the
early nineteenth century, the commercial hunt grew larger in scale with the use of modern
technologies such as large schooners and air surveillance.81
International controversy about seal hunting started around the 1950s to 1960s,
when images and stories about the hunt started to appear in the national and international
media.82 Objections to seal hunting can be categorized under two main headings:
conservation, and animal suffering.
On the conservation side, intensive seal hunting reduced populations of seals and
altered their geographic distribution enough to raise concerns that the survival of some
species of seals might be threatened.83 For example, by the mid-twentieth century grey
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seals in the North Atlantic were on the verge of extinction, with their range reduced to a
narrow area around the Gulf of Saint Lawrence.84
Today, however, the numbers of seals hunted are relatively small compared to the
peak years. Populations appear to have stabilized.85 As a result, the conservation
concern is now less acute. Opponents of seal hunting do still cite this as a concern,
especially given the problems of climate change and warming oceans for animals that
depend on stable sea ice for successful reproduction.86
The second type of criticism raised against sealing has to do with the pain, distress
and suffering caused to the seals. The seal hunt is associated with an exceptionally stark
image of brutality towards animals: hunters clubbing baby seals over the head on the ice
floes.87 The young seals are both defenseless and unusually attractive, with fluffy coats
and faces that almost seem to have been designed to appeal to our sympathies.88 Seal
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hunting is not controversial simply because of the amount of suffering involved. On that
measure alone, it would hardly be fair to single sealing out for stronger criticism than
industrial animal farming. What seems to be particularly troubling about the seal hunt for
those who fight against it is that it is a way of interacting with the natural world that
seems starkly callous and lacking in compassion.
The Canadian nature writer and animal protection advocate Farley Mowat
recounted in his 1987 book Sea of Slaughter that the controversy over sealing took off
partly because of a tone-deaf marketing campaign by a company promoting tourism in
Quebec.89 A film intended to attract visitors included scenes from a seal hunt in the
Magdalen islands and footage of a baby seal being clubbed to death. The images shocked
viewers so much that, according to Mowat, it started the modern anti-sealing
movement.90
The international animal advocacy NGO the International Fund for Animal
Welfare (IFAW) formed in 1969 to campaign against seal hunting. In 1983 and 1984,
IFAW organized a consumer boycott of Canadian seafood products in the UK and the
US. The boycott was very effective in changing public views and government policy on
sealing – although the effects were temporary.
IFAW encouraged consumers and retailers to stop buying Canadian fish until the
seal hunt was banned completely.91 Under pressure, the Canadian government formed a
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Royal Commission on Seals and Sealing in Canada, under the chairmanship of Albert
Malouf (known as the Malouf Commission).92 The government responded to public
pressure and recommendations of the Malouf Commission by tightening up the
regulation of seal hunting. It banned sealing from large ships and cut subsidies to the
sealing industry.93
In the aftermath of the IFAW boycott and the Malouf Commission, the seal hunt
shrank to a small, local hunt of around 20,000 animals a year, and the Canadian
government was reportedly considering abolishing seal hunting outright.94 But in 1985
IFAW suspended the boycott, believing that it had largely achieved its goals; it was also
concerned about the negative effects on people in Eastern Canada’s fishing
communities.95 In 1995, then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Brian Tobin brought back
a subsidized and expanded seal hunt. The seal hunt resurged. The 2004 hunt was
described as “bigger, bloodier, and crueler than at any time since the 1950s” and “the
world’s largest slaughter of marine mammals.”96
Meanwhile, the EEC enacted its first import restriction on seal products. In 1983,
the EEC adopted a Directive prohibiting imports of skins from harp and hooded seal
pups.97 This Directive was justified based on conservation risks, rather than animal
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welfare concerns (although it is likely that objections to the cruelty of the hunt were part
of what drove it). The Directive refers to “the population status of the harp and hooded
seals and especially … the effect of non-traditional hunting on the conservation and
population status of hooded seals.”98 It applied “only … to products not resulting from
traditional hunting by the Inuit people,” noting that seal hunting as traditionally practiced
by the Inuit left seal pups unharmed.99
The European import ban dramatically reduced the market for the white coats of
baby harp seals. The Canadian government brought in regulations making it illegal to
trade in the skins of baby harp seals in the “whitecoat” stage (up to about two weeks old)
and hooded seals in the “bluecoat” stage (up to about 14 months).100
Thus, by the time of the IFAW boycott, killing of the iconic fluffy white baby
harp seals was already curtailed. But most harp seals that are killed were (and are) still
very young, between a month and three and a half months old.101
7.4.2 Norway
Norwegian sealing has a long history, although the hunt is smaller in scale (and
less internationally notorious) than the Canadian seal hunt.102 Petros Mavroidis
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characterizes the Norwegian seal hunt as part of a “very sophisticated resource
management program” that does not include “brutal” or inhumane hunting methods.103 In
the past, however, the Norwegian seal hunt has been a target of controversy for much the
same reasons as the larger Canadian hunt.
The centre of Norwegian sealing is the city of Tromsø, 350 kilometres north of
the Arctic Circle.104 Tromsø “owes its very existence to the harvesting of seals and
whales.” 105 At the height of the industry in 1955, close to 300,000 seals were caught
and processed in Norway, most in Tromsø. 106 Seal skin “was, and still is, used to make
boots and clothing in Norway; the meat is eaten locally and across the country.”107
In 1987 Odd F. Lindberg, a freelance journalist, author and photographer, joined a
sealing ship for the season.108 The following year he applied to be and was appointed as
a volunteer seal hunting inspector for the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries.109 The
Tromsø newspaper Bladet Tromsø published interviews with Lindberg in which he
described witnessing illegal and inhumane practices, including seals being skinned while
still alive and female harp seals being beaten to death while trying to protect their pups.110
Lindberg also made a documentary film, “Seal Mourning.”
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In 1989 the entire film was shown on Swedish television, and clips were shown in
TV stations around the world, including the BBC and CNN.111 The seal hunters sued
both Lindberg and the newspaper for defamation, and they were successful in the
Norwegian courts. The case eventually went to the European Court of Human Rights,
which ruled that Norway had unreasonably interfered with the defendants’ freedom of
expression, in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.112
The publicity around this conflict, and the international attention to Lindberg’s
documentary, made Norwegian sealing a subject of controversy and a target of animal
welfare activists. By the early 1990s, however, it appears that the controversy had faded.
A 1993 Associated Press report observes that the annual seal hunt that year “began
quietly,” with no demonstrations or protests.113
But the bad publicity was the beginning of a series of events (including the EU
ban) that shrank the market for seal products and has made the survival of the industry
doubtful. As a recent Irish Times story reported,
Photos and footage of hunters vigorously clubbing seal pups in the
1980s and 1990s marked the beginning of the end. The outside world
was appalled, and public opinion quickly turned against sealers and the
governments that supported them. Since then, a combination of
activism, an end to government subsidies and plummeting demand have
driven the industry to the edge of extinction.114
The same story also reports that the loss of sea ice has also affected the hunt: “[t]he 2016
season saw hunters waste two months sailing from Tromso to the coast of Greenland:
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when they arrived, they were greeted by rain – and no ice.”115 Because commercial
markets declined, the Norwegian seal hunt was sustained by government subsidies, but
the subsidy program ended in 2014.116 With the loss of financial support and without
access to the EU market, the Norwegian industry does not appear likely to survive at this
point.
7.4.3 Greenland
Greenland is a semi-autonomous part of the Kingdom of Denmark. With respect
to the EU, its status is that of an Overseas Country or Territory Associated with the
Union.117 Although Denmark is an EU member state, Greenland is not part of the EU and
therefore, for the purpose of WTO law and the Seal Products dispute, Greenlandic seal
products are imports from a non-EU country. The law in Greenland is a mix of
“domestic, Greenlandic laws of Danish and customary origin; Danish laws; and elements
of the European Union’s legal system.”118
Five species of seal (harp, ringed, hooded, harbour and bearded) are found in the
waters off Greenland, and all of them are hunted. Harp and ringed seals make up about
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95% of the catch.119 Seal hunting contributes to hunters’ subsistence and “is an important
part of the cultural and social identity.”120
The population of Greenland is almost 90% Inuit, and almost all seal hunters in
Greenland are Inuit. In the WTO proceedings it was estimated that 100% of seal
products from Greenland would qualify for the Indigenous Exception.121
The seal hunt in Greenland is different in character from the Canadian and
Norwegian hunts. It is “a full-year activity and is characterised by individual hunters
going out with small boats and sled dogs to hunt.” 122 It is at least somewhat more of a
recreational and cultural activity than an organized commercial one, “opportunistic and
dispersed rather than organised and concentrated.”123 Seals are mainly (about 85%)
killed by shooting them with rifles from small boats.124 Local laws permit killing marine
mammals, including seals, by netting and drowning them. About 15% of seals are killed
this way.125
The Greenlandic hunt has not been a target of activism, negative publicity, or
boycotts, in the same manner as the Canadian and Norwegian hunts – even though by the
numbers Greenland’s is the second biggest seal hunt in the world. This is probably
because the hunters are Greenlandic Inuit, and opponents of the hunt see an ethically
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meaningful distinction between Inuit hunting and non-indigenous commercial hunting.
That distinction is also reflected in the EU Seals Measure.

7.5

Adoption of the Seals Measure

The resumption of the large-scale Canadian hunt in the 1990s sparked renewed
opposition to sealing in Europe.126 First, some of the EU member states enacted seal
embargoes in their domestic legislation. The Netherlands and Belgium both imposed
bans on seal products in 2007.127 At the same time, Germany, Austria, France,
Luxembourg, Italy and the UK were also considering bans or had taken steps towards
banning seal products.128
7.5.1 Declaration of the European Parliament
In 2006, the European Parliament adopted a Declaration calling on the European
Commission to ban the import, export and sale of all products from harp and hooded
seals, but without affecting traditional Inuit seal hunting.129 The Declaration refers to
both conservation concerns and animal suffering as reasons for restricting trade in seal
products. The preamble of the Declaration notes that “more than one and a half million
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harp seal pups have been slaughtered in the North West Atlantic over the last four years”
that “the vast majority of these animals were less than three months old,” that “the last
time the annual number of seals now being killed was slaughtered in the 1950s and 1960s
the seal population was reduced by two thirds,” and that “a team of international
veterinarians concluded that 42% of the slaughtered seals they examined may have been
skinned whilst still conscious.”130
7.5.2 EFSA Opinion
The European Commission requested the Animal Health and Animal Welfare
Panel of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to prepare a compilation of
scientific evidence on the animal welfare effects of seal hunting (the EFSA Opinion).131
The EFSA Opinion brings together the available scientific evidence on the animal
welfare aspects of seal hunting and on the killing methods best suited to reduce
“unnecessary pain, distress and suffering.”132 It concluded that “seals are sentient
mammals that can experience pain, distress, fear and other forms of suffering.” 133
Although it is possible to kill seals without causing avoidable suffering, there was “strong
evidence that, in practice, effective killing does not always occur.”134 The main risks
were shots or blows that failed to kill on the first attempt; when the first try failed, the
seals might have to be shot or hit again, or might be moved or skinned while
conscious.135 Another risk was “struck and lost” seals – those that are hit or (usually)
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shot and then escape, “with injuries that may cause suffering and affect their survival in
the wild.”136
EFSA recommended using what it identified as the most effective killing
methods: the hakapik, a specialized blunt-force instrument used to kill seals by crushing
the skull; clubbing; and shooting. Each method had risks that should be reduced with
appropriate rules, training, and management. Netting seals and drowning them under
water was not recommended.137
The EFSA Opinion did not consider the ethical or social implications of the seal
hunting controversy, as the panel was charged only with assessing scientific evidence on
whether seals can be killed with minimal pain, distress, fear and other forms of suffering,
and which methods are best suited to achieve this result.
7.5.3 COWI Report (2008)
In 2008, the European Commission engaged a Denmark-based consulting firm,
COWI, to carry out an assessment of the potential impact of a ban on seal products (the
COWI Report).138 The COWI Report includes analysis “of the socio-economic context in
which [seal] hunting takes place” so as to assess “how legislative and non-legislative
measures will affect local economies and trade patterns.”139 It also considers the various
ethical concerns (conservation, animal welfare, the effect on sealing communities, and
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the cultural significance of Indigenous seal hunting) that are part of the discussion about
the seal hunt.140
The COWI Report includes an examination of public opinion on seal hunting, and
on the different options for regulating the import and marketing of seal products in the
EU. Public consultation was done through a questionnaire using the European
Commission’s Interactive Policy-Making tool, which ran for eight weeks from December
20, 2007 to February 13, 2008.141 The Commission received 73,153 responses, an
“extremely high” number compared to previous consultations on animal welfare issues.142
Most respondents considered seal hunting distinguishable from other ways of using
natural resources, and of these more than 80% thought seal hunting was different because
“hunting seals to use for fur and other non-essential products is not justified.”143
Survey respondents were asked to indicate a preference among five different
possible legislative measures: doing nothing; labeling to inform consumers that a product
is made from seal; labeling to inform consumers where seal products come from;
allowing seal products to be placed on the market only when they come from countries
where seal hunting is regulated and monitored to protect animal welfare; or an outright
ban on seal products.144 A strikingly high percentage – 79.8% – favoured a complete
ban.145
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As the COWI Report explains, the survey was open to non-residents of the EU,
and there were public awareness campaigns by NGOs in Canada and the US urging
people to register their disapproval of seal hunting by participating in the consultation.146
The strong support for a ban among survey respondents overall is likely to have been
affected, and perhaps exaggerated, as a result. But COWI also broke down the statistics
for residents of the then 27 EU member states,147 and of those respondents, 73% were in
favour of a ban.148
The COWI Report provides evidence (although with acknowledged weaknesses)
that seal hunting was an important moral issue and that the public was morally opposed to
the continued presence of seal products on the market. The report noted the high number
of responses, indicating that “seal hunting is a very salient issue to a large number of
citizens.”149 Feelings about the matter were strong: responses showed “massive
dissatisfaction with current seal hunting practices.”150 A clear majority in all the
geographical areas that COWI analysed preferred a ban on seal products, but this was
more pronounced for respondents in the Anglo-Saxon countries (the UK, US and
Canada), where most respondents lived.151
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7.5.4 European Commission’s Proposal: Market Access Conditioned
on Animal Welfare Standards
On July 23, 2008, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation
on trade in seal products within the EU, and imports into and exports from the EU.152
The proposal was not an outright ban, but made access to the market conditional on
complying with specific requirements to ensure the seals were killed and skinned without
unnecessary suffering.
The Commission Proposal referenced the expressions of moral rejection of
sealing that it had received through public consultation, noting that members of the public
were “concerned about the animal welfare aspects of the killing and skinning of seals.” 153
These concerns were based on “ethical reasons” and objection to the “avoidable pain,
distress and other forms of suffering, which seals, as sentient mammals, are capable of
experiencing.”154 The Commission had received “a massive number of letters and
petitions on the issue expressing citizens’ deep indignation and repulsion” about trade in
seal products.155Another reason for the proposed legislation was to harmonize the
conditions of trade within the EU, in light of the fact that two member states had
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legislated to restrict trade in seal products and several others were considering doing
so.156
The Commission Proposal was to permit trade in seal products only if, in the
place where the seals were killed and skinned, there were “adequate legislative provisions
or other requirements” to ensure that seals were killed and skinned without avoidable
suffering.157 It also required effective enforcement of such local legislative provisions,
with an effective mechanism for certifying and monitoring compliance.158 Annex II of
the Proposal specified detailed criteria for determining whether the relevant animal
welfare requirements and enforcement mechanisms were adequate, including that animal
welfare principles must be “specified in the applicable legislation or other requirements”
and that third-party monitoring must be possible with minimum of administrative or
logistic impediments.159
The Proposal recommended this regime for conditional market access because it
would allow trade in seal products to take place where there were reasonable assurances
that seals were killed and skinned without avoidable suffering, while addressing public
concerns about the use of inhumane methods.160 One other approach that had been
discussed – and was part of the survey used in the COWI Report – was to label seal
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products so that consumers would be informed about where they came from and could
make their own decisions about which sealing industries to support. The Commission
Proposal rejected that option. The reason was that it would not give sealing countries
enough incentive to improve their legislative protections for seal welfare.161
The Commission Proposal discussed the EU’s legislative competence to enact the
proposed legislation. The EU has no authority to legislate “in the field of ethics as such,”
but it does have power to regulate the internal EU market in a way that minimizes
internal barriers.162 Unharmonized rules among the member states are trade barriers, so
when members have adopted different rules on something, the EU is competent to bring
in Union-wide rules.163 This is so even if the matter involves ethical considerations,
because ethics are not relied on as the basis of legislative competence.164
7.5.5 The EU Legislates: A Complete Ban (With Exceptions)
The Commission Proposal tried to strike a balance between animal welfare
protection and the sealing industry. The European Parliament and Council of Ministers
decided instead to opt for a tougher approach: a complete ban on trade in all seal
products. This was the approach adopted in the Seals Regulation of 2009.165 There are
exceptions in the Seals Regulation, but they are not designed to differentiate between
products associated with higher or lower levels of animal welfare. Instead, they are
exemptions that deal with other considerations and are not directly shaped by the animal
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welfare concerns underlying the main prohibition (this feature of the legislation would
become a major point of contention in the WTO litigation). The Travel and Marine
Management Exceptions are carve-outs for small amounts of seal-derived products and
activities that should not make a material difference in the commercial market. The
Indigenous Exception is based an independent objective: to protect traditional Inuit
culture and minimize interference in it.166
The results of the public consultation described in the COWI Report informed the
EU’s decision to adopt a ban rather than a less strict measure, such as access to the
market conditioned on regulatory standards where the seals were hunted, or a labeling
scheme. The consultation survey was also referred to by the EU as evidence of public
moral concerns about seal hunting, both in the Seals Regulation itself167 and in the WTO
dispute.168

7.6

EC – Seal Products at the WTO

In November 2009, after the Seals Regulation was passed, Canada started
proceedings against the EU in the WTO dispute settlement system.169 Shortly afterwards,
Norway also filed a complaint.170 The complainants alleged violations of a long list of
WTO provisions, but the most important were the MFN and NT rules in GATT and the
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TBT Agreement. The core of the complaints was that the exceptions to the ban
discriminated against Canadian and Norwegian seal products compared to seal products
originating elsewhere, especially those from Greenland that could benefit from the
Indigenous Exception.
The WTO panel issued its report on November 25, 2013. The panel decided that
some aspects of the Seals Measure – or, to be more precise, some aspects of the
exceptions – discriminated against the complainants’ seal products in a way that was not
justified under WTO law. To that extent, the EC-Seals case at this stage was a technical
win for the complainants. But the implication was that the ban could be made WTOcompliant if the exemptions were narrowed, effectively meaning that the ban on trade in
seal products would be WTO-legal if the EU made it stricter. In substance, the decision
favoured the EU, and it was not welcomed by the complainants.171
7.6.1.1

The Seal Hunt and the Significance of Animal Suffering

A significant portion of the panel report is devoted to a careful and detailed
analysis of the different kinds of seal hunting for which the EU legislation provides
different treatment (that is, commercial hunting, culling for marine management
purposes, and Inuit subsistence hunting).172 The panel reviewed in considerable detail the
characteristics of these different types of seal hunt, whether they are different in ways that
matter for the legal analysis, and how much pain, suffering and distress they involve for
the seals.
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One of the noteworthy aspects of the report is how seriously the panel took these
matters. The EC – Seal Products panel report is the first and, so far, the only place in
WTO law (or in the jurisprudence of any international tribunal) where one can find a
sustained, hard look at the realities of animal suffering at the hands of humans. That
includes an unflinching assessment of evidence of some of the disturbing occurrences in
seal hunting, such as the use of hooks and gaffs173 to retrieve shot seals while they are
still conscious.174 As the panel observed, “[t]he complainants do not deny, and the
evidence before us confirms, that inhumane killing and poor animal welfare outcomes do
occur in seal hunts.”175
During the hearing, the panel considered video evidence of seal suffering in the
hunt. In the panel’s decision, the graphic nature of the video evidence is diluted by the
objective and measured language of a formal legal ruling. But a blog post written by
Robert Howse, a prominent trade law scholar who was at the panel hearing in Geneva,
suggests that the experience of watching the video footage would have had considerable
emotional impact, too:
The core of the EU's presentation was its video footage of the repeated
failure of Canadian sealers to ensure that animals were rapidly made
unconscious and thus did not suffer intensely before dying. The video
… is too horrible for me to describe it with greater precision or detail.
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What’s abundantly clear is that these are not isolated cases, but a
substantial number of seals are left in agony.176
Howse observed that at the end of the first day of hearings, after seeing the video
evidence, the panel chair “cautioned anyone who was in the room against going out and
eating meat for dinner” and said that he would be having raclette (a Swiss cheese fonduetype dish).177 This vignette is a sign of something significant happening in the evolution
of animal-protection norms in international law. Animal suffering is not usually spoken
of or given serious attention in adjudicative chambers at all, and especially not in
international ones. But in this extraordinary moment, one of the inner sanctums of
international lawmaking took account of the reality of animal suffering, and of its
connection to everyday activities like eating dinner.
Ultimately, the panel decided that that although the risks of animal suffering in
the seal hunt could be managed by using optimal methods with trained hunters in the
right conditions, as a practical matter both environmental conditions and the profit
imperative made it hard to ensure that this would always happen, and also made it hard to
monitor hunting properly.178
7.6.1.2

The TBT Agreement

The panel’s legal analysis focused mainly on the TBT Agreement.
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7.6.1.2.1

Definition of Technical Regulation

The panel first determined that the Seals Measure was a “technical regulation”
within the meaning of the TBT Agreement.179
The definition of a “technical regulation” sets out three requirements. A provision
or measure is a technical regulation if: (1) it applies to an identifiable product or group of
products, (2) it specifies one or more characteristics of the product or related processes
and production methods (or PPMs), and (3) compliance with it is mandatory.180
The parties only disagreed about the second part of this test: whether the Seals
Measure established or (in the language of the TBT Agreement) “laid down,” product
characteristics or related PPMs.181 The panel determined that the Seals Measure did lay
down product characteristics, by specifying types of products containing seal that were
and were not allowed to enter the EU market. Having decided that the Seals Measure laid
down product characteristics – which was enough to determine that it was a technical
regulation – the panel did not go on to determine whether it also laid down PPMs.
7.6.1.2.2

Article 2.1

The panel went on to consider Canada’s claim under Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement that Indigenous and Marine Management Exceptions failed to accord
“treatment no less favourable” to Canadian seal products, as compared to both domestic
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third-country (Greenlandic) products. Canada argued that the Seals Measure
discriminated against Canadian exports because products from seals culled in Sweden, an
EU member state, were covered by the Marine Management Exception182 and
substantially all Greenlandic seal products were covered by the Indigenous Exception,
while Canadian products did not fit into these exemptions.
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement requires that “products imported from the
territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded
to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other
country.”183 The complainants argued – and the EU did not contest, for this purpose –
that all seal products were “like products,” regardless of whether or not they qualified for
the exceptions.184 The panel agreed that all seal products were “like.” The legislation
differentiated between products based on different types of hunts – the purpose, and who
is hunting. But these distinctions do not affect the characteristics, uses or tariff
classification of the final product. Seal products from all types of hunts are like
products.185
There is a fourth factor (beside physical characteristics, end uses and tariff
classification) in the test under WTO law for “likeness,” and that is consumers’ tastes and
habits.186 That is, if consumers see products as different and want to choose between
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them, that can be a factor indicating that they are not “like” or substitutable. The
complainants presented evidence that people who buy seal products do not differentiate
between them based on the way the seals were hunted.187 The EU did not contest that
evidence.
This is potentially an important point, although not much turned on it in this
particular dispute. The “like products” analysis does not preclude the possibility that
differences in the animal welfare effects of the way products are produced could ground a
finding that they are not like products if there is evidence that consumers do differentiate
between the products on that basis. If two categories of products – hypothetically, a
category produced with high animal welfare standards versus one produced with low
animal welfare standards – are not “like products,” then regulating them differently is
much less likely to raise issues under WTO law.
The next step in the analysis, after deciding that the products at issue were “like
products,” was to look at whether the complainants’ products had been given
discriminatory treatment. The test here is whether the measure being challenged modifies
the conditions of competition in the marketplace to the detriment of the complainants’
products. The EU argued that for this test, the panel should compare only between the
different groups of products categorized by the Seals Measure. As the EU argued, the
conditions of competition for all products that conformed to the Indigenous Exception
were the same, regardless of where the products came from. Similarly, all products that
qualified under the Marine Management Exception were treated the same, regardless of
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origin, and all products that did not fit into an exception were treated the same, regardless
of origin.188 That, the EU said, was not discrimination.
The panel disagreed with that position. It said that the right approach was to
compare Canada’s seal products (conforming or not) to the entire category of domestic
seal products and to the entire category of Greenlandic seal products.189 Accordingly, it
was all but a foregone conclusion that the exceptions were found to discriminate against
Canada. EU products that met the Marine Management Exception were given an
advantage compared to Canadian products, since Canadian products did not meet the
Marine Management Exception. Similarly, Greenlandic products qualifying for the
Indigenous Exception had an advantage over Canadian products that did not fit into that
exception.
As discussed in Chapter Six in the analysis of the US-Tuna III (dolphin-safe tuna
labeling) case, the WTO has read in an implicit policy exception in Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.190 Discrimination that creates detrimental impact is permissible if it
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction that is designed and applied in
an even-handed manner.191
The panel determined that the distinction between commercial and traditional
Indigenous seal hunting created by the Indigenous Exception was legitimate, because of
the different purposes of the two kinds of seal hunting. The purpose of hunts that met the
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criteria under the exception was “to preserve the tradition and culture of Inuit and to
sustain their livelihood,” this was distinguishable from the purpose of commercial hunts,
and the distinction justified the regulatory discrimination between the two kinds of
products.192
But the distinction was not designed and applied in an even-handed way.
Greenlandic Inuit were the only Inuit community that had applied for and received the
exemption for their products.193 This was despite the fact that the Greenlandic hunt was,
if anything, more similar to commercial sealing than was the case for other Inuit
communities, including those in Canada.194 The panel considered that this appeared not
to be “merely an incidental effect of the application” of the Indigenous Exception.195
When the exception was crafted, European legislators expected that only Greenlandic
Inuit, who had essentially their own stand-alone industry, would be able to take
advantage of it.196 For Canadian Inuit, processing and distribution networks were
inextricably integrated with those used by non-Inuit hunters. It was not feasible for
Canadian Inuit to get access for their products under the Indigenous Exception when
commercial Canadian products were banned.
In short, the panel found that the exception was “available de facto exclusively to
Greenland, where the Inuit hunt bears the greatest similarities to the commercial
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characteristics of commercial hunts.”197 This aspect of the design of the exception was
arbitrary, and disconnected from its legitimate purpose.
The panel found that the Marine Management Exception did not even make it past
the first part of the test: it did not stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction.198 Culls for marine management purposes involved the same risks of animal
suffering as commercial hunts, and there and no separate justificatory purpose for this
exception as there was for the Indigenous Exception.
7.6.1.2.3

Article 2.2

Both Canada and Norway argued that the Seals Measure violated Article 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement. Under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, a technical regulation
must not be “more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking
account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.”199 The complainants argued that the
Seals Measure was not connected enough to its objective of protecting animal welfare,
and that EU could have designed a law with a less severe impact on trade.
Under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, legitimate objectives “are, inter alia:
national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.”200 Unlike GATT
Article XX, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement does not include an express public morals
exception. But the legitimate objectives are an open-ended list that (implicitly) does
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include public morality.201 The objective of addressing EU public moral concerns about
animal welfare was, therefore, a legitimate objective.
The panel found that the Seals Measure was adopted to further a goal connected
to public morality: standards of right and wrong conduct concerning seal welfare.202
Even though the exceptions allowed marketing of some seal products without any
conditions related to animal welfare (which undermined the overall objective),203 the
panel determined that the Seals Measure did contribute to the objective of addressing
concerns over animal welfare.204 Appellate Body precedent had recognized the right of
WTO members to determine for themselves what constitutes “public morals” in their own
societies. 205 The panel was persuaded that “animal welfare is an issue of ethical or moral
nature in the European Union.”206 It was in this connection that the panel also
acknowledged the growing presence of global norms concerning animal protection:
International doctrines and measures of a similar nature in other WTO
members, while not necessarily relevant to identifying the European
Union’s chosen objective, illustrate that animal welfare is a matter of
ethical responsibility for human beings in general.207
The complainants argued that the Seals Measure did not meet the test of being
“necessary” because a less trade-restrictive alternative could have been used. Rather than
a ban, the EU could have granted seal products access to its market “conditioned on
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compliance with animal welfare standards combined with certification and labeling
requirements”208 – an approach that would be to some extent similar to the 2008
Commission Proposal.209 But the panel acknowledged the practical challenges and costs
of identifying which products should be excluded, and concluded that it would not be
reasonable to require the EU to choose this option over a ban.
7.6.1.3

GATT

The complainants also presented claims that the Seals Measure discriminated
against them in contravention of Articles I and III of GATT. The panel’s analysis under
GATT is relatively short. As the panel observed, recent WTO jurisprudence indicates
that the obligations under GATT and the TBT Agreement should be interpreted as
harmonious and consistent.210 The legal analysis under GATT, therefore, covered much
of the same ground that had already been covered under the TBT Agreement, and
covered it briefly.
With respect to discrimination, the panel determined that the Seals Measure did
discriminate against Norwegian and Canadian products by modifying the conditions of
competition to their detriment, for substantially the same reasons that it found
discrimination under Article 2.1 of GATT.211 There was therefore a prima facie violation
of Articles I:1 (MFN) and III:4 (NT) of GATT.
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Turning to the justification of the Seals Measure under GATT Article XX(a), the
panel considered whether the legislation was “necessary to protect public morals” and
whether it met the requirements of the Article XX chapeau.212
Canada argued that the Seals Measure did not even come within the scope of
public morals under Article XX(a), saying that it did not reflect a rule of moral conduct
“applied generally throughout the community or society and broadly accepted within the
community.”213 Canada said that, in particular, the distinction drawn in the Seals
Measure between commercial and non-commercial seal hunts did not reflect a pervasive
standard of moral conduct in the EU.214
This was an unusual move by Canada. In previous WTO cases concerning the
policy exception for public morality, complainants had not challenged whether the
measures in question came within the category of public morals at all. Rather, their
arguments focused on whether moral distinctions were “applied in an impermissibly
arbitrary way.”215 EC – Seal Products was the first case in which complainants
insinuated that “the measure was motivated by reasons that should not qualify as moral at
all.”216 Canada’s position “test[ed] the boundaries of the public morals exception.”217
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Although this argument did not persuade the panel, it is important that it even was
an argument. Canada’s questioning of the EU’s bona fides in invoking public morality as
a justification reflects the broader normative struggle in this case over the coherence and
consistency of the Seals Measure, where balancing competing moral objectives or policy
goals crosses over into hypocrisy, and, ultimately, whether the protection of animals has a
place in the class of “public morals” and legitimate policy objectives at all.
The panel’s conclusion on this point was that it did. For essentially the same
reasons that the panel went over in the TBT Agreement Article 2.2 analysis, it decided
that the Seals Measure was indeed necessary to further an objective based in public
morality. In this connection the panel indicated that a very trade restrictive measure such
as a ban (which the Seals Measure was) would have to meet a threshold requirement of
contribution to its objective, making at least a “material” contribution, to meet the
necessity test. 218 (The panel determined that the Seals Measure did make a material
contribution, by reducing the volume of trade in seal products.) As discussed in Section
7.6.2.2 below, the Appellate Body overruled the panel on this point.
Having determined that the Seals Measure passed the first step in the test for
justification under Article XX, the panel then went on to look at its consistency with the
requirements of the Article XX chapeau. Here, the Seals Measure fell short. In its
analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the panel had found that the
distinctions between products that met the Indigenous and Marine Management
Exceptions were not connected to the measure’s animal welfare objective or applied in an
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even-handed manner. This amounted to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” under
the chapeau, and so the Seals Measure was not justified under Article XX.219
7.6.1.4

The Travel Exception

The Travel Exception played a very minor role in the panel decision. The
complainants argued that the Seals Measure, including the Travel Exception, imposed
quantitative restrictions on trade in violation of Article XI of GATT, and did not present
any other specific claims on this particular exception.220 The panel did not agree that the
Travel Exception constituted an import restriction; rather, it was a derogation from the
general ban on seal products, which was analyzed as a discriminatory measure under
GATT Articles I and III rather than a restriction on imports under Article XI. Given the
limited scope and minimal practical effect of the Travel Exception, it was not an
important aspect of the case.
7.6.2 Appellate Body Report
Canada, Norway and the EU all appealed aspects of the panel decision to the
WTO Appellate Body. The Appellate Body’s report was released on May 22, 2014.
The Appellate Body made some important changes to the panel’s doctrinal
analysis, overruling it on a number of legal points. But the overall substance of the
Appellate Body’s decision was very similar to that of the panel. The Seals Measure did
violate WTO law – once again, a technical victory for the complainants – but the
compliance problem lay in the arbitrary operation of the exceptions, most importantly the
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Indigenous Exceptions. The ban itself could coexist with WTO obligations, and the
design of the whole scheme could be adjusted so as to comply. Importantly, the
adjustments needed could be in the direction of stronger protection for animal welfare.
Most importantly from the point of view of the development of animal protection
norms in WTO law and international law, the Appellate Body confirmed the place of
animal welfare as a recognized value in WTO law and a legitimate basis for WTO
members to exercise their right to regulate.
7.6.2.1

The TBT Agreement

The Appellate Body overruled the panel’s determination that the Seals Measure
was a technical regulation because it specified required characteristics of the products in
question.
The Appellate Body emphasized that the assessment of whether a measure is a
“technical regulation” must be done based on a holistic consideration of the nature of the
measure, especially of its “‘integral and essential’ aspects.”221
The Appellate Body did not quite put it this way, but its approach guides
decision-makers to look at a challenged measure overall, and ask whether in its essence it
is really the kind of thing that was meant to be included in the category “technical
regulation.” On that approach, the Seals Measure does not look very much like what one
would ordinarily think of as a technical regulation. It is a ban. It has some exceptions
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with conditions, but so do many prohibitions in law. If the Seals Measure is a technical
regulation, then so are a lot of other legal provisions that we would not intuitively put in
that category.
The Appellate Body disagreed with the panel’s conclusion that the Seals Measure
laid down rules concerning product characteristics with which compliance was
mandatory.222 The Appellate Body observed that the requirements the Seals Measure sets
out for products to qualify for exemption from the ban – the kind of hunt involved, the
identity of the hunter, and the purpose of the hunt, are not characteristics of the final
product.223 If anything, they are aspects of the way the product was produced.
EC – Seal Products is the first case under the TBT Agreement to rein in the scope
of the definition of a technical regulation. The category had been expanding steadily
under interpretations applied in the prior TBT cases. The move in EC-Seals to stop the
expansion could be important for the future of animal welfare and animal protection rules
in the WTO context. Previous chapters have touched on the importance of the TBT
Agreement for the trade-animal relationship: because this agreement covers such things
as rules that require informing consumers about the treatment of animals in the
production process, and because it creates cumulative obligations over and above the
GATT disciplines, it could be an added constraint on the ability of WTO members to
regulate for animal protection.224 So, provisionally at least, it is an encouraging
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development that the scope of the TBT Agreement has not continued to expand
unchecked.
On the other hand, the Appellate Body’s decision on this point is narrow, and it
leaves an important question open. The panel had only determined that the Seals
Measure was a technical regulation because it “laid down product characteristics.” The
definition of a technical regulation has two parts: a measure can be a technical regulation
if it lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods.
The panel had found it unnecessary to decide whether the Seals Measure met the second
part of the test (processes and production methods). The Appellate Body declined to rule
on this point in the absence of any analysis by the panel.225 It remains possible, therefore,
that a complex set of rules and exceptions like the Seals Measure could be found to be a
“technical regulation” on the basis that it lays down processes and production methods
with which compliance is mandatory.226
Because the Appellate Body reversed the panel on whether the Seals Measure was
a technical regulation, the panel’s conclusions about its compliance with the TBT
Agreement are of no force or effect.227 But the reasoning that supported those
conclusions, including the panel’s recognition of animal welfare as an important moral
and ethical principle, was not overruled, and it remains instructive.
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7.6.2.2

GATT: Discrimination and Article XX(a)

The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the non-discrimination analysis
under GATT is very similar to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, and that the Seals
Measure de facto discriminated against Canada and Norway because of the
disproportionately detrimental effect on their products of the ban coupled with the
exceptions.228
Canada argued that the panel had been wrong to conclude “that there was a risk to
the public morals of the European Union regarding animal welfare that is unique to
seals.”229 As the Appellate Body observed, this amounts to questioning whether the Seals
Measure actually was adopted to protect public morals at all.230 Canada essentially
accused the EU of moral incoherency or hypocrisy, for invoking moral concerns about
animal suffering in seal hunting while at the same time tolerating animal suffering when
other animals were hunted, or commercially slaughtered.231
It is true that European laws on animal protection reflect complicated
compromises between animal welfare and human interests in using animals. But there is
a lot of evidence of a genuine, pervasive ethical commitment to animal protection in
Europe.232 There is more, and stronger, animal protection law than exists probably
anywhere else in the world. European institutions are committed to improving animal
welfare, and they invest in it. There is consistent public opinion data indicating that
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animal welfare is a matter of concern to European citizens. In this context, it is not
inherently hypocritical to address a particular type of animal suffering in a specific way,
even if there are inconsistencies in the ways that different ways of using animals are
regulated.
The Appellate Body recognized this, pointing out that the concept of “public
morals” is not a scientific or precise concept, but has to do with standards of right and
wrong in a particular society. WTO members have the right to determine for themselves
how strictly they want to protect against a moral ill and if they want to deal with moral
concerns differently, even if the concerns are similar.233
Canada and Norway both argued that the necessity test under Article XX was not
met because the Seals Measure did not make a material contribution to its objective.234
On this question, the Appellate Body corrected the panel’s analysis. The Appellate Body
underscored that there is no “pre-determined threshold of contribution” of materiality, or
any other threshold requirement, that has to be met to satisfy the requirement necessity in
Article XX(a).235 Rather, necessity always involves a process of weighing and balancing
factors including the importance of the measure’s objective, how much it contributes to
the objective, and how trade restrictive it is.236
The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s determination that the Seals Measure
contributed to its objective, and that the EU was entitled to choose this way over an
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alternative, less-trade-restrictive approach like a certification and labeling scheme. The
Seals Measure was therefore provisionally justified under GATT.237
7.6.2.3

The Chapeau

The chapeau of Article XX requires that a measure must not be applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade. The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the Seals Measure did
not meet this requirement. The application of the Seals Measure – in particular the de
facto exclusive availability of the Indigenous Exception to Greenlandic Inuit products –
was arbitrary or unjustifiable.238
The Appellate Body’s route to this conclusion, however, was by way of a
different legal analysis to that of the panel. The panel had more or less transposed its
reasoning from the “even-handedness” requirement under Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement to the chapeau analysis. The Appellate Body determined that there were
important textual and legal differences between the two inquiries, and that the panel had
erred in applying the same test in both contexts.239 It went on to “complete the analysis,”
in the parlance of WTO law – that is, to proceed to its own de novo examination of
whether the Article XX chapeau requirements were met.
There were three reasons for the Appellate Body’s finding of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination. First, treating Inuit seal products differently under the
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Indigenous Exception, which had no eligibility requirements related to inhumane killing
or skinning methods, could not be reconciled with the objective of reflecting moral
concerns about seal welfare.240
Second, the requirements under the Indigenous exception that eligible seal
products had to come from hunts that contributed to the subsistence of the Inuit
community, and of which the products were at least partly used, consumed or processed
within the community according to its traditions, were ambiguous. They left too much
discretion to certifying bodies to determine whether they were met.241 This vagueness
left it open to authorities to allow in seal products from hunts that should really be
defined as commercial hunts, under an exception that was supposed to be for noncommercial Indigenous subsistence hunting. In this connection, the Appellate Body
referred to the concern identified in US-Shrimp: exporting countries could not know with
clarity what was expected of them to qualify for entry into the US market.242 That
problem contributed to a finding of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in USShrimp, and it also did in EC – Seal Products.
Third, the EU had not shown that it had made sufficient efforts to enable
Canadian Inuit to access the European market via the Indigenous exception on a fair and
equal footing with the Greenlandic Inuit sealing industry.243 The EU argued that this was
not its fault, but Canada’s fault. Canada had not designated a local entity qualified as a
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“recognized body” that could sign off on the conformity of seal products with the criteria
of the Indigenous Exception, and so Canada had chosen not to do what it needed to do to
avail itself of the exception.
The Appellate Body acknowledged that if this had been entirely a matter of
private choice – Canadian Inuit sealers simply refusing to participate in the program – it
would not be discrimination by the EU.244 But the Indigenous Exception seemed to be
purpose-built for Greenland’s Inuit sealers and for “recognized bodies” in that
community. The Appellate Body was of the view that “the European Union [had] not
pursued cooperative arrangements to facilitate the access of Canadian Inuit to the
[Indigenous] exception.”245 Again, this situation was similar to the problem in USShrimp, where the US had worked out a cooperative, multilateral approach to sea turtle
conservation with some trading partners (not including the complainants), but had not
made appropriate efforts to negotiate a comparable arrangement with the complainants.246

7.7

Amendments to the Seals Measure After the WTO

Report
After the Appellate Body’s decision, the EU made changes to the Seals Measure
to bring it into compliance with WTO law by addressing the problems identified in the
panel and Appellate Body reports.
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In 2014, Canada signed a joint statement with the EU setting out a framework for
cooperation that would allow Canadian Indigenous sealers access to EU markets under
the Indigenous Exception.247 The two sides pledged to work together to establish the
necessary administrative arrangements, including an attestation system no less favourable
to Canadian Inuit than the system in place for Greenland.
In 2015, the EU passed the Amended Seals Regulation, which repealed the
Original Implementing Regulation.248 The Amended Seals Regulation adds a new animal
welfare requirement to the Indigenous Exception. Eligible hunts must be “conducted in a
manner which has due regard to animal welfare, taking into consideration the way of life
of the community and the subsistence purpose of the hunt.”249 The Marine Management
Exception has been abolished completely, but an exemption for non-commercial,
occasional imports of seal products for the personal use of travellers and their families
remains. The New Implementing Regulation, also adopted in 2015, sets out amended
rules for recognition of entities empowered to certify compliance with the conditions of
the exemption, and for the process of attestation.250
If Canada and Norway had considered the Seals Measure as amended to still be
out of compliance with WTO obligations, they could have pursued compliance
proceedings.251 They did not do so, and the deadline for further proceedings is long past.
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It is therefore a reasonable conclusion that the complainants may have judged further
litigation to be unlikely to yield more favourable results, or to have reluctantly accepted
the modified regime as being within the EU’s right to regulate under WTO law.

7.8

Inuit Sealing and the Indigenous Exception as

“Strategy of Avoidance”
The biggest problem with the Seals Measure from the point of view of WTO
compliance was the Indigenous Exception. When the EU decided to ban seal products,
but at the same time to pay due recognition to the cultural significance of traditional
hunting in Inuit communities, it took on a challenging task. The solution it chose was to
exempt Greenland’s Inuit hunt more or less completely, without anything in the rules to
address whether the Inuit hunt also caused avoidable or unacceptable animal suffering.
This strategy is an example of what Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson identify as the
“strategy of avoidance” of the conflict between animal rights and Indigenous rights.252 By
this, they mean simply not applying animal rights or animal protection principles to
Indigenous animal-use practices, drawing a line around those practices and treating them
as not up for scrutiny or discussion.253
This is a common strategy, and an understandable one, when dealing with one of
the most difficult problems in the development of animal-protection norms. Criticizing
Indigenous practices for exploiting animals or causing animal suffering is a very sensitive
matter, which can provoke accusation of cultural insensitivity or even racism, and it often
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fails to get to productive dialogue.254 People who want to protect animals often do also
want to respect Indigenous rights and traditions. Placing Indigenous practices off-limits
for criticism or regulation can be an attractive solution255 but, as Kymlicka and
Donaldson argue, it is “ultimately unstable.”256 The Appellate Body’s ruling in EC –
Seal Products illustrates some of the problems that make it unstable: it introduces a moral
and justificatory incoherence that is not compatible with the nature of legitimate and
normatively well-grounded law.
The effect of the EU Seals Measure on Inuit sealers has been one of the most
controversial aspects of this initiative. Inuit leaders strongly opposed the ban,
denouncing it as colonialist and hypocritical,257 “insulting and culturally arrogant.”258
Some legal scholars have criticized it in similar terms; Elizabeth Whitsitt, for example,
describes the Seals Measure as an instance of “moral imperialism … whereby the
dominant EU culture defines and imposes its morality onto foreign indigenous
communities without meaningful consideration of their interests and in the face of
effectively destroying their ability to benefit from traditional and cultural seal hunting
practices.”259
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The world’s two largest seal hunts are in Canada and Greenland, and the main
populations of Indigenous peoples involved in sealing are the Inuit of those two
countries. Sealing is an “integral [part] of the way of life of Inuit communities in the
Arctic,” due to the importance of seal meat in the traditional diet, the supplemental
income that sealing generates, and the importance of passing down hunting knowledge
from one generation to the next.260
Because the Indigenous Exception as originally formulated seemed to be almost
tailor-made for Greenland, and given the special relationship between Greenland and
Denmark (an EU member state), some observers have questioned the bona fides of the
EU in creating this carve-out from the general ban on seal products. Pietros Mavroidis,
for example, expresses “doubt as to whether the EU was genuinely pursuing protection of
public morals,” suggesting that “[t]he likelier scenario is that the EU lawmakers were
torn between those arguing for similar protection, and those caring more for the economic
impact the measure would have on the Greenland Inuit community.”261 Mavroidis
proposes that the problem could have been solved by budgeting for increased subsidies to
the Greenland Inuit to make up for the loss of the seal trade.
But this is an oversimplification. The meaning of seal hunting to Inuit
communities is more than merely economic, and the EU’s compromise does appear to
reflect more than mere political expediency. It was the outcome of a genuine struggle to
reconcile competing values. The same values are also reflected in earlier European

260

Dorothée Cambou, “The Impact of the Ban on Seal Products on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples: A European Issue” (2013) 5 Y B Polar L 389 at 390.
261
Mavroidis, supra note 8 at 389.

302

action on sealing. The 1983 Seal Pups Directive distinguished between commercial
hunting and traditional hunting “with due respect for the balance of nature,” noting that
“hunting, as traditionally practised by the Inuit people, leaves seal pups unharmed,” and
applied only to seal products “not resulting from traditional hunting by the Inuit
people.”262
Similarly, in 2006, when the European Parliament called on the European
Commission to immediately draft a regulation to ban the import, export and sale of all
harp and hooded seal products, it specified that “this regulation should not have an impact
on traditional Inuit seal hunting which, however, only accounts for 3% of the current
hunt.”263 Following that direction, the Seals Measure that the Commission adopted
includes the Indigenous Exception as a mechanism to allow products of traditional Inuit
hunting continued access to the EU market. The web page that explains EU policy on
trade in seal products states that there is an exemption for Inuit seal products because
“[t]he seal hunt is part of the socio-economy, culture and identity of the Inuit and other
indigenous communities and it contributes greatly to their subsistence and
development.”264
Among the EU’s objections to commercial sealing are the destructiveness of
hunting on a large scale, and the association of commercial hunting with unnecessary
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luxury products. From the EU’s point of view, traditional Inuit hunting does not engage
these concerns – or, at least, does not engage them to the same extent as commercial
hunting. Inuit hunting is, generally speaking, small in scale and closely linked to
tradition and community. Seals are hunted for food, to generate subsistence income, and
to keep traditional cultural practices alive, rather than simply for profit.265 Tradition,
culture, community cohesion, and the transition of knowledge from one generation to the
next are at least as important as exploiting a resource for financial return.
Sealers in the coastal communities of Eastern Canada and Norway might well
argue that this description actually does fit their activities (which in the EU taxonomy
would be defined as commercial). In general, all sealing communities consider the hunt
to have cultural and social as well as economic importance. Selheim argues that hunting
by seal hunters in two Newfoundland communities chosen as examples fits the criteria for
the Indigenous Exception, and that it exhibits the characteristics that are the rationale for
the exemption – apart from the fact that the hunters are of European origin. There is a
long historical tradition of sealing, a community with a distinct identity, a continuation of
the hunting tradition across generations, the products are used in a traditional and
community-based way, and seal hunting contributes to subsistence.266
But in the case of Indigenous hunting, there is an additional consideration: the
unique status of Indigenous peoples under international law. The United Nations
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Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was adopted by the UN in
2007.267 It acknowledges (inter alia) the right of Indigenous peoples not to be subjected
to destruction of their culture,268 the right to practice and revitalize cultural traditions and
customs,269 the right to be secure in the enjoyment of their means of subsistence and to
engage freely in traditional and other economic activities,270 and the right to maintain,
control, protect and develop their cultural heritage (including “knowledge of the
properties of flora and fauna”).271
With the adoption of the UNDRIP, the recognition of rights to self-determination
in other international human rights instruments, and developing jurisprudence on
Indigenous rights in domestic and regional law, the rights of Indigenous peoples “have
crystalized as a specific issue within the framework of international law.”272 The
preamble of the Seals Regulation connects the Indigenous Exception to the protection of
Inuit seal hunting under international law, noting that “[t]he hunt is an integral part of the
culture and identity of the members of the Inuit society, and as such is recognised by the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”273
Further, there is an argument that what makes Inuit hunting distinct is not simply
the material features of the hunt (the scale of the hunt, how the products are used, how
much money is made) but, at a much deeper level, the worldview and the conception of
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human-animal relationships on which Indigenous hunting traditions are based. Constance
MacIntosh proposes that within Indigenous ontologies, hunting takes place in a context of
ongoing relationships of reciprocal rights and responsibilities, in which animals are
empowered, volitional participants – by contrast to a European view of hunting as an
instrumental activity that uses animals as a material resource.274 Kymlicka and
Donaldson argue that “the idea that animals are property to be used instrumentally is
foreign to Indigenous cultures” and that Indigenous peoples regard animals as “selves and
subjects, worthy of intrinsic respect, who are agents capable of co-authoring humananimal relations.”275
The Indigenous Exception manifests an intention to place Indigenous hunting, as
a cultural practice with a special moral and internationally protected status, completely
outside the scope of the animal welfare concerns that animate the Seals Measure. This is
an example of what Kymlicka and Donaldson call the “strategy of avoidance,”
concerning Indigenous treatment of animals, which they explain as follows:
If the application of AR [animal rights] principles to Aboriginal
practices generates charges of racism and misunderstanding, and if
respectful dialogue seems impossible, then a way out of the
predicament is simply not to apply AR principles to Aboriginal
practices. This is a common strategy amongst AR activists, not only in
Canada, but around the world. Implicitly or explicitly, AR activists
have supported, or at least acquiesced in, the idea of an Aboriginal
exemption.276

274
Constance MacIntosh, “Indigenous Rights and Relations with Animals: Seeing Beyond
Canadian Law” in Peter Sankoff, Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes, eds, Canadian Perspectives on Animals
and the Law (Toronto: Irwin, 2015) 187 at 188-189.
275
Kymlicka & Donaldson, supra note 252 at 165-166.
276
Ibid at 169.

306

The carve-out for Indigenous sealing is one of the examples of this “strategy of
avoidance” that Kymlicka and Donaldson point to, along with the exemption for
Aboriginal subsistence whaling from the International Whaling Commission’s
moratorium on commercial whaling.277
Kymlicka and Donaldson argue that, while there may be good reasons for
adopting the strategy of avoidance, there are serious problems with it.278 The avoidance
strategy precludes a “deeper discussion” that could find common ground on animal
protection:
The avoidance strategy … does nothing to explain why these practices
might be ethically acceptable or even ethically admirable, as many
Aboriginals believe. On the contrary, it leaves the implicit suggestion
that Aboriginal practices are ethically deficient from an AR perspective,
but granted a legal loophole on other grounds. And this uneasy modus
vivendi stands in the way of coordinated action against the main
beneficiaries of the status quo: the animal industrial complex that
continues to exploit animals in ways that are abhorrent from both AR
and Aboriginal perspectives.279
The Seals Measure and the Indigenous Exception illustrate how the avoidance
strategy that Kymlicka and Donaldson analyze can break down. The EU tried to
sequester traditional Indigenous sealing under an exemption with no conditions related to
animal suffering. That suggests that the humaneness or otherwise of Indigenous sealing
practices is simply not open to scrutiny – and also implies, as Kymlicka and Donaldson
point out, that Indigenous hunting may be inhumane (but will not be held to any standard
of humaneness).
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The idea of the strategy of avoidance helps to illuminate why the Seals Measure,
especially the Indigenous Exception, was criticized for lacking moral coherence and
ultimately failed to stand up to examination in the WTO dispute settlement process.280
The lack of connection between the exception and the moral (animal-welfare promoting)
objectives of the ban on seal products was the main reason that the WTO Appellate Body
found that the Seals Measure had elements of arbitrary discrimination that were
inconsistent with WTO law.281
Inuit opposition to the trade ban drove Canada’s decision to seek dispute
resolution at the WTO.282 This was despite the fact that the Seals Measure was designed
to carve out traditional Inuit sealing from its scope and, at least potentially, give
Indigenous sealers a monopoly on access to the European market, which might look like
a significant market advantage.283
In practice, however, the ban on commercial products more or less destroyed the
market for Inuit sealers as well. This was the case not only for the Canadian Inuit whose
products did not qualify for the Indigenous Exception, but also for the Greenlandic Inuit
whose products did.284 The supply chains, processing facilities and market infrastructure
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for Inuit and non-Inuit seal products are not separable, but intertwined and
interdependent.285 This interconnection is more pronounced for Canadian Inuit seal
products, which use the same processing facilities and routes to market as non-Indigenous
products. But Greenlandic Inuit sealers, too, are not immune from the economic forces
that shape the overall market.
The practical effect of a ban with a special carve-out for Inuit products on Inuit
producers is a concrete illustration of the problem Kymlicka and Donaldson identify
when they say that avoidance is “ultimately unstable.”286 In the real world, the
distinction cannot be upheld in a logically coherent way, nor can it achieve results that
are calibrated as intended. Inuit sealers do not exist in a pristine zone untainted by
commerce or by interaction with non-Inuit enterprises. The animal welfare concerns that
drove regulation of non-Inuit sealing do not stop mattering when it comes to Inuit sealing,
and a legislative framework that elides this can only amount to an “uneasy modus
vivendi.” The result was a fragile legal structure that did not withstand scrutiny by WTO
adjudicators.
The long history of the conflict over seal hunting shows that it is connected to
deeply felt and conflicting values: moral abhorrence against the way some seals are killed
and the suffering that they endure, rejection of seal hunting as an unnecessary use of
charismatic animals to make luxury goods, and the place of sealing in local cultural
traditions and in the economic life of the communities where it is practiced. It is a
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question on which consensus or “shared understandings” are hard to achieve. This clash
of values has an additional layer of complexity because of the importance of seal hunting
to Indigenous peoples.
The fate of the Indigenous Exception at the WTO illustrates that an attempt to get
around these problems through an appealing, but unstable, “strategy of avoidance” is hard
to defend on grounds of fairness, even-handedness, non-arbitrariness and justifiability –
in other words, qualities that make law law-like, and that reflect Fuller’s criteria of
legality. The WTO’s EC – Seal Products decision reminds international actors that if
shared understandings on animal protection are to be reflected in law in a way that
generates adherence, these criteria cannot be ignored.

7.9

Interactional Analysis: How EC – Seal Products

Developed WTO Law on Animal Protection
This section uses Brunnée and Toope’s interaction theory as a framework for
evaluating the evolution of animal protection norms in WTO law in the EC – Seal
Products case. There are five main developments from EC – Seal Products that are
important from the point of view of animal welfare and animal protection in the WTO
legal context. Each one is considered here with attention to what it means for the
formation of legal norms concerning animal protection, as understood through the lens of
interactional theory.
7.9.1 Norm Formation: Animals Matter
The first point is simply the fact that animals matter in WTO law. Animal
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protection has been recognized as a serious value with real weight in this context. The
WTO panel and Appellate Body treated the interests and the protection of animals as
beings that matter in themselves as real, serious values that deserved to be balanced
alongside human economic interests – even to be weighed against important human rights
like the cultural rights of Indigenous peoples.
This was a material change. Recall that, as recently as 2005, informed observers
feared that the WTO would completely devalue animal interests in the international legal
system and would damage, dilute and undermine animal protection efforts.287 The extent
to which animals are recognized in EC – Seal Products as morally significant beings, the
careful attention paid to the evidence of suffering in seal hunting and the details of
different hunting methods and welfare protections, and the serious consideration given to
expressions of moral outrage concerning seal hunting, are important signs of progress on
this front. So is the shift away from subsuming animals’ individual interests within
questions of environmental protection and conservation, to giving serious consideration
to the idea that animals matter in themselves and that humans have ethical obligations
towards them beyond just not causing the extinction of animal species.
For those who are (understandably) frustrated with the limited protection of
animals in international law, and with the additional complications that international
obligations – especially trade obligations – can create for animal protection initiatives,
this development may not seem like much. Perhaps it is not. But if it is looked at as part
of the process of emergence of an international norm through a process of social
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interaction, it can be seen as a meaningful shift that may build the groundwork for more
progress in the future.
The WTO DSB adjudicators’ acceptance that animal suffering is a real and
serious matter that implicates ethical obligations for humanity – a consideration that can
even alter our choices about what to have for dinner – is a sign that these normative
propositions have evolved beyond the stage of propagation by the vanguard of “norm
entrepreneurs”288 and into mainstream acceptance. The professional scientific and policy
experts (EFSA and COWI) who were involved in developing and informing the
normative foundation of the Seals Measure may be considered “epistemic communities,”
whose input helped to “[frame] the issues for collective debate, [propose] specific
policies, and [identify] salient points for negotiation,”289 and also enhanced the credibility
and legitimacy of the resulting policy choices.
The acknowledgement of animal interests as inherently ethically significant and
as grounding human obligations is in itself evidence of the progression of animal
protective norms through the process of norm formation in the international legal system.
But it is not – as Brunnée and Toope’s interactional theory underlines – the end of the
story. The emergence of an international norm is not a binary event, but, rather, occurs
along a continuum, and it is not a sufficient condition for the formation of a legal norm.
It is, however, a necessary condition.
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7.9.2 Public Morals, Moral Incoherence, and the Criteria of Legality
The second important development in EC – Seal Products is the express
recognition that animal welfare can be a component of public morals and a legitimate
basis for invoking public policy exceptions.
EC – Seal Products is an important case on the public morals policy exception.
There had only been two prior WTO cases on public morals: US-Gambling,290 in 2005
(which involved an equivalent exception in the WTO treaty on trade in services), and
China-Audiovisuals, in 2009.291 The law on public morals was, therefore, relatively
underdeveloped. EC – Seal Products moved the jurisprudence ahead on a number of
points that had not been fully addressed, including what can count as public morals and
how the necessity requirement can be met.
There is extensive scholarship on the seal dispute and public morals, written both
before and after the EC – Seal Products case was decided.292 Here, I do not propose to
reiterate all the analysis that has already been done by other scholars. Rather, I focus on a
particular aspect that is important to my interactional analysis of the progression of
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animal protection norms into legal norms. That aspect is the coherence or moral
consistency of the Seals Measure.
Coherence matters in the process of transforming social norms, or shared
understandings, into specifically legal norms. Interactional theory tells us that this
metamorphosis occurs through articulation of norms in a practice of legality – which, I
have argued, the WTO dispute settlement process is – and that it happens when norms
come to exhibit the characteristic qualities of law, or the criteria of legality.
In EC – Seal Products, the panel and the Appellate Body interrogated the moral
justifications that the EU advanced to justify its legislation for conformity with certain
requirements that law has to meet to be legitimate law. To the extent that the Seals
Measure was found wanting in this respect, it had to change.293
Canada and Norway attacked the moral coherence of the Seals Measure for two
reasons. The first was that the EU singled out the treatment of seals for moral
condemnation, while other kinds of mistreatment of animals which were factually similar
in relevant ways – industrial slaughter of food animals, and hunting animals other than
seals – were legal in the EU and not marked as morally abhorrent. The second was the
lack of continuity from the overall ban to the Indigenous and Marine Management
exceptions, both of which allowed seal products into the EU market without any
requirements related to animal welfare.
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generate adherence.
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On the first point, the WTO Appellate Body rightly rejected the complainants’
arguments, following established WTO precedent that confirmed the right of members to
choose for themselves what is morally important to them and what degree of protection
for public moral values they want to reflect in their law. These are indispensable
underpinnings of the right to regulate. A requirement of moral consistency across the
board would be an impossible standard to meet. Every society makes choices about what
it finds morally condemnable. Those choices might seem illogical or inexplicable from
the outside. But that is the nature of moral judgments: at least to an extent, they are not
reducible to logic.
In practical terms, if no WTO member could legislate to protect certain kinds of
animals in certain situations (for example, to protect the wellbeing of pets) without also
extending consistent protections to all animals in all situations (for example, ensuring a
similar standard of wellbeing for laboratory animals or animals raised for food), it would
be impossible for WTO members to legislate to protect animals at all without triggering
WTO compliance difficulties. This is exactly what WTO critics feared in the 2000s. EC
– Seal Products definitively (and encouragingly) holds that WTO law imposes no such
requirement.
By contrast, the second coherence problem, the inconsistency between the moral
objective of the Seals Measure and its exceptions, was the reason that the WTO DSB
found that the measure was not consistent with WTO law, in particular with the chapeau
of Article XX.
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Critics have argued that requiring moral consistency between the primary measure
and its exceptions is itself somewhat hypocritical, given how easily and commonly we
accept mismatches between the objectives of primary rules and exemptions in areas other
than animal protection.294 We have securities laws that require listing and disclosure to
protect investors, but contain exceptions for crowdfunding, grants of stock to employees,
and sales to family members.295 We have freedom of information laws that contain
exceptions for privacy.296 It is completely normal for a legal provision to reflect an
overall objective counterbalanced by one or many different, competing, sometimes
contradictory objectives.
More pertinently, in the area of regulation for the protection of animals,
exceptions are ubiquitous. As noted in Chapter Three, de facto exceptions to animal
protection rules exist because authorities chronically fail to enforce those rules.297 Even
leaving the problem of underenforcement aside, many general legal requirements to
protect animals or refrain from treating them inhumanely contain express exceptions that
are so broad as to render the primary obligation almost meaningless.298
So it is very common in domestic law for animal protection laws to contain
exceptions that undermine their apparent moral objectives. And yet the Appellate Body
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See, e.g., Howse, Langille & Sykes, supra note 8 at 98-99, arguing that “[t]he WTO should …
permit states to regulate for complex moral reasons that may include multiple justifications, some of which
may even appear to conflict” and noting that, for example, in the case of a prohibition on murder that has an
exception for assisted suicide both the rule and the exception may be morally motivated, but they could be
based on different and competing moral norms.
295
See, e.g., Securities Act, RSBC 1996 c 418, s 48, empowering the Securities Commission to
order exemptions where it considers that it is not contrary to the public interest.
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See, e.g., Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996 c 165 s 22.
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See discussion in Section 3.5 above.
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A striking example is the existence of exemptions from general animal cruelty laws for
practices that are commonly followed in the relevant industry, particularly in farming. See discussion in
Section 6.4 above.
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found that this was not acceptable, in the context of WTO law, for a legal regime that
affected international trade.
This is where the WTO’s moral coherence analysis connects to the criteria of
legality, in particular to the criterion of congruence of official actions with declared rules.
As I argued in Chapter Three, the congruence requirement is the Achilles heel of animal
protection as an international legal norm.299 Our laws on animal protection (international
and domestic) are in fact, generally, deeply morally incoherent, even morally
schizophrenic, and self-contradictory, in a different way from laws that regulate around
other moral values. It is almost as if we want to look as if we are legislating to protect
animals, but, at the same time, we do not really want to do it if it means we have to make
any real changes or sacrifices. And when it comes to conflicts between animal protection
and Indigenous rights, the “strategy of avoidance,” while it may appear to be a way
around an impasse, is unstable because, as Kymlicka and Donaldson note, “it fails to
engage with the actual ethical commitments of any of the parties.”300 It is unstable
because, taken to its logical conclusion, it destroys law’s congruence with its own stated
ethical purpose.
One way of understanding the Appellate Body’s ruling in EC – Seal Products is
as a discipline on this kind of mismatch between officially declared rules and the reality
of the law in action (as it is applied, in the language of the Article XX chapeau). WTO
members can enact laws reflecting their moral views about animal protection. Each
WTO member can do this in a way that reflects its own choices about which animals
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See discussion in Section 3.5.1 above.
Kymlicka & Donaldson, supra note 9 at 173.
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deserve protection, what kind of practices should be morally condemned, and how much
protection it thinks is the right amount. That kind of moral inconsistency could be called
incoherence, but it is really more accurate to call it diversity, and is not a problem from a
rule of law point of view. But exceptions that are not well grounded in principle or that
significantly undermine the overall animal protection objective make the law as it is on
the books incongruent with what it actually does in practice, and that, in turn, makes the
law impermissibly arbitrary. The moral incoherence of animal protection law (in this
sense) is a serious impediment to its potential evolution as an international legal norm.
Other problems that the Appellate Body found with the Indigenous Exception can
also be linked to Fuller’s criteria of legality. Fuller argued that legitimate law must
exhibit generality, treating like cases alike and not making ad hoc determinations without
a consistent basis, and that it must be publicly promulgated so that people who are subject
to it know what it is that they are subject to.301 The Appellate Body’s criticisms of the
Indigenous Exception (like the shortcomings of the US rules on turtle excluder devices in
US-Shrimp302) reflect concerns that these qualities of legitimate law were lacking. The
Indigenous Exception purported to be a generally available exemption, but the Appellate
Body considered it to be only available as a practical matter to Greenland. The
“subsistence” and “partial use” criteria were vague and permitted too much official
discretion, so that Canadian Inuit seeking access to the exemption did not know what was
expected of them.
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See discussion in Section 3.4.3 above.
See discussion in Section 6.3.2 above.
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7.9.3

Implied Jurisdictional Limitation and the Qualities of Law

The third important point to take from EC – Seal Products concerning animal
protection law is that actions taken to condemn or attack animal cruelty in other
jurisdictions are not necessarily illegal under WTO law. EC – Seal Products strongly
suggests, even if it avoids explicitly stating, that there is no across-the-board prohibition
on legislation that affects conduct outside the enacting jurisdiction – no “implied
jurisdictional limitation.”303
The EU Seals Measure was fairly frankly aimed at stopping or punishing the
Canadian seal hunt. The Appellate Body held that it did not need to decide the question
of whether there was an implied jurisdictional limitation prohibiting this kind of extraterritorially directed legislation, or what the extent or nature of such a limitation might be,
because in this case there was a nexus to the EU: the EU wanted to protect its citizens and
consumers from participation in a practice to which they had a moral objection. But the
Appellate Body’s analysis leaves very little space where the concept of an implied
jurisdictional limitation could operate. It is hard to imagine a law with extra-territorial
effects that could not somehow be connected to moral or other concerns in the enacting
jurisdiction.
This is an important practical point for the future of disputes over animal
protection in WTO law. EC – Seal Products should allay some of the early concerns that
WTO obligations would unduly constrain the ability of member states to adopt legislation
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EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 1 at para 5.173
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reacting to poor animal welfare practices in other countries by restricting imports or
conditioning market access on compliance with higher animal welfare standards.
EC – Seal Products does underline, however, that there are limits on what one
WTO member state can do on the basis of its moral convictions to affect industries and
practices in other member states, consistent with its WTO obligations. Those limits
reflect the criteria of legality. One society’s rules about protecting animals can, in
principle, reach beyond the jurisdiction and target what is being done in another
jurisdiction – at least if there is some kind of connection or nexus to the enacting
jurisdiction. But it must do so in a way that is justifiable, non-arbitrary, and consistent
with the rule of law.
Trade measures like the Seals Measure may aim to promulgate animal-protective
norms to other jurisdictions, and to raise the standard of animal protection internationally.
In some cases, they even may succeed in doing so. But interactional theory suggests that
these nascent norms will not inspire adherence or be accepted as legitimate unless they
exhibit what Fuller called the “internal morality of law.”304
7.9.4

Regulatory Distinctions Based on “PPMs” Are Not Illegal

The fourth point is that it is hard to argue plausibly after EC – Seal Products that
PPM-type restrictions based on the animal welfare effects of the way an item was
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See Section 3.4.3, above.
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produced cannot be designed in a way that complies with WTO law (if the debate over
PPMs was not already dead after US-Shrimp and subsequent cases).305
This development, too, is consistent with the insights of interactional theory.
There is nothing about PPMs that is inherently offensive to any of the criteria of legality.
In fact, if anything, it is the old assumption that PPMs were WTO-illegal that is hard to
reconcile with the characteristic qualities of law.
The supposed rule against PPMs does not appear in GATT at all. It is in the
definition of a “technical regulation” under the TBT Agreement, but not in a way that
suggests that distinguishing between products on the basis of PPMs is impermissible.
Nor does this posited prohibition have a solid basis in case law. In short, it is not
“promulgated,” in Fuller’s terminology. If there were such a prohibition, it would
constrain the right of WTO members to regulate too strictly, and on an unclear and
illogical basis. There is no coherent rationale for permitting trade rules based on the
outward characteristics of a product but prohibiting trade rules based on the way the
product was produced.
The requirements under the Seals Measure for seal products to be placed on the
EU market are PPMs. The Appellate Body implicitly recognized this when it overruled
the panel’s determination that the Seals Measure “laid down product characteristics,”
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See discussion in Marceau, supra note 8 at 323-328. Marceau argues that, in light of the
Appellate Body’s remarks on “related processes and production methods” under Annex 1 of the TBT
Agreement, the category may have renewed significance and need fresh consideration. With respect to the
justification of “PPMs” under GATT, however, she observes that “it seems clear that the traditional
product-related/non-product-related distinction may no longer be relevant in the GATT context, particularly
since it is not expressly referred to therein. Moreover, Article XX is open to a series of policy
considerations, without any distinction of whether and how such policy affects the products subject to the
challenged restriction.” Ibid at 326.

321

while indicating that it actually had much more to do with the way the products were
produced. There is no suggestion at all, however, that if the Seals Measure is indeed a
PPM that would preclude it (or any other animal-welfare related PPM) from being
justified and upheld under GATT or the TBT Agreement.
7.9.5 Arbitrary Discrimination Can Be Cured with Stronger AnimalProtection Measures
Finally, the outcome of EC – Seal Products illustrates that the requirement under
WTO law to avoid arbitrary discrimination can actually result in stricter rules that raise
the standard of animal protection across the board, rather than driving it down to a lowest
common denominator. The EU’s amendment to the Seals Measure eliminated one
exception (the Marine Management Exception) and added an animal welfare criterion to
another (the Indigenous Exception). This change did a great deal to correct the lack of
coherence between the moral objective of the Seals Measure and the exceptions.
As a result of the amendments to the scheme, the overall category of exempt
products is smaller than it was before. Furthermore, no seal products are allowed into the
EU (except for the very minor group of products exempt under the Travel Exception)
without satisfying criteria related to animal welfare. As was the case in US-Shrimp, the
final result of EC – Seal Products was to increase the animal protection requirements
under the challenged legislation.
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7.10

Conclusion

We live in an international society that is like a “densely-packed high-rise,”306
where one country’s animal welfare values and practices are intertwined with those of
other countries. Seal hunting methods in Canada affect citizens in the EU because they
may be unwillingly supporting those practices by participating in a market for seal
products. Expressions of moral opprobrium against seal hunting by the EU affect the
sealing economy outside the EU. If international legal norms on animal protection are to
evolve, the challenge is to work out common ground and mutually acceptable rules in a
world where there are very different beliefs about the ethical status of animals, and
especially about how animal interests should be weighed against other important
interests, including those of Indigenous peoples.
EC – Seal Products is an example of this process in action. The case provides a
strong basis to conclude that there is some real common ground on animal protection,
even if that common ground is narrow. It is notable that none of the participants in the
dispute rejected the notion that animal welfare was a moral issue, or that it was a
legitimate area to legislate on. The complainants only questioned the consistency and
good faith of the EU in choosing this one issue to target, as well as the way it chose to
legislate about it.
From EC – Seal Products, it appears that these international actors, at least, did
not share common understandings on the substance of animal protection legislation – on
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Eyal Benvenisti, “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to
Foreign Stakeholders” (2013) 107:2 AJIL 295.
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how laws should be or legitimately can be made to protect animals. International shared
understandings at this level would be a necessary precondition to the emergence of
positive, substantive international law on animal protection, and that foundation does not
appear to exist yet. But EC – Seal Products is evidence of a more limited, but fairly
solid, consensus on the idea that animal protection is among the acceptable and legitimate
reasons for which international actors in the “global high-rise” can adopt legal measures
that affects others.
EC – Seal Products also specifies some of the ways that norms have to comply
with Fuller’s criteria if they are to stand up to scrutiny in the practice of legality that is
the WTO dispute settlement process. This goes both ways. WTO members that act to
protect animals have to act non-arbitrarily, transparently and even-handedly. By the
same token, WTO members have a right to regulate to protect animals. Arbitrary,
unpromulgated restrictions on that right (like the prohibition that once was thought to
apply to trade measures aimed at processes and production methods) are not valid.
The greatest single weakness for animal protection as a true legal norm is
unpunished or exempted noncompliance. The reality is that animal protection law is too
often just law on paper, not real law. In EC – Seal Products, the WTO panel Appellate
Body policed what Fuller calls the criterion of congruence of official action and declared
rules, by insisting that the EU could not have a paper seal protection regime that
undermined its own rationale by exempting an important category of potentially lowwelfare products – even if there was an important competing rationale, the protection of
Indigenous cultural traditions, for that exception.
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EC – Seal Products is a significant step in the process of construction of animal
protection as an international norm. The next chapter looks at another context where
development in this direction may occur: the construction of positive obligations
concerning animal protection under non-WTO trade law, especially in the new, ambitious
trade agreements that look to create robust shared transnational regulatory frameworks.
As I argue in Chapter Eight, animal protection has a place in those emerging cooperative
regulatory efforts.
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Chapter 8
8.1

Emerging Animal Protection Norms in
Preferential Trade Agreements

Introduction

This chapter examines developments on animal protection in the context of
reciprocal non-WTO trade agreements: preferential trade agreements or PTAs.1 PTAs
are numerous, and proliferating. A 2011 report by the WTO observes that there has been
a “rapid expansion and intensification of … activity [in non-WTO trade agreements],
particularly over the last 20 years.”2 A new and potentially even more important
development is the emergence of an ambitious category of PTAs, the “megaregional trade
agreements” or MRTAs. These new trade deals that aim to achieve regulatory
cooperation and harmonization on a much wider range of matters than are covered by
traditional trade agreements, including on many areas usually considered domestic.
Applying the analytical tools of interactional theory, I argue that certain features
of PTAs enable the emergence of robust shared understandings, support the development
of animal protection epistemic communities, and encourage meaningful implementation
and enforcement of both domestic and international animal protection law, making it
more law-like. Earlier chapters of this thesis considered WTO dispute resolution as a
practice of legality that is contributing to the formation of legal norms on animal

1

Section 8.2 explains why I use this term, which seems to be becoming standard among scholars.
WTO, World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From coexistence to coherence (Geneva: WTO, 2011), online:
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf. See also David A
Gantz, “Regional Trade Arrangements” in Daniel Bethlehem et al, The Oxford Handbook of International
Trade Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 237 at 238.
2
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protection. This chapter argues that new treaty norms included in PTAs are another
practice of legality that is doing so as well, but in different ways.
Section 8.2 gives some background on PTAs and on the terminology used to
describe them. Section 8.3 is a brief discussion of the significance of PTAs for the
development of international legal norms on animal protection. Section 8.4 explains the
relationship of PTAs to the WTO and GATT. Section 8.5 focuses on the emergence of
the MRTAs and the current challenges to their continued progress.
The most important MRTA for the purposes of this analysis is the Comprehensive
and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, also referred to as the TPP), which
entered into force for Canada in 2018.3 The CPTPP Environment Chapter contains a
number of important provisions relevant to animal protection. To understand how those
provisions evolved, in Section 8.6 I review precursors to the CPTPP Environment
Chapter in some earlier PTAs.
Section 8.7 is a detailed analysis of the CPTPP Environment Chapter sections
relevant to animal protection. Section 8.8 looks at the inclusion of animal welfare
provisions in the EU’s PTAs. Section 8.9 applies the interactional theoretical model to
understand PTAs as a practice of legality contributing to the construction of global
animal protection norms.

3
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, 8 March 2018, [2018]
ATS 23 (entered into force on 30 December 2018 for Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and
Singapore, and entered into force 14 January 2019 for Vietnam) [CPTPP].
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One feature of modern PTAs that I do not address here is investor-state dispute
settlement, or ISDS. It is typical for PTAs to include chapters providing certain nondiscrimination and other rights to foreign investors, and providing for recourse against the
state if those provisions are breached – something that is not part of WTO law. Such
rules can undermine domestic regulation, including regulation for the protection of the
environment and of animals. ISDS is a complex and multifaceted area of law that is
distinct from trade law (although typically linked to it), and to address it adequately
would take this analysis far off course. I would simply note that PTAs are not wholly
good or wholly bad, for animals or in any other sense, and that the potential they may
have to build global animal-protection norms may be undercut by other aspects of
economic globalization including ISDS.

8.2

What are PTAs?

The term “preferential trade agreements” is used here to mean all reciprocal trade
agreements between two or more parties that offer one another preferential terms on
trade. They range from bilateral agreements between just two countries, through trade
deals formed between a number of countries that may be close together or share other
commonalities, all the way up to the MRTAs, which cover huge fractions of the global
economy.
The terminology in this area is confusing, and in a state of flux. Some of the
scholarship that I refer to in this discussion uses different terms for what I am calling
PTAs. In the WTO’s own in-house terminology, these agreements are usually called
regional trade agreements, or RTAs. Although “regional trade agreement” is not a term
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defined in WTO treaty law, it is established in WTO usage. The WTO has a Committee
on RTAs, established in 1996, which is responsible for monitoring individual agreements
and also considers the systemic implications of such agreements on the multilateral
trading system.4 It also maintains a database of Regional Trade Agreements in force of
which it is notified by members (as is called for under WTO rules).5 Until recently, it
was fairly standard for scholars to follow the same convention and use the terms
“regional trade agreements” or “RTAs.”
In the last decade or so, however, that descriptor has been rendered less accurate
by the expansion of trade negotiations to agreements that go beyond the geographical
scope of anything that could reasonably be called a “region.”6 The CPTPP, for example,
was originally signed by twelve nations in Asia and North and South America: Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. When the US pulled out after the 2016
election, the remaining eleven nations concluded an agreement incorporating most of the

4
WTO, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, WTO General Council Decision of 6 February
1996 WTO Doc WT/L/127 (establishing the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements and its terms of
reference).
5
WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Database, online:
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx. See also Petros C Mavroidis, “Always Look on the
Bright Side of Non-Delivery: WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements, Yesterday and Today” (2011) in
WTO Discussion Forum World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From coexistence to coherence, online:
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_forum_e/wtr11_14dec10_e.pdf (discussing the
mechanism for reporting PTAs to the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements and for the
Committee’s authority to decide whether or not to clear PTAs as consistent with GATT Article XXIV.
6
See discussion of the major initiatives towards creating MRTAs that began in the 2000s, in
Shujiro Urata, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Origin, Evolution, Special Features and Economic
Implications” (2018) 35:1 J Southeast Asian Economies 22 at 23.
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provisions of the TPP: the CPTPP.7 To call this vast trading bloc “regional” would
stretch the meaning of the word beyond recognition.
Similarly, the US has for several years been in talks with the EU towards a
proposed trade agreement called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP); Canada recently concluded a trade agreement with the EU and its member states,
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)8; and sixteen Asian and
Pacific nations are negotiating a proposed trade agreement called the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Despite the presence of the word
“Regional” in the title of the latter, these are not regional agreements. The logic that
drives them is not geographical contiguity or regional identification, but the economic
power of liberalizing trade across significant portions of the global economy. The WTO
Regional Trade Agreements web page refers to this category of trade agreements and
proposed agreements as “large plurilateral agreements.”9 These are the class of
agreements that I refer to here as MRTAs.
There are also a large number of PTAs that are too small to be accurately be
called “regional,” because they are between only two parties (which also may not be in
the same region). Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason note that in 2013 about 60% of active
PTAs were bilateral agreements.10 They speculate that the increase in bilateral

7

Supra note 3.
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Canada and European Union, 30 October 2016,
online: https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agracc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (entered into force provisionally 21 September 2017).
9
WTO, “Regional trade agreements,” online:
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (referring to “a notable increase in large
plurilateral agreements under negotiation”).
10
Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade
4th ed, (London: Routledge, 2013 at 86.
8
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agreements and the growth in MRTAs may be linked, since agreements with many
parties are difficult to conclude and take a long time, and in the meantime bilateral
agreements remain a viable, less ambitious way to develop preferential trade
relationships.11
Because “regional trade agreement” now seems an outdated and even misleading
term, I prefer to use the term PTA, which appears to be becoming the predominant term
used by writers on trade law. The WTO’s own 2011 report adopts this usage, noting that
“[o]ne half of the PTAs currently in force are not strictly ‘regional,’” and that “[t]he trend
towards a broader geographical scope of PTAs is even more pronounced for those PTAs
that are currently under negotiation or have recently been signed,” which are nearly all
cross-regional.12
“Preferential” is not the only option for denoting non-WTO reciprocal trade
agreements. One disadvantage of this choice of terminology is that “preferential” has
some degree of pejorative connotation in the WTO context, since trade “preferences” are
a form of discrimination at odds with core WTO principles.13 On the other hand, it is
accurate. It is a fact that PTAs do create preferential trade terms as between the parties to
them (that is really the point of a PTA), whether one views that as positive or negative.
Some commentators refer to the class of agreements that I am calling PTAs
simply as “free trade agreements” or FTAs. But this seems imprecise, since the WTO
treaties are themselves free trade agreements. In any event, “free trade,” whether under
11

Ibid.
WTO, supra note 2 at 6.
13
For example, Gantz describes the use of the term “preferential” by scholars critical of PTAs as
“somewhat derisive.” Gantz, supra note 2 at 243.
12
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WTO rules or PTAs, is always a relative concept; no trade treaty mandates absolutely
“free” trade without any regulatory or tariff barriers at all. Arguably, PTAs actually
diminish free trade at the global level, because every nation treats all of its trading
partners differently depending on which PTAs they are signed up to together. Jagdish
Bhagwati, a scholar who has been a vocal critic of PTAs, argues that because of their
proliferation “we now have once again a world marred by discriminatory trade, much as
we had in the 1930s.” 14 In his view, PTAs have created a new protectionism.15 Gantz
suggests that a more accurate term would be “non-global” trade agreements,16 but this
usage is not common.
To make matters even more confusing, there is also a category of non-MFN trade
schemes that the WTO refers to as “preferential trade arrangements” (and for which it
uses the acronym PTAs).17 These are unilateral trade preferences such as tariff waivers,
which are sometimes extended to developing countries by wealthier countries and often
conditioned on compliance with provisions concerning non-trade objectives, such as
human rights provisions. For the avoidance of doubt, I am not following the WTO’s
usage here, and the term “PTA” as used in this thesis means reciprocal trade agreements
outside the WTO.

14
Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine
Free Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 14.
15
Ibid.
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Gantz, supra note 2 at 238.
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WTO, “Regional trade agreements and preferential trade arrangements,” online:
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/rta_pta_e.htm.
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8.3

PTAs and Animal Protection

There are two important points to highlight regarding the relationship between
animal protection and PTAs. The first is that, in the WTO system, significant legal
developments since the Uruguay Round have mainly occurred in the dispute settlement
system, through the interpretation and application of WTO law by DSB panels and the
Appellate Body, rather than through the negotiation and conclusion of new treaty
provisions. In other words, legal evolution is happening in the judicial rather than the
legislative branch of the WTO.
This is because the WTO treaty-making process has not produced much in the
way of significant outcomes since the creation of the WTO. The current Doha Round of
negotiations has been going on since 2001, and it has been declared dead numerous
times.18 This is probably because the high number of members of the WTO and the
diversity of perspectives, economies and cultures among them have made it difficult to
reach consensus on anything but relatively narrow and uncontroversial matters.19 In
addition, the ideological commitments to neoliberalism and economic globalization that
drove the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO architecture were already

18

For example, the 2013 edition of Trebilcock, Howse & Eliason’s authoritative work on the
regulation of international trade law has a postscript reflecting on the reasons for the “Doha collapse”
(Trebilcock, Howse & Eliason, supra note 10 at 802-808). Six years later, the Doha Round is still officially
going on.
19
As Trebilcock, Howse & Eliason observe, “[t]oday, more than ever, the WTO membership
exhibits enormous diversity in levels and trajectories of economic development, political systems and
capacities.” Ibid at 805. See also Frank Altemöller, “A Future for Multilateralism? New Regionalism,
Counter-Multilateralism and Perspectives for the World Trade System after the Bali Ministerial
Conference” (2015) 10:1 Global Trade & Customs J 42 at 42 (since 2001, “negotiations progressively
stagnated. It seemed ever more difficult to find common interests, let alone to formulate results, amongst
the numerous, politically outspoken and highly disputatious Member States. Several WTO Ministerial
Conferences ended in failure”).
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becoming less fashionable before it was concluded.

The WTO is a diverse global

institution without a “thick” shared normative foundation. It is probably neither possible
nor desirable for it to be otherwise, given the WTO’s truly global reach and the diversity
of international society. But it means there is a lack of common ground and agreement
about how to achieve further trade liberalization through the WTO negotiation and treatymaking process.20
With the treaty negotiation process stagnating, the formation, development and
articulation of legal norms occur mainly through the judicial branch of the WTO. While
the diplomatic process has gone through “almost two decades of political paralysis,”21 the
WTO’s judicial system is an institutional success, having navigated two decades of
disputes and produced a “vast jurisprudential acquis”22 while managing not to become
the target of serious attacks on its legitimacy, and crafting rulings that balance trade
liberalization with non-trade values.
PTAs, by contrast to the treaty negotiation process at the WTO, provide
opportunities for smaller groups of countries to make progress on the political and
diplomatic front, creating new and more ambitious trade treaty regimes that incorporate
progressive norms. In the PTA context, treaty negotiation and treaty drafting are
important practices of legality within which new legal norms are taking shape and being
articulated. Some of those new norms are very relevant to animal protection, and open up
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new possibilities for international cooperation and interactive lawmaking for the
protection of animals.
The second point of contrast with the WTO is that animal protection has a place in
WTO law only in a negative sense, in the context of exceptions. WTO case law has now
firmly established that animal protection, including animal welfare, can justify derogation
from trade obligations. It is not, however, an affirmative obligation in any way. In
PTAs, this, too, is different. Modern PTAs typically include positive obligations to
maintain specified legal and enforcement standards on social issues linked to trade, such
as human rights, labour, and the environment. Positive environmental obligations under
PTAs include commitments to certain types of animal protection, such as the protection
of endangered animal species and the prevention of illegal trafficking of animals and
products derived from them.
There is a good deal of skepticism among both environmental and animal
advocates about these types of trade treaty provisions,23 and the skepticism is
understandable. Environmental provisions in PTAs, especially older ones, have been
somewhat ineffective in practice. It could reasonably be argued that these kinds of addons to trade deals are more about making the trade agreements look acceptable than about
really doing anything to protect the environment. The same risk exists with the animalprotection aspects of PTAs. My own view is that this concern, while it is certainly not
unfounded, is no reason to turn away from the potential of PTAs to disseminate higher
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legal standards of animal protection, and to increase international dialogue and
cooperation on building frameworks for better animal protection.

8.4

Preferential Trade Agreements and the Global Trade

Regime: GATT Article XXIV
Bilateral and multi-party trade agreements have coexisted with GATT since its
creation – and, indeed, predated its creation by many decades.24 When GATT was
originally formed after the Second World War, negotiators were already contemplating
the creation of a separate trading bloc (in WTO parlance, a customs union25) in Europe.
This European trading partnership would eventually evolve into the EU. The project of
economic unification in Western Europe was seen as important for rebuilding the
economy and keeping peace after the Second World War.26 Britain also had a system of
trade preferences for countries that were part of the Empire, and later the Commonwealth,
and those preferences remained in place when the GATT multilateral system was
created.27
Today, WTO members are parties to a large number of bilateral trade agreements,
free trade zones and multiparty trade agreements.28 The number of PTAs has increased
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significantly in the last couple of decades. Gantz, writing in 2009, observed that
“[w]hereas 12-15 years ago only a few dozen functioning agreements existed, now there
are hundreds.”29
There is an inherent tension between PTAs and the basic non-discrimination
principles of the multilateral trade regime. The point of a PTA is to create mutually
favourable trade terms for the parties. This objective is at odds with one of the core
principles of GATT / WTO law: the most-favoured nation (MFN) rule. As discussed in
Chapter Five, the MFN rule under Article I:1 of GATT (along with equivalent provisions
in other WTO agreements) requires each WTO member to grant all other WTO members
treatment at least as favourable as that which it extends to any other trading partner. The
logic of MFN says that entering into any preferential trade deal with a trading partner,
whether a member of the WTO or not, would immediately result in equally favourable
terms having to be offered to the rest of the WTO.
What makes this apparent contradiction legally possible is Article XXIV of
GATT.30 Article XXIV creates an exception from the application of GATT rules for two
types of trading arrangements outside GATT: a customs union, or a free trade area. 31 The
exemption also applies to interim arrangements necessary to form either a customs union
or a free trade area, if they set out a plan for doing so within a reasonable period of time,
and provided that the duties and regulations imposed on goods from outside the customs
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union or free trade area do not become more onerous than they were before its
formation.32
In a customs union, two or more members eliminate internal duties on
“substantially all the trade” between themselves, and apply common duties and
regulations to imports from outside the union.33 The members of a customs union adopt a
common trade border for the whole union, and eradicate trade borders within the union.
The EU is an example of a customs union. The formation of a customs union, which
requires adopting a common external trade policy, involves a relatively high degree of
economic integration between the parties.
Most of the preferential trade agreements that exist now are not customs unions.
The more common type of non-WTO free-trade agreement is the second category: the
free-trade area. In a free-trade area, two or more members eliminate duties and trade
barriers on “substantially all the trade” internally, but – unlike in a customs union – the
members continue to set their own external trade policy.34 As between the members of
the free-trade area, duties and regulatory trade restrictions should be reduced or
eliminated on “substantially all” (although not all) trade for the exemption to apply. But
this exemption is looser than the one for customs unions. It is easier for two or more
countries to agree on liberalized trade rules among themselves but retain independence on
other aspects of trade policy than it is to enter into a customs union, which is a step
further towards full economic integration.
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The inclusion of an exemption for free trade areas (and also for interim
arrangements leading up to the creation of a free trade area) considerably expands the
scope of the Article XXIV exemption from MFN rules.35 Kerry Chase has shown
through illuminating archival research that this expansion was supported by US officials
during the negotiations towards the ITO and then the GATT36 because at the time the US
was secretly negotiating a free trade agreement with Canada (which was never
concluded) and wanted global trade rules that would permit the adoption of that
agreement.37
In addition to being broader in scope than an exception limited to customs unions,
Article XXIV has many ambiguities and conditions that are difficult to apply. For
example, where exactly the line is demarcating “substantially all” trade? Ambiguities
like this give WTO members opportunities to stretch the limits of the exemption.
Reading the treaty text literally, it might seem that Article XXIV creates a limited
and carefully controlled exception to MFN rules, limited to trading blocs that are
relatively closely integrated or on the way to a high level of integration. In practice,
however, it has functioned as a generous loophole, and it has enabled the proliferation of
PTAs. It is possible or even likely that many of the PTAs in existence now are not
strictly compliant with the requirements of Article XXIV. But GATT or WTO
complaints on this matter are extremely rare. Mavroidis summarizes a number of reasons
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for this, including the fact that virtually all WTO members participate in PTAs and they
therefore “have little incentive to undermine their options in this area .”38
The relationship between the GATT / WTO multilateral trade framework and
PTAs has been ambivalent from the start, and it remains so. On the one hand, PTAs
undermine, even cancel out, the essential premise of multilateralism that global trade
should be on equal terms for all. On the other, stricter restrictions on PTAs would
prevent the development of newer, potentially deeper trading relationships among smaller
groups of participants in the multilateral regime that could become more widely adopted.
These different views of the effect of PTAs on global trade is captured in the
metaphors of the “spaghetti bowl” and the “stepping stone.” The “spaghetti bowl”
portrays PTAs as generators of multiple entangled and overcomplex separate sets of trade
rules that undermine the coherence and fairness of the global trading system. Bhagwati
(the leading proponent of this view) argues:
With PTAs proliferating, the trading system can … be expected to
become chaotic. Crisscrossing PTAs, where a nation had multiple
PTAs with other nations, each of which then had its own PTAs with yet
other nations, was inevitable. Indeed, if one only mapped the
phenomenon, it would remind one of a child scrawling a number of
chaotic lines on a sketch pad.39
Conversely, the metaphor of PTAs as “stepping stones” sees them as interim
steps towards more widespread progress, with many WTO members looking to them as a
way to “accomplish a degree of trade liberalization on a sub-global level that is
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impossible or at least more difficult to achieve globally.”40 Furthermore, agreements
reached at the sub-global level could become a template or precedent for commitments
that all WTO members might eventually agree to.
Whether PTAs are ultimately a good thing or a bad thing for the world trading
system, from the point of view of animal protection their most interesting aspect is the
incorporation of linked affirmative obligations on non-trade matters. PTAs provide a
way for international obligations concerning the protection of animals – both protection
of wild animals, as an aspect of environmental commitments, and animal welfare,
through explicit provisions on welfare – to be linked to binding dispute settlement
mechanisms under trade treaties. The trade-animal protection link can also foster
dialogue, transparency, exchanges of ideas and expertise, and international collaboration
to improve capacity to protect animals. Indeed, there are examples where this has already
occurred, as I set out below – in particular, in Section 8.6.3, which looks at how
mechanisms under a PTA provided a way to enhance the protection of endangered sea
turtles in the Dominican Republic.41

8.5

The Rise (and Fall?) of the MRTAs

An important new development in PTA lawmaking is the emergence of MRTAs:
big and far-reaching new trade deals that cover large portions of the world’s economy
and territory. MRTAs are different, and significant, not only because they have outsized
geographical scope, but also because they go beyond the regulatory scope of older trade
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agreements. They aim to create trade relationships for the twenty-first century, covering
new areas of economic activity and addressing various non-trade governance matters that
are affected by trade liberalization, including environmental protection.
This ambitious agenda is described by trade scholars as “deep integration.”
Modern PTAs, especially those that bring together many diverse nations, aim to achieve
coherence on a number of regulatory fronts as a way to reduce barriers to trade. Another
motivation is to shore up the legitimacy and public acceptance of trade agreements that
may have a significant effect on many aspects of economic and social life, and can be
controversial. If trade liberalization in the mid-twentieth century was mainly about
reducing tariffs, today, after decades of negotiations on tariff reduction (at the WTO and
in PTAs), tariff differentials are not as important as they used to be as a barrier to trade.42
The main focus now is on reducing differences in regulatory standards that impede or
slow down cross-border trade.
The more regulatory requirements between trading partners coalesce, the less
friction there will be for cross-border flows of goods and services. “Deep integration” is
the process of moving closer to coalescence and cooperation on these behind-the-border
regulatory matters. The deep integration agenda is not exclusive to MRTAs. Bilateral
and smaller multilateral treaties now frequently include deep-integration features. But it
is one of the common characteristics of the large trading blocs that are now emerging.
The impact of this shift towards regulatory coherence goes further than just
facilitating trade. MRTAs are “deep integration partnerships” that aim not only to
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increase trade links but also to “improve regulatory compatibility and provide a rulesbased framework for ironing out differences in investment and business climates.”43 This
means that modern trade agreements include multiple pages of rules about matters that
may not seem to have much to do with trade at all, and are usually solidly within the
purview of domestic law. They aim to re-shape “various aspects of what previously were
viewed as mainly internal matters, including anti-corruption policy, business organization
law, competition policy, consumer protection, data protection, domestic environmental
law, intellectual property, labor law, and other areas.”44
The WTO’s 2011 report on PTAs posits that deep integration is needed not only
to stimulate trade, but also to respond appropriately to the transnational governance
challenges that economic integration creates.45 Freer trade brings about more integrated
economies and transnational production networks. For these networks to work well, they
“may require a degree of international governance that only deep integration can
supply.”46 MRTAs respond to this need by creating various substantive provisions and
institutional frameworks for transnational regulation. Kingsbury et al describe this form
of global governance through MRTAs as “megaregulation,” by which they mean “a novel
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form of inter-state economic ordering and regulatory governance on an extensive
substantive and trans-regional scale.”47
One of the fears of trade critics is that the homogenization of regulatory standards
through trade automatically means driving those standards down. But integration can
actually work in the opposite direction, at least theoretically and perhaps in practice.
Modern MRTAs typically include affirmative obligations to maintain and enforce
relatively high legal standards in certain social policy areas, including environmental
protection. Wealthier countries are concerned that developing nations will gain an unfair
advantage by having lower standards in these areas. So richer states like the US and the
EU ask trade partners to commit to higher standards as a condition of access to new trade
deals. For example, as outlined in Section 8.6, for many years US trade policy has been
not to enter into PTAs without affirmative commitments on labour and the environment.
Meidinger sees MRTAs as more than mere trade agreements. For him, they are
“tools in forming geopolitical alliances that extend beyond liberalized trade.” 48
Meidinger argues that they are essentially geostrategic in nature.49 In a similar vein, Kerr
queries whether the purpose of the CPTPP is really to increase trade, or rather the
geostrategic objective of moving the “gravitational center of influence from China to the
U.S. in the Asia-Pacific.”50
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MRTAs are also about more than just the nations that are party to the MRTA.
Because they are “sufficiently large and ambitious to influence trade rules beyond their
areas of application,” MRTAs have “a systemic and global impact.”51 They are designed
to set the standards on which trade agreements negotiated and concluded in the future
will build, and to function as a benchmark for regulatory and other reforms that may
influence future reforms in global trade regulation.52
These features make MRTAs worth watching as incubators of developing global
norms, not just on trade rules in the limited or traditional sense, but also on the extensive
and expanding list of connected “deep integration” subjects. To an extent, that list
already includes animal protection, because it is a component of environmental
obligations.
Until 2016, it seemed reasonable to predict that the fast pace of formation of new
MRTAs would continue, much as the general category of PTAs has proliferated over the
last few decades. Now, though, it is unclear what will happen. The US was the most
important driver of new trade agreements, with its strong ideological commitment to
trade liberalization, deep institutional expertise, and huge amount of political and
economic leverage to get agreements done. That has changed. Despite the enthusiasm of
political and institutional leaders for economic globalization, popular opposition to it is
real and passionate. The anti-trade point of view is now reflected in the Trump
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administration, although there are still administration officials who are in favour of free
trade.
At present, the future direction of the US government on trade is unpredictable,
and it is also unclear what the rest of the world will do in these new circumstances. The
US has withdrawn from the TPP, but the other parties have proceeded to conclude the
CPTPP. Following US threats to withdraw from NAFTA, the NAFTA parties have
signed a new agreement with mostly similar terms: the Canada-United States-Mexico
Agreement (CUSMA).53
Whether or not MRTAs as a class of trade agreements are the way of the future,
for the time being, at least, their potential systemic impact on international legal norms is
worthy of attention and analysis. MRTAs are powerful engines of global governance. If
global animal law is to be a meaningful part of global governance in the coming decades,
these agreements are probably a good place to look for it. The clearest connection to
animal protection is in the environmental provisions of MRTAs.

8.6

Precursors of the CPTPP Environment Chapter

The CPTPP Environment Chapter includes a number of features that represent the
current “state of the art” for PTA environment rules, including a binding obligation to
effectively enforce domestic environmental law, incorporation by reference of obligations
under multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), binding dispute resolution, and
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mechanisms for public submissions. These provisions, discussed in detail in the next
section, evolved from earlier PTAs, especially those to which the US was a party. They
reflect the historical experience of the US with integrating environmental provisions into
trade agreements. This section summarizes how the environmental language of the
CPTPP emerged from previous PTAs.
8.6.1 NAFTA
The first multilateral PTA to include affirmative rules on the environment was
NAFTA, which came into force in 1994.54 The environmental provisions are elaborated
in a side agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC).55
The NAAEC was, for its time, an innovative and progressive way to link trade
and the environment. It obligated each party to “ensure that its laws and regulations
provide for high levels of environmental protection” and to “strive to continue to improve
those laws and regulations.”56 It provided for the parties to request dispute resolution
(under a process separate from the general NAFTA dispute settlement process) in the
case of an allegation of a “persistent pattern of failure” by another party to effectively
enforce its environmental law.57
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The NAAEC also created the North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC),58 “the first trilateral forum for promoting a regional collaborative
approach to environmental protection in North America.”59 The CEC consists of a
Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.60 The Secretariat is
authorized to consider submissions “from any non-governmental organization or person
asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law,” provided
that certain criteria are met.61 It can respond to submissions by determining that the
submission warrants a response from the party in question.62 It can also (independently
of the determination as to whether the submission warrants a response) determine that the
submission warrants the creation of a factual record, in which case it informs the Council
and then proceeds to prepare a factual record if the Council instructs it to do so.63 The
NAAEC structure for public participation and civil society submissions is borrowed from
and built on in later PTAs, including the CPTPP Environment Chapter.
Although the environmental provisions of NAFTA were precedent-setting, they
have been criticized for “[falling] short of holding member countries to a high
environmental standard.”64 The CEC had no power to enforce compliance or investigate
failures to enforce regulations, and there was little evidence to suggest that it influenced
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NAFTA parties’ trade policies.65 The citizen submission process has been described as
“a significant step in the democratization of international environmental law,”66 but it has
important weaknesses.67 The lack of strong environmental enforcement mechanisms
under NAFTA spurred demands for tougher environmental provisions in future PTAs.68
In 2018 NAFTA was superseded by CUSMA,69 which has an Environment
Chapter (Chapter 24) featuring many of the more modern environment provisions now
commonly found in PTAs. Many of the CUSMA provisions are identical to or even or
stronger than the CPTPP Environment Chapter rules that are discussed in detail in
Section 8.7. The CEC remains in existence and is referred to in the CUSMA
Environment Chapter as the main mechanism for cooperative environmental activities
between the parties.70
8.6.2 After NAFTA: Environmental Norms in US PTAs
NAFTA raised public awareness of the risks of weak environmental governance
associated with liberalized trade. As a result, it has become a political priority to ensure
that trade agreements are married to stronger environmental provisions.71 The US
government negotiates trade agreements on the basis of a conditional pre-authorization
from Congress called the Trade Promotion Authority or “fast track,” which specifies
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conditions that trade agreements have to satisfy; the requirements for environmental
protection have become increasingly strong over time.72
Reflecting these requirements, all recent US PTAs include “environmental
chapters that contain core obligations to provide for high levels of environmental
protection.”73 Since a bipartisan agreement in 2007, PTAs are required to specify the
incorporation of seven listed MEAs, a binding obligation not to fail to implement or
enforce environmental laws in a way affects trade or investment, and inclusion of these
environmental obligations in the dispute settlement system that applies to the whole
agreement.”74 Another common feature of recent US PTAs is “provisions to promote
public participation, provide appropriate remedies for violations of environmental laws,
and promote measures to enhance environmental performance.”75
The PTAs drafted to meet these requirements have had a global influence, beyond
agreements that the US is party to. As Meidinger notes, they draw on a “common pool of
environmental norms” and both borrow from past agreements and serve as templates for
future ones.76
The US has been the global demandeur for strong environmental chapters that
include binding rather than merely hortatory or aspirational provisions, incorporation of
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MEAs, dispute resolution through the dispute resolution process that applies to the main
agreement with potential monetary and trade sanctions for persistent failure to enforce
environmental law, and robust public participation mechanisms. All of these features are
in the CPTPP, largely reflecting the US negotiating position, although the US is no longer
part of the agreement.
8.6.3 CAFTA-DR: Public Participation and Capacity-Building for
Endangered Species Protection
The first major PTA after NAFTA for the US was CAFTA-DR, an agreement
with a group of Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic. The US joined this PTA in
2005.
Responding to criticisms of NAFTA’s environmental provisions, the US
government promoted CAFTA-DR as “a significant improvement upon NAFTA,” with
strengthened dispute settlement and citizen submission processes.77 CAFTA-DR builds
incrementally on NAFTA, and it still has weaknesses; as Vincent observes, “CAFTA-DR
encourages countries to strengthen environmental regulation at all levels, but it neither
requires them to do so nor gives them incentives for such action.”78
But CAFTA-DR does have a mechanism for public participation in monitoring
and advocating on the implementation of the environmental provisions (which is common
in modern PTAs). This may seem like a weak form of oversight compared to formal
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enforcement mechanisms, but there has been experience using these public participation
provisions that have yielded quite promising results in international collaboration for the
protection of animals. CAFTA-DR’s public participation process is the only PTA
mechanism so far (as far as I am aware) to have been used by an animal protection NGO
specifically for the purpose of improving legal protection of animals.
Article 17.7 of CAFTA-DR sets out the process for making submissions. It
provides that “[a]ny person of a Party” (including NGOs that have a presence in the
relevant country) can file a submission saying that the party is not effectively enforcing
its environmental laws. Submissions are filed with a secretariat, which may decide to
request a response from the party in question. Whether or not the secretariat decides to
request a response, it can decide that the matter warrants development of a factual record,
and can do so if the Environmental Affairs Council instructs it to.79
In 2007, Humane Society International (HSI) filed the first submission under
Article 17.7, concerning the Dominican Republic’s enforcement of domestic laws on the
protection of endangered sea turtles.80 Andrew Lurié, an attorney with the Humane
Society of the United States, and Maria Kalinina, an international trade specialist with
HSI, recount in a 2015 article how this process unfolded after HSI filed its submission.81
Local law banned the capture and killing of green, hawksbill, loggerhead and
leatherback turtles, the collection of their eggs, and the sale of any products derived from
them.82 It also required the government to prepare an inventory of products made from
79
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sea turtles that were made before the ban came into force and were sold or used in artisan
and commercial establishments.83
HSI and wildlife protection organizations working with them determined that the
required inventory had not been prepared, so that the government lacked information on
which products were made before the ban came into effect. HSI argued that “without the
inventory, enforcing the domestic laws was impossible and undermined the [Dominican
Republic's] ability to determine if any turtle products are imported illegally” – a violation
of the Dominican Republic’s obligations under CITES which are also incorporated by
reference into the Environment Chapter of CAFTA-DR. Ultimately, the secretariat
compiled a factual record and released it publicly in 2011.84
Lurié and Kalinina describe the submission process as having a number of
important benefits. Most importantly, the Dominican Republic did take steps to improve
enforcement of its sea turtle protection laws in response to HSI’s submission.85 The
development of a detailed factual record by the secretariat on technical, scientific, and
legal issues concerning sea turtles in the Dominican Republic created a baseline of useful
information, and spared the resource-constrained government of a developing country the
cost of developing this record itself.86 Increased public awareness of the issue due to the
submission process helped the government to build up the political capital to act on sea
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turtle conservation, and to “engage with various entities on capacity building to improve
enforcement of its environmental legislation.”87
Lurié and Kalinina write that the main shortcoming of the process was that it took
too long (almost four years) for the factual record to be completed. They argue that
failure to develop a record within a reasonable time could be very harmful when
endangered species are struggling to survive and delays could have grave consequences.88
If it is evaluated against an adversarial model of enforcement, where compliance
is mandatory and noncompliance is penalized with binding judgments and financial
penalties or suspension of trade benefits, the process that Lurié and Kalinina recount
might appear to be weak and toothless. But HSI’s experience with the sea turtle matter
illustrates how real, positive results that help animals can emerge from a process of
sharing information, public discussion, and cooperation, not just from litigation and
punishment. For developing-country governments with limited resources, whose people
may see conservation as a low priority versus economic survival, there are fiscal and
political obstacles to fulfilling environmental commitments that adversarial enforcement
may not do very much to solve. The submission process under CAFTA-DR, by contrast,
provided help in enabling the government of the Dominican Republic to act.
It is also important that a robust framework for collaboration and capacitybuilding was already in place, as contemplated in the capacity-building provisions of
CAFTA-DR.89 HSI had been involved in capacity-building efforts in the Dominican
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Republic since 2005, and had worked on public outreach efforts against wildlife
trafficking and improving care for rescued and confiscated animals.90
Many elements of the CAFTA-DR Environment Chapter, including the provisions
allowing submissions by private citizens and NGOs as well as capacity-building, are also
found in the CPTPP. HSI’s experience with this type of legal structure under CAFTADR is an illustration of what advocates can potentially do to benefit animals using the
tools that exist in the CPTPP and in other modern PTAs.

8.7

The TPP / CPTPP: Environmental Protection Linked to

Trade Partnership
The Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP began life as a negotiation to update an
existing PTA, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (also known as the P4)
between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore.91 The negotiations eventually
expanded to the twelve TPP countries, which were already linked by an extensive
network of bilateral and multilateral PTAs between them in various configurations. The
TPP developed at least in part as a consolidation and harmonization of existing trade
agreements.92
The trade agreement that ultimately emerged was ambitious indeed, covering a
huge portion of the global economy, about 40% of global GDP, a combined population of
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about 800 million, and about 40% of world trade.93 The coverage of legal and economic
issues was similarly ambitious. The TPP is probably the most prominent example of the
“high-quality, twenty-first century” deep-integration trade agreement, addressing a much
broader range of issues than traditional trade deals.94 It had chapters addressing a
number of areas that are not addressed in the WTO agreements, including
telecommunications, e-commerce, and small and medium enterprises.
The TPP parties announced that they had agreed on a final text in late 2015, and
the treaty was signed in February 2016 in Auckland.95 Before the official text was made
public, versions of some of the chapters were leaked by organizations critical of trade and
economic liberalism, Citizens Trade Campaign and Wikileaks.96 The leaked text sparked
impassioned criticism mainly from the left-leaning end of the political spectrum. Critics
argued that the new trade agreement served the agenda of powerful US corporations and
did nothing to alleviate poverty in the Asia-Pacific region, and that the negotiation
process had lacked transparency.97
As it turned out, a more decisive threat to the TPP, somewhat unexpectedly, came
from the other end of the political spectrum. In 2016, Donald Trump was elected
President of the US, after a campaign in which he was sharply critical of US trade
agreements and especially of the TPP, which had been the signature trade initiative of the
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prior Obama administration. In January 2017, days after the new administration took
power, the US government announced that it was withdrawing from the TPP.98 Since the
US was by far the biggest economy among the twelve parties, its withdrawal seemed
initially to spell the end for the TPP. But the remaining eleven members decided to move
ahead and conclude an agreement that incorporated by reference most of the agreed text
of the TPP.99 This reborn, but diminished,100 trade deal is the CPTPP.
After the profound shifts in global politics and ideology since 2016, it is difficult
to predict what will happen to the CPTPP. Until 2016, the progression to increased
international trade liberalization, deeper economic integration and more comprehensive
and ambitious PTAs seemed almost inexorable. That is no longer the case. The
legitimacy of ever-increasing economic globalization is in question now in a way that it
has not been since the protests against the WTO in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, and despite its diminished coverage after the US exit, the CPTPP
remains an important example of the MRTA phenomenon and an indication of the
direction that trade-related legal standards may take in the future. Part of the reason for
this is that the CPTPP parties hope that additional countries will join the pact in future,
increasing its reach and influence over time. The eleven CPTPP members have
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reportedly reached out to the US and even to China to discuss the possibility of their
eventually joining the pact.101 In 2017, the parties issued a joint statement speaking of
their vision for the TPP to expand to include other economies willing to accept its high
standards.102
A further reason for the CPTPP’s continuing significance is the fact that the
agreed text represents the outcome of many years of tough negotiations, and expresses
the consensus of the parties on what the standards of a high-quality, state-of-the-art
modern trade agreement should be. Urata observes that the agreement “aims to set a new
standard for global trade and incorporate next-generation issues to boost the
competitiveness of member countries in the global economy.”103 Polanco Lazo and
Fiedler propose that it will set a precedent for trade agreements for years to come,
becoming a “template for negotiations” on trade-linked matters such as anti-corruption,
environmental protection, and labour standards.104
These scholars’ analyses suggest that the CPTPP may be a useful place to look in
order to anticipate what lawmaking in the trade arena might look like in the future,
including how trade provisions may be integrated with a progressive agenda on linked
social issues. The CPTPP is significant for animal protection because there is potential
for animal protection to become part of a trade-linked progressive agenda. In fact, animal
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protection is already integrated into the CPTPP to an extent through the agreement’s
Environment Chapter.
8.7.1 Animal Protection and the CPTPP Environment Chapter
The Environment Chapter is not the only aspect of the CPTPP that is relevant to
environmental regulation in the new trade bloc. Other provisions, including ISDS and
rules on regulatory coherence, have implications for environmental protection.105 For
animal protection, however, Chapter 20 has special importance, because it creates
positive obligations to protect wild animals and to prevent illegal trade in wild animals,
linked to a powerful dispute settlement mechanism.
This development is especially important since wildlife poaching and trafficking
are significant problems in the Asia-Pacific region. CPTPP countries “are either source
or demand countries for illegally trafficked wildlife, many of which are endangered or
likely to become endangered,” and domestic laws against wildlife trafficking may be
lacking or underenforced.106 For example, the elephant population in Vietnam (a CPTPP
party) has crashed due to poaching and weak environmental laws, among other factors.107
Vietnam is also an importer of rhino horn, and “heavily implicated in the rapid decline of
the African rhino population.”108 The CPTPP creates both legal leverage and institutional
frameworks to improve the regulation of activities that cause significant harm to animals.
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When Wikileaks released the draft text of the draft Environment Chapter in 2014,
it also issued a press release describing the environmental obligations as “just media
sugar water” and “a toothless public relations exercise.”109 Compared to NAFTA,
however, the TPP reflects a meaningfully tougher approach on linking high
environmental standards to membership in the trading partnership. In fact, the stringent
environmental standards were “one of the most challenging areas of the negotiations,” in
particular with developing nations, who were “concerned with including environmental
provisions, as they would be at a disadvantage if they must adhere to the same standards
as developed nations.”110 Canada’s foreign affairs ministry, Global Affairs Canada,
describes the agreement’s provisions to enhance environmental protection as “one of the
most ambitious outcomes negotiated by Canada to date.”111
The next subsections look at specific provisions of the Environment Chapter that
are potentially significant for animal protection:
•

Article 20.3, which sets out the parties’ general commitment to
environmental protection and to ensuring a high level of environmental
protection under domestic law;
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•

Article 20.4, which commits the parties to the implementation of
multilateral environmental agreements;

•

Articles 20.8 and 20.9, which provide mechanisms for public participation
and submissions and for members of the public to seek information about
implementation of the Chapter;

•

Article 20.12, which deals with frameworks for cooperation between the
parties to implement the Chapter;

•

Article 20.16, which commits the parties to promote conservation of
marine wildlife, including by prohibiting shark finning;

•

Article 20.17, which deals specifically with illegal trade in wildlife; and

•

Article 20.23, the rules for settlement of disputes.

8.7.1.1

General Commitment to Environmental Protection under

Domestic Law
Article 20.3 establishes general commitments under the Environment Chapter. In
this Article, the parties “recognise the importance of mutually supportive trade and
environmental policies and practices to improve environmental protection in the
furtherance of sustainable development.”112 The Article also reiterates the customary
international law principle that each party has the sovereign right to set its own levels of
domestic environmental protection.113
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The parties agree to maintain a high level of environmental protection, and
continuous improvement, under their respective domestic laws.114 They also agree not to
fail to enforce environmental laws through a sustained or recurring course of action that
affects trade between the parties.115
These obligations require all of the CPTPP parties to ensure that their laws,
regulations and enforcement mechanisms bring about a high and improving level of
environmental protection. That includes developing countries, where domestic standards
of environmental protection may (whether on paper or in practice) be relatively weak.
Theoretically, these commitments under the CPTPP could translate into better legal
protection for wildlife threatened by low domestic environmental standards. The softness
of the legal standards in the text and the counterbalancing principle of sovereign
autonomy in these matters may, however, dilute the strength of these general
commitments as hard, enforceable obligations.
8.7.1.2

Multilateral Environmental Agreements

Article 20.4 of the CPTPP affirms each party’s commitment to “implement the
multilateral environmental agreements to which it is a party.” In one sense, this
obligation is empty, since CPTPP parties are already legally bound to implement MEAs
to which they are parties. There is, however, some symbolic importance to the
foregrounding of MEA commitments in the context of an influential trade treaty. There
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is also potential practical significance to incorporating them by reference into actionable
obligations under the CPTPP.
“Affirms its commitment to implement” is not as strong as “shall implement,” but
it is possible that a party’s persistent failure to implement provisions of an MEA could
lead to a complaint under the dispute settlement provisions and, ultimately, to the
imposition of trade sanctions as a penalty for the lack of implementation – something that
is typically not available under MEAs themselves. Joining up MEA obligations and trade
compliance measures in this way enhances the enforceability of MEAs among CPTPP
parties.
One MEA to which all of the CPTPP countries are parties is CITES.116 As
discussed below in Section 8.7.1.6, the Environment Chapter also contains additional
specific provisions concerning CITES and illegal trade in wildlife.
8.7.1.3

Public Information and Participation

The CPTPP provides for citizen participation in monitoring and providing input
on the parties’ implementation of the Environment Chapter, through requests for
information, consultation, and written submissions that may inter alia allege a party’s
failure to effectively enforce its environmental laws.
These provisions are similar to the public participation structure under CAFTADR, although there are some differences. The CPTPP does not expressly provide for the
creation of a factual record as CAFTA-DR Article 17.8 does, but Article 20.9(5) provides
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that the CPTPP Committee on Environment shall develop its own procedures and that
they may provide for creating reports.
Article 20.8, Opportunities for Public Submissions, provides that the parties “shall
seek to accommodate requests for information” regarding their implementation of the
Environment Chapter, and calls for the use of existing or newly created consultative
mechanisms with members of the public, including people with relevant experience
“including experience in business, natural resource conservation and management, or
other environmental matters.”
Article 20.9, Public Submissions, commits each of the parties to making
provisions for receiving and considering public submissions on the implementation of the
Environment Chapter. If there is a submission, the party in question has to respond in a
timely manner and must make the submissions and the response available to the public.
The Committee on Environment established under the CPTPP can also consider whether
the matter is suitable for cooperative activities.117
This framework for public participation may in some ways seem a weak tool for
combatting severe problems of environmental degradation and wildlife depletion in
CPTPP countries. Some of the language is merely hortatory. For example, under Article
20.8 the parties need only “seek to accommodate” requests for information, and have no
hard obligation to do so. In the consultative process envisioned in Article 20.8, input
from business is on the same footing as input from environmental NGOs and experts on
ecology, which seems to do little to alter the balance of a legal structure that is already
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heavily tilted towards trade and economic interests with environmental protections as an
add-on. The potential outcome is discussion and cooperation, rather than sanctions for
noncompliance.
But to dismiss the public participation provisions as nothing but window-dressing
would be to miss the genuine opportunities for improved openness and dialogue that they
offer. Recall that in the WTO system there is no formal space for citizen or non-state
participation, apart from the limited case of being able to submit amicus briefs in DSB
proceedings. The CPTPP provides more: an avenue for citizens to hold TPP member
governments accountable for meeting their commitments under the Environment Chapter,
and also to have a voice on how best to implement those commitments. HSI’s experience
using the public submission process under CAFTA-DR generated effective collaborative
efforts to improve protection for sea turtles. NGOs with a presence in CPTPP countries
now have the same kind tool available for addressing the implementation of animal
protection obligations under the Environment Chapter, including those that protect animal
welfare.
Take, for instance, the example posited in Section 8.7.1.4 of wild animals covered
by CITES being transported with inadequate welfare protections in a way that subjects
them to suffering and injury. Only another CPTPP party would have standing to seek
formal litigation in respect of such an incident through dispute resolution, and this would
be unlikely to happen. But HSI and similar organizations would have a legal means
under the public participation provisions to seek information about the problem, bring it
to public attention, and make suggestions on how the situation could be improved. These
provisions provide citizens and NGOs with a potentially meaningful soft power.
365

We might associate these kinds of mechanisms mainly with improving
environmental governance in developing countries, where it tends to be weaker – as was
the case in the Dominican Republic sea turtle case. But wealthy countries, too, often
have inadequate and underenforced animal protection laws. The CPTPP public
participation mechanisms provide a new tool for animal advocates in Canada to hold our
own government accountable for what it does, and fails to do, on animal protection.
Animal protection groups, environmental organizations concerned with wildlife
protection, and private citizens, could use these mechanisms to seek information and to
be consulted about matters such as whether approval of big infrastructure projects that
affect wildlife habitats is consistent with Canada’s obligations under MEAs incorporated
by reference into the CPTPP, or whether Canada’s new shark finning ban (discussed in
Section 8.7.1.5) is being properly enforced so as to meet TPP commitments on shark
conservation.
Kerr sees “hope that the citizen participation model of the TPP can help to find a
common currency for negotiating transnational issues related to habitat destruction,
species loss, climate change and business development.”118 Admittedly, the public
participation provisions give citizens no more than a platform to ask questions and give
input, and governments can ignore the input. But, as Kerr rhetorically asks, “is it better
to remain in a pre-TPP universe where no one is talking, or to bring in a chorus of new
voices even if we’re not sure anyone will listen? It is unclear what there is to lose.”119
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8.7.1.4

Cooperation Frameworks

The CPTPP Environment Chapter is replete with references to cooperation on
environmental problems and to working together to develop the parties’ capacity to
address with those problems. The most important of these provisions is Article 20.12,
Cooperation Frameworks, which specifies that the parties “shall cooperate to address
matters of joint or common interest among the participating Parties related to the
implementation of this Chapter, when there is mutual benefit from that cooperation,” and
that cooperative frameworks may include NGOs and non-parties to the agreement.120
There are also references to cooperative efforts and frameworks woven into many of the
other sections of the Environment Chapter.
These references include, inter alia:
•

The Objectives section (Art 20.2(1)), pursuant to which “the Parties
recognise that enhanced cooperation to protect and conserve the
environment and sustainably manage their natural resources brings
benefits that can contribute to sustainable development, strengthen
their environmental governance and complement the objectives of this
Agreement,”

•

The Public Submissions section (Article 20.9(4)), which provides that
the response to a submission alleging that a party is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws may include consideration
of “whether the matter could benefit from cooperative activities,” and
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•

The Conservation and Trade section (Article 20.14(7)), whereby the
parties “shall endeavour to identify opportunities, consistent with their
respective law and in accordance with applicable international
agreements, to enhance law enforcement cooperation and information
sharing, for example by creating and participating in law enforcement
networks.”

These are exactly the kinds of provisions that inspire accusations of windowdressing and empty public relations exercises. They really do not function as hard,
enforceable legal obligations. It seems implausible, for example, that CPTPP parties
could be held to account on these commitments through dispute resolution; how could a
panel determine whether or not a party has “endeavour[ed] to find opportunities” to
enhance law enforcement opportunities on wildlife trafficking? But an important point to
keep in mind is that adversarial disputes and punishment of noncompliance are not the
only, or even necessarily the most effective, ways to foster adherence to legal norms.
The CAFTA-DR example discussed in Section 8.6.4 above demonstrates that
cooperation and help with building capacity can be a “powerful tool to improve
enforcement and benefit wildlife conservation.”121 Cooperative frameworks are not
necessarily an obligation that is imposed on the parties or that they take on reluctantly.
Rather, these opportunities to share knowledge and institutional capacity can be a perk of
membership in a trade partnership, one that augments the parties’ collective and
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individual capacity to cope with environmental threats and creates channels for dialogue
and relationship-building.
8.7.1.5

Marine Wildlife and Shark Finning Bans

Article 20.16 of the CPTPP, Marine Capture Fisheries, includes commitments to
regulate marine fisheries so as to prevent overfishing, reduce by-catch, and promote the
recovery of overfished stocks.122 The parties also agree to promote long-term
conservation of sharks, marine turtles, seabirds, and marine mammals, “through the
implementation and effective enforcement of conservation and management
measures.”123 For sharks, those measures are to include, along with data collection,
bycatch mitigation and catch limits, prohibitions on shark finning.124
Shark finning is the practice of catching sharks, cutting off their fins, and
returning the shark to the ocean.125 They either drown, are eaten by predators, or bleed to
death.126 Shark fins are used for shark fin soup, “a highly desirable traditional Chinese
luxury dish that is prized as a status symbol.”127 The fin trade is driven by demand from
China and other Asian countries where shark fin soup has cultural cachet.128
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Shark finning threatens the survival of sharks, an important group of marine
species. It is also cruel. That is to say, it is an animal protection problem that combines
both conservation and welfare concerns. For both reasons, it has become very
controversial.129 Shark finning is also an example (like seal hunting) of an animal
protection problem connected to a culturally significant practice.
Many international frameworks already exist that could be a basis to protect
sharks from overexploitation and to target shark finning in particular. These international
instruments include CITES, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Bonn
Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals. But the response of the international
community through these mechanisms has, so far, fallen far short of acting effectively to
conserve sharks.130 Jefferies proposes that this regulatory gap can be remedied at least in
part by a network of domestic legislative actions, citing the examples of US federal law
concerning shark finning, and Hawaiian state law that prohibits both trade in shark fins
and the preparation and sale of shark fin soup.131 Hawaii’s ban on shark fin sales shut
down the market for shark fin soup in the state. This demonstrates, Jefferies argues, that
a domestic jurisdiction that is not “plagued by the problems preventing the creation of a
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comprehensive international response” can take effective action unilaterally to protect
sharks.132 Jefferies suggests that initiatives like this may come to have much greater
impact as part of a network of similar domestic legal reforms in many jurisdictions, and
notes that other US states as well as several other countries have been considering the
adoption of shark-fin bans based on Hawaii’s.133
In June 2019, Canada passed a new law bringing in amendments to the Fisheries
Act and related legislation that include a prohibition on the import and export of shark
fins.134 The legislation makes Canada the first G7 nation not just to prohibit shark
finning in domestic waters135 but to shut down the market for imported shark fins.136
Not long ago, such legislation would probably have made lawmakers
apprehensive about possible challenges under international trade law. Compare, for
example, the US measures on sea turtles and dolphins that were challenged under GATT
and WTO law, discussed in Chapter Five. Today, there can be little doubt that Canada’s
new shark fin trade ban is well within the policy space allowed under WTO law.
Furthermore, it can be seen as an action that fulfils the affirmative commitments Canada
has taken on under the CPTPP,137 and it could be example of what other CPTPP parties
might do in furtherance of those commitments. Article 20.16 of the CPTPP Environment
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Chapter does not expressly require banning imports of shark fins; the treaty text only
calls for “measures that should include, as appropriate … finning prohibitions.” But
legislation that deals with the demand side of the shark finning problem is undoubtedly
an effective way to lead on this new international obligation to promote the long-term
conservation of an iconic marine animal.
Sharks are ecologically important apex predators. But they are not like the
typical, appealing “charismatic megafauna” that are often used as symbols of our
responsibility to protect wildlife (such as polar bears, elephants, and whales). They are
definitely not cute; on the contrary, many people find them repugnant or terrifying.
Nevertheless, attitudes about sharks have gradually changed, from an attitude of fear and
loathing to one of respect and care, in a way that reflects an evolving environmental
consciousness. The express requirement in the CPTPP to adopt domestic laws
prohibiting shark finning can be seen as an expression of that evolving consciousness,
and a vehicle for the international dissemination of associated legal norms.
8.7.1.6

CITES and Illegal Trade in Wildlife

Article 20.17 of the CPTPP (Conservation and Trade) addresses the problem of
trade in wildlife, and sets out commitments to improve conservation and combat the
illegal wildlife trade. It begins with an affirmation of the importance of combatting
illegal taking of and trade in wildlife. Under Article 20.17(2), the parties agree to take
appropriate legislative and other action to fulfil their obligations under CITES.
Like the other affirmative obligations in the Environment Chapter, this provision
is enforceable through dispute resolution. However, the complaining party has to meet
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two prerequisites first. It must show as a threshold matter that the other party has failed
to meet its CITES obligations “in a manner affecting trade or investment” between the
parties.138 It must also try to address the matter through consultative or other procedures
under CITES before accessing the CPTPP dispute resolution mechanism.139 The parties
also commit to take measures to protect and conserve wildlife within their territories, and
to strengthen government capacity and cooperation with civil society organizations on
these matters.140
One provision in Article 20.17 that would have been a fairly significant move to
stronger wildlife protection is Article 20.17(5), which is in the treaty text and would have
taken effect had the original TPP not failed – but under the new CPTPP this language is
indefinitely suspended.141 Article 20.17(5) would have obligated each party to combat
trade in wildlife if it was illegal to take it under any applicable law – not just the law of
that country. The text provides that each party “shall take measures to combat, and
cooperate to prevent, the trade of wild fauna and flora that, based on credible evidence,
were taken or traded in violation of that Party’s law or another applicable law, the
primary purpose of which is to conserve, protect, or manage wild fauna or flora.”
Footnote 26 clarifies that “‘another applicable law’ means a law of the jurisdiction where
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the take or trade occurred and is only relevant to the question of whether the wild fauna
and flora has been taken or traded in violation of that law.”
This provision had (and may have in the future, if the parties eventually agree to
un-suspend it) the potential to drive legal standards on trade in wildlife upwards through
a ratcheting-up effect. It would have bound the CPTPP parties to take measures to
combat trade in wildlife and wildlife products even if taking the wildlife was not illegal
under the domestic law of that party – if it was illegal in the source country (whether or
not the source country itself was party to the CPTPP).142
For example, assume that an animal is protected under domestic conservation
laws in country A so that it is illegal to hunt that animal, or to sell it or parts of it. Say
there is an active trade in these animals, perhaps for display in zoos or as exotic pets or to
be used for adornment or traditional medicine, in other countries where the species is not
legally protected. If the animal in question is illegally hunted or sold in country A and
shipped to zoos or consumers in country B, or shipped through country B to end
destinations somewhere else, and if country B is party to the CPTPP, then country B
would be obligated under this provision to endeavour to take measure to combat and
prevent the trade. This obligation would apply even if country B had no laws prohibiting
hunting or trading these animals, and even if they were not a species listed under CITES.
The highest level of protection in force in any country where the animals are taken would
have become the benchmark level of protection for all the CPTPP parties to which, or
through which, those animals were traded.
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It is not difficult to see why the CPTPP parties were ultimately not able to agree
on this once the US, a proponent of high environmental standards with a disproportionate
amount of negotiation leverage, had exited.143 The remnant of this text, even though it
currently has no legal force, is evidence of the high degree of ambition in the TPP to
protect wildlife and crack down on the illegal wildlife trade.
From the point of view of animal protection as a principle that bridges
conservation and animal welfare, perhaps the most notable aspect of Article 20.17 is the
specific incorporation of CITES obligations – bearing in mind that CITES, although it is
not primarily an animal welfare treaty, does include a number of provisions related to
animal welfare. The animal welfare aspects of CITES are discussed in Chapter Four.144
The relevant provisions deal with the humane treatment of wild animal specimens during
transportation, and with the care of illegally traded animals if they are seized by
authorities for failure to comply with CITES requirements.
This means that the CPTPP is a real, current example of positive animal welfare
obligations being incorporated into a major trade agreement and potentially backed up
with the force of binding dispute settlement and trade sanctions. As discussed in Chapter
Four, noncompliance with CITES is widespread, and its animal welfare provisions, which
may often seem like a mere afterthought, are certainly no exception.145 The CPTPP
creates the possibility that a CITES party could seek dispute resolution concerning
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another CITES party’s noncompliance with animal welfare obligations by, for example,
permitting live animals to be shipped in a manner that causes them injury or subjects
them to cruel treatment. That may be a remote possibility, given that the complaining
party would have to show that the noncompliance affected trade and investment between
the parties, and would also have to get through numerous layers of required process
before being able to request dispute resolution by a CPTPP panel. It is still, however, a
possibility, and that is a meaningful, if small and incremental, development in the status
of animal welfare in international law.
8.7.1.7

Dispute Resolution

One of the most important features of the CPTPP Environment Chapter is that it is
enforceable through the dispute resolution mechanism that applies to the entire
agreement. It also has an internal process that a complaining party is required to go
through before dispute resolution under the main agreement. There are a series of
required steps, starting with consultations between the parties on matters arising under the
Chapter, then moving to the representatives of each party (senior trade and environment
officials) on the Environment Committee, and culminating with consultations at the
ministerial level.146 Should this fail to resolve the matter, Article 20.23 provides that a
CPTPP party can request consultations or the formation of a dispute settlement panel
under Chapter 28 of the CPTPP, the overall dispute settlement mechanism.
Importantly, Chapter 28 provides that, if there is a ruling against a CPTPP party
and that party fails to comply with the ruling, the noncompliant party may be required to
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provide compensation in a form agreed on with the complaining party, or the
complaining party may “suspend benefits” (that is, impose trade sanctions) as a
punishment for the noncompliance.147 This means that failure to meet commitments
under the Environment Chapter can be disciplined through the regular dispute settlement
process and by the imposition of trade sanctions. As Global Affairs Canada observes, it
is “a first for Canada” for environmental provisions to be enforceable under the general
dispute mechanism of a trade agreement.148
Meidinger argues that the compliance mechanism for the Environment Chapter is
weakened by the requirement to go through a series of consultations before having access
to dispute settlement under Chapter 28.149 Nevertheless, it is relatively strong compared
both to some prior environmental provisions in trade agreements and also compared to
compliance mechanisms under international environmental law. As Vincent notes, the
multiplicity of multilateral environmental agreements has done relatively little in practice
to solve global environmental problems, because noncompliance under those agreements
has no real consequences, or consequences less costly than compliance.150
Integrating environmental commitments into trade agreements, especially if those
commitments are linked to the enforcement mechanism under the trade agreement, may
be an effective way to promote adherence to international environmental obligations.
Vincent argues that in fact it may “represent the best chance for true promotion of
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environmental sustainability.”151 To the extent that obligations for the protection of
animals are included in the environmental standards covered by the CPTPP, the same
observation can also be applied concerning the international promotion of animal
protection.

8.8

Animal Welfare in the EU’s Trade Agreements

The EU places a relatively high value on animal welfare. Chapter Seven
explained some of the legal and institutional architecture in the EU for the protection of
animal welfare,152 and Chapters Five and Six both briefly touched on the EU’s
unsuccessful efforts to include animal welfare on the WTO agenda – after which it
changed focus to incorporating animal welfare provisions into its PTAs.153
The first free trade agreement to reference animal welfare standards expressly154
is the 2002 Association Agreement between the EU and Chile.155 The Agreement refers
in the Preamble to the “importance of animal welfare.” The annexed agreement on
sanitary and phytosanitary measures156 expressly addresses the development of mutually
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agreed standards in animal welfare that reflect the standards adopted by the OIE.157 It
also provides for consultations between the parties to be initiated based on animal welfare
concerns,158 and incorporates specific standards on stunning and slaughter.
Cabanne observes that, since this agreement was concluded in 2003, Chile has
adopted new regulations on animal welfare in the transportation and slaughter contexts,
has implemented a stakeholder consultation program that includes animal welfare NGOs,
and collaborates productively with the EU on animal welfare both domestically and
internationally.159
The EU’s trade agreement with South Korea,160 which has been provisionally
applied since 2011 and was ratified in 2015, states in the chapter on sanitary and
phytosanitary measures that the chapter “aims to enhance cooperation between the Parties
on animal welfare issues, taking into consideration various factors such as livestock
industry conditions of the Parties.”161 Since then, the EU has typically included a similar
provision in its bilateral PTAs.162
The EU has been criticized for not doing enough in its PTAs to fully reflect the
values of the European public concerning the moral status of animals as sentient beings
and the importance of high animal welfare standards. Eurogroup for Animals, a
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European animal welfare advocacy organization, points out that the language typically
built into EU trade agreements is non-obligatory, and limited to the context of
cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary regulatory matters, when the significance of
animal welfare extends beyond that context.163
Eurogroup for Animals argues that a better approach would be to include a
separate chapter on animal welfare in all EU trade agreements, to allow trade partners
access to the EU market only on condition that they adhere to animal welfare standards
equivalent to those in the EU, and to make express reference to animal welfare as a
component of sustainable development.164 Eurogroup for Animals has drafted model
provisions that it proposes for inclusion in EU PTAs.165 These model provisions borrow
some design elements and concepts from existing environmental rules in PTAs. For
example, the draft text provides that parties shall not fail to effectively enforce animal
welfare law to encourage trade or investment,166 provides for frameworks for cooperation
on animal welfare issues,167 and sets up mechanisms for citizen participation and
submissions.168 The explanatory notes accompanying the model text note where
particular provisions are based on the Trade and Environment chapter of CETA and
PTAs either under negotiation or already concluded.169
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8.9

Applying Interactional Theory: PTAs and the

Formation of International Animal Law
The theory of interactional international law proposes that the formation of
international legal norms that command adherence requires three related components: a
basis in shared understandings, articulation in a way that exhibits the distinctive qualities
of law or principles of legality, and elaboration through a specifically legal category of
interaction, or a practice of legality.170 This section assesses the development of animal
protection norms in the context of PTAs against the criteria of interactional theory. The
international trade arena has become an important generator of legal norms on animal
protection that meet the criteria of binding interactional law to a greater extent than many
of the examples of global animal law discussed in Chapter Four. This is a needed
contribution to the formation of global animal law.
So far there are no fully articulated provisions in trade agreements that address
animal welfare specifically in the thorough way proposed by Eurogroup for Animals.171
But there are norms of animal protection embedded in the environmental provisions of
PTAs, which are evolving through the trade lawmaking practice of legality.
8.9.1 Shared Understandings
PTAs, and especially MRTAs, are vehicles for disseminating wildlife protection
values globally, building a basis of shared understandings between the parties,
stimulating the growth of epistemic communities, and creating opportunities for legal
170
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interaction on environmental and animal protection. That is not the central purpose of
PTAs; they are trade agreements, not animal protection agreements. But the linked
obligations on improving environmental and animal protection standards create fertile
ground for international interaction on this matter in the context of a practice of legality.
Chapter Four discussed objections to international animal welfare norms on the
basis that they reflect a chauvinistically Western worldview, and how important it is that
it not be just a way to “naively export European values.”172 PTAs do not dispel doubts
about cultural imperialism, or concerns that they could be a vehicle for exporting Western
values to unwilling destinations. There are undeniable differences in power between the
parties to these agreements. The growing body of environmental norms in MRTAs has
mainly been included in response to US demands (as outlined in Section 8.6), and the EU
consciously uses trade access as a bargaining chip to induce trade partners to accept its
preferred treaty language on animal welfare. In some cases, animal-protective values in
PTAs may even be foregrounded in part to shame or single out those who are not part of
the PTA club. For example, the specific reference to shark finning in the CPTPP could
be taken as defining a normative stance in opposition to China.
But to portray what is happening just as cultural imperialism or the export of
Western animal protection values would be much too simplistic, and would misrepresent
a much richer and more nuanced reality. PTAs, and in particular MRTAs, which cut
across diverse regions and cultures, are a forum where a great diversity of ideas about
animal protection interact with one another. Kerr argues that through interaction in these
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frameworks in the CPTPP context “legal actors become more embedded in the discourse
of endangered species and habitat integrity, and this helps to internalize concepts like
animal welfare within the individual and collective legal consciousness of a given
nation.”173 Through this process, “[t]he increased institutionalization of global animal
law within the commercial and bureaucratic communities of the Asia-Pacific should help
to promote a workable, transnational valence to animal rights discourse.”174 As a result,
we may hope to see animal protection norms – not just Western ones, but global ones –
becoming woven into the social fabric of nations that participate in this discourse.
The exchange of ideas and values about animals in the PTA context does not run
in just one direction. All cultures have their blind spots and areas of moral inconsistency
regarding animals. Kerr suggests that through the process of intercultural confrontation,
Western countries may be prodded to re-examine and modify their own conceptions of
animal protection: “animal welfare activists should … acknowledge the possibility of a
re-definition of what animal welfare means” as a result of the emergence of a “transcultural conception of animals.”175
Kerr also suggests that the positioning of animal welfare norms in the
Environment Chapter of the CPTPP may contribute to the emergence of a synthesis
between US animal and environmental law, which he describes as “kin doctrines” despite
the theoretical differences and even opposition between them in US thought.176 In other
words, Kerr suggests that interaction through the CPTPP may contribute to the
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emergence of a more holistic conception of animal protection that bridges the divide
between welfare and environment.177
Another way in which PTAs can foster shared understandings is through
dissemination of the work of norm entrepreneurs and by generating robust epistemic
communities. Here, the mechanisms for public participation and cooperative capacitybuilding are especially important. Through these channels, NGOs, citizen advocates, and
experts have a way in to shaping practice under trade agreements that does not exist in
the WTO context and is a new aspect in international trade law. This model started with
NAFTA’s creation of the CEC, but now it is spreading in a truly global way through its
inclusion in MRTAs that span vast portions of the world.
HSI’s experience with sea turtle protection in the Dominican Republic, using the
public participation and capacity-building frameworks of CAFTA-DR, is a real-world
example of how this can happen. That example suggests that advocates and experts can
genuinely move the needle concerning the priority given to animal protection in a
community, by framing and publicizing information, deploying their expertise in a
culturally sensitive way, and building up trust and knowledge through their work to help
build local capacity to address animal protection problems – a process that interactional
theory would recognize as norm-generating social interaction. Such activities enhance
the legitimacy of animal protection norms and their ability to command adherence in a
way that mere imposition from the outside (or “naively exporting” them) cannot.
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8.9.2 The Criteria of Legality
Interactional theory argues that norms may emerge from a basis in shared
understandings, but they will not be in the distinctive subset legal norms unless they take
on specific characteristics associated with law. Those characteristics are what Fuller
described as the criteria of legality.178
Chapter Four summarized the existing and emerging examples of global animal
law in treaties and other international legal practices. There are international animal
protection norms that exhibit some, even most, of the criteria of legality. But the case for
global animal law as law is weak when it comes to what Fuller called the criterion of
congruence of official action with declared rules.179 Put simply, there may be rules on
paper, but international actors often do not follow them. Another area of weakness is that
law must not require more of those subject to it than is possible for them to perform.
Some international actors, particularly developing countries with limited resources, may
not realistically be able to live up to aspirational animal protection norms, at least not
without help.
The animal protection norms in PTAs may go some way to remedying both of
these deficiencies. To the extent that animal protection principles in international law fail
to exhibit the criteria of legality, they fall short of being legitimate law that commands
adherence. If PTAs and the practice of legality around them can supplement the
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deficiencies, then they are making an indispensable contribution to the development of
global animal law as real law.
8.9.2.1

The Congruence Criterion

The biggest weakness of global animal law is that it falls short on the criterion of
congruence of official action with declared rules. Lack of enforcement and widespread
noncompliance undermine the status of law as law. As discussed in Chapter Four, the
animal welfare requirements of CITES may not really be law in the sense of interactional
theory (despite near-global commitment to them as a formal matter) because of pervasive
failure to comply with them.180 The Environment Chapter of the CPTPP, and parallel
provisions in other PTAs that draw from the same common pool of norms and legal
templates, could change that. Under the CPTPP, failure to implement CITES obligations
is potentially a matter for dispute resolution and trade sanctions: an enforcement
mechanism with teeth. It remains to be seen whether compliance will actually improve as
a result, but the possibility should not be discounted.
If in the future trade agreements include comprehensive animal welfare chapters,
as Eurogroup for Animals proposes for the EU’s trade agreements, then persistent failure
to enforce domestic animal welfare standards could also become actionable through trade
dispute resolution processes, promoting better compliance and the development of more
robust legal norms.
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8.9.2.2

The Possibility Criterion

Fuller argued that a law cannot really be a law if it demands what is impossible to
perform.181 PTAs may augment the extent to which animal protection obligations exhibit
this characteristic of law, through their mechanisms for cooperation and capacitybuilding. Lurié and Kalinina’s account of working for better sea turtle protection in the
Dominican Republic emphasizes that funding, public information and shared expertise
through cooperative frameworks were essential in making it a real possibility for officials
in the Dominican Republic to implement their domestic law in accordance with their
international obligations under CAFTA-DR.
8.9.3 PTAs as a Practice of Legality
The negotiation, drafting, and implementation of PTAs amount to a quintessential
practice of legality, involving the negotiation and expression of agreed norms in a
characteristically legal form. The interactional concept of articulation of norms through a
practice of legality is more a holistic than a linear one. PTA norms are based on existing
shared understandings, but interaction through PTA practice disseminates, strengthens,
and reshapes those shared understandings.
The institutional mechanisms of PTAs create settings that are conducive to
interaction between participants in epistemic communities, government officials, and
members of the public – the kind of environment that fosters the growth of norms based
on shared understandings. Kerr describes the CPTPP as having a “dialogic quality” that
“decentralizes compliance management across national boundaries and outside of state
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actors.”182 His description is reminiscent of Brunnée’s characterization of a practice of
legality as a “range of practices through which all participants in the international legal
system demonstrate adherence to [a] norm as well as support its legality.”183 This
suggests that modern PTAs, and especially MRTAs, have created a potentially powerful
engine for driving the development of global animal protection norms through a practice
of legality.
The overview of global animal law in Chapter Four portrays an intellectually
fertile area of emerging norms, with flourishing scholarly activity and active NGO
advocacy. The weakness of such activities is that they do not necessarily translate into
law. The mechanisms for interaction, participation and dialogue in PTAs create
opportunities for the ideas of global animal law to take concrete shape in influencing
policy, official actions, and the emergence and widespread support of legal norms.

8.10

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed developments on animal protection in PTAs, with the
main focus being on the Environment Chapter of the CPTPP. I have evaluated these
initiatives as part of a process of formation of legal norms on animal protection that meet
the criteria set out in Brunnée and Toope’s interactional theory of international law.
On the whole, these are promising developments for global animal law. PTAs
provide something that the WTO does not (and seems unlikely to in the near future): an
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avenue for creating positive international obligations concerning animal protection, rather
than just negative space where parties are permitted to choose their preferred level of
animal protection in their own territories. Mechanisms in PTAs including meaningful
enforcement and participation infrastructure exhibit some of the hallmarks of practices of
legality. These are places where truly global, truly legal animal protection norms could
start to emerge, based on robust shared understandings, exhibiting the characteristics of
law – including, importantly, meaningful enforceability and compliance – and elaborated
through a practice of legality. Lurié and Kalinina argue that this type of practice under
PTAs is “changing the way that governments and civil society think about wildlife
conservation and animal welfare,” and they express hope that “this groundswell of
enthusiasm for the protection of wild animals will inspire negotiators to include
meaningful protections for animals beyond the environment provisions.184
In case this assessment seems naively optimistic, some caveats should be added.
First of all, what exists in PTAs so far is almost entirely the potential for the formation of
animal-protective legal norms, not mature international animal law already formed.
There is no treaty text that expressly sets out detailed animal welfare obligations and
mechanisms for implementing and enforcing those obligations, along the lines of the
provisions Eurogroup for Animals has proposed for EU trade treaties. What we have
instead is mainly hints and implications about animal protection that motivated advocates
have managed to discern in the environmental provisions of PTAs.
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Institutional structures like the public participation mechanisms under CAFTADR and the CPTPP are important, and they offer animal advocates an unprecedented
opportunity to speak up for animal interests in the trade arena. There are new channels to
talk. There is still, as Kerr puts it, the risk that no one will listen.
Perhaps more concerning than these deficiencies is the fundamental tension
between liberalized trade and animal protection that is discussed in the Introduction to
this thesis. We cannot ignore the risk that, all other things being equal, the more PTAs
succeed in furthering their central purpose of increasing trade and economic activity, the
worse the overall situation of animals will be, especially to the extent that trade in
animals and animal products increases.185
The most important practical conclusion from this chapter is that advocates for
animals have the opportunity to affect what happens next. MRTAs with modern
environmental provisions and mechanisms for citizen involvement are spreading. Some
animal advocates may still be suspicious of trade agreements and may consider their
environmental provisions to be just a public relations exercise. But we should not allow
the perfect to be the enemy of the good, or even to be the enemy of the very slightly
better than the status quo. There is a new way for the interests of animals to be
represented in the development of international legal norms, and the animals need every
opportunity for representation they can get.
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Chapter 9

Conclusion

Global animal law scholars have made a convincing case that animals need
effective transnational laws to protect them. The growth of global activities that affect
animals has made a governance gap, with a lack of global rules and oversight to regulate
those activities.1 In Sabine Brels’s words, “[i]n a globalized world, animal protection
must be globalized.”2
Domestic law, which is weak anyway on animal protection, cannot adequately
respond to the many international challenges in animal protection. It is not equipped to
handle global animal protections such as those covered in this thesis: the killing of marine
animals as fisheries by-catch, an internationally expanding factory farming industry,
illegal trafficking in wildlife, shark finning, and many others.
The increasing integration of the global economy through liberalized trade is one
of the causes of this governance gap. The legal structures and institutions that regulate
international trade may make possible innovative solutions to fill the gap. As discussed
in Chapter Five, international trade law, as law, is not based solely on a rationale of
economic efficiency. According to the theory of comparative advantage, it would be
economically efficient to get rid of trade barriers unilaterally, without any framework of
reciprocal legal obligations or governance. International trade law is about the infusion
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of global economic integration with rule-of-law principles. To echo Pauwelyn, there is
more to life than money, and trade is “an instrument to achieve nobler goals.”3
As the need for effective global animal law grows more acute, practices of
legality in the trade-law arena are a promising place to look for signs of its emergence.
This is somewhat surprising given the traditional (and far from unfounded) hostility of
animal advocates to the project of trade liberalization. But, as the cases and examples
covered in this thesis demonstrate, the institutions of international trade are not blind to
the governance deficits that globalization creates. They have responded in some creative
and progressive ways, with real potential to improve animal protection through global
cooperation.
Global animal law scholarship has also generated a rich account of what
transnational law for the protection of animals would look like – and does look like,
where it already exists. Fundamentally, it is grounded in the philosophical insights of the
“animal turn.”4 These are most importantly the recognition of animal sentience, the
intrinsic moral significance of animals as individuals and fellow creatures, and the ethical
implications that follow for regulating human conduct.
A hallmark of global animal law is its holistic understanding of animal protection
that leaves behind the traditional bifurcation between conservation of animal species as
resources for human use and enjoyment, and the ethical imperatives that ground legal
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protection for animal welfare.5 Global animal law reflects an integrated worldview,
understanding the “the major interconnections between animals, humans, and the planet”
and seeing the legal protection of all these components as part of a broader movement for
justice.6
Chapter Four outlined some of the places where the elements of global animal law
are already manifested in international law, including provisions on wildlife welfare in
conservation treaties, and initiatives to adopt international statements that animal welfare
matters globally. But advocates for a strong and effective legal framework of global
protection for animals are well aware of the deficiencies of the law that exists now.
International animal protection law “is still in its very early stages.”7 The glimpses of a
global animal law sensibility that can be discerned in international law remain
fragmented, thin, uncoordinated, and expressed at a high level of generality.8
I have applied Brunnée and Toope’s theory of interactional international law9 here
to bring out more specifically what is missing in global animal law, as it currently exists,
when measured against the characteristics it would need to have to emerge as real law, in
the sense that interactional theory understands it. The central question for interactional
theory is what makes international law legitimate.10 What makes global society arrive at
a consensus that norms have the authority of law, and that they are important and
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legitimate enough to command adherence? The answer, according to interactional
theory, is that they must be grounded in shared understandings, they must exhibit the
criteria of legality, and they must be articulated, developed, supported and applied
through a practice of legality. To the extent that these elements are lacking for the
principles of global animal law, then no matter how desirable or morally right we might
think those principles are in the abstract, they will continue not to achieve very much in
practice.
Interactional theory also helps to shed more light on why the trade law arena can
be a place to develop GAL in a way that builds up the features of interactional law. The
trade law regime is the site of robust international practices of legality. The most
important of these is the adjudication process at the WTO. Also, in modern preferential
trade agreements, new and intriguing practices of legality are taking shape, as described
in Chapter Eight. In addition to the process of negotiating trade rules and rules on tradelinked governance matters (including the protection of wild animals in a number of
contexts), there are structures for information-seeking, participation and oversight that
could support collaborative approaches to animal protection, and to some extent already
have done.
Such mechanisms and fora for negotiating, articulating and applying specific
norms on animal protection are one of the most important ingredients that global animal
law has been missing so far. Much of what constitutes global animal law today consists
of hortatory words and statements of abstract principle. It is in the process of interaction
in the context of a practice of legality that difficult compromises are hammered out,
consensus positions are identified, and concrete rules are written and implemented.
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This thesis has set out a detailed account of how practices of legality in the trade
context are helping to shape international animal protection norms as legal norms that fit
the criteria of interactional theory.
The GATT and WTO disputes before EC – Seal Products,11 reviewed in Chapter
Six, recognized the importance of animal protection as a legitimate policy objective
domestically and as a matter with global significance. The cases, especially US-Tuna
III,12 exhibit tentative moves towards an approach that sees conservation and welfare as
holistic and integrated, and animal wellbeing as a valid justification for regulation that
affects trade.
EC – Seal Products, discussed in Chapter Seven, is a much more significant
landmark. It is important not only because of the WTO panel’s endorsement of animal
welfare is “an ethical responsibility for human beings in general” and “a globally
recognized issue.”13 An at least equally important aspect of the case is that the WTO
dispute settlement body held animal protection principles to a tough standard of
legitimacy, insisting that difficult cultural clashes over welfare and traditional animal-use
practices could not be sidestepped through a “strategy of avoidance”14 (in Kymlicka and

11
European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products (Complaints by Canada and Norway) (2013), WTO Docs WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R,
WT/DS400/R/Add1, WT/DS401/R/Add1 (Panel Report) [EC – Seal Products Panel Report], as modified
by European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products
(Complaints by Canada and Norway) (2014) WT/DS401/AB/R (Appellate Body Report).
12
United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products (2011), WT/DS381/R (Panel Report), as modified by United States – Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (2012), WT/DS381/AB/R (Appellate Body
Report).
13
EC – Seal Products Panel Report, supra note 11 at paras 7.409, 7.420.
14
Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson. “Animal Rights and Aboriginal Rights” in Peter Sankoff,
Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes, eds, Canadian Perspectives on Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin, 2015)
159.
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Donaldson’s term) that introduced incoherence and arbitrariness into the EU’s law on
trade in seal products.
The new structures for global governance in MRTAs go further. Here, unlike in
WTO law, there are affirmative obligations to protect animals that are part of the legal
regime. The emphasis is on environmental conservation, but environmental
commitments like those in the CPTPP Environment Chapter also exhibit elements of the
holistic sensibility and ethical orientation that are the hallmarks of global animal law.
More globalization may mean more suffering for animals. But, as Peter Singer
and Miyun Park have argued, it does not have to.15 At the same time that global trade in
animals and animal products is increasing, their welfare is becoming recognized as a
matter of international concern.16 Globalization makes it difficult to ignore the need for
international cooperation to mitigate the worst harms of animal exploitation and to
protect animals. Globalization, in particular the evolution of transnational forms of
governance and law, can also provide the tools that are needed to build effective global
animal law. The international trade regime is an important part of this picture. It can be
the crucible for developing the consensus-based, concrete, workable and enforceable
animal protection principles that so far are mostly absent at the global level.
Perhaps most importantly of all, there are opportunities here for animal advocates
and proponents of global animal law to shape what happens next. Trade law is not, of
course, the only or even the most important international arena where international legal

15

Miyun Park & Peter Singer. “The Globalization of Animal Welfare: More Food Does Not
Require More Suffering” (2012) 91:2 Foreign Affairs 122.
16
Ibid.
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protection for animals can evolve. The analysis set out here suggests three important
conclusions that may inform future efforts on this front. First, international trade law
does not necessarily block the development of progress on animal protection at the
international level, as critics like Peter Stevenson once feared.17 Second, international
law that protects animals can be more effective – and more grounded in an ongoing
practice of legality – if linked to meaningful accountability mechanisms (including in the
form of trade sanctions) and cooperation frameworks, as the example of new trade
agreements with linked positive environmental obligations illustrates.18 And finally,
environment side chapters in new trade agreements like the CPTPP include potentially
useful tools, such as the ability to request information and to initiate complaints, that may
prove useful to animal advocates – both in bringing about practical changes that help
animals, and in enabling ongoing international interactions concerning principles of
animal protection.

17
18

See discussion of these concerns in Section 2.2.
See discussion in Chapter Eight.
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